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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : LANDING/DECELERATION-LGC FMEA NO 02-1A -078 -1 REV:09/19/88

ASSEMBLY :NOSE LANDING GEAR (NLG)

P/N RI :MC621-0012

P/N VENDOR:1170850 MENASCO

QUANTITY :1

:ONE ASSEMBLY

VEHICLE

REDUNDANCY SCREEN:

CRIT. 102 103

HDW: 104

CRIT. FUNC:

EFFECTIVITY: Х X Х PHASE(S): PL LO 00 DO LS X

PREPARED BY:

R. A. GORDON

APPROVED BY: DES

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APPROVED BY MASA !!

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DES

J. S. MULLEN W. J. SMITH

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ITEM:

NOSE LANDING GEAR LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY

FUNCTION:

LINKAGE THAT LOCKS THE SHOCK STRUT AND DRAG BRACE INTO POSITION.

FAILURE MODE:

STRUCTURAL FAILURE

CAUSE(S):

OVERLOAD, DEFECTIVE PART/MATERIAL.

EFFECT(S) ON:

- (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE
- (A) LOSS OF LOAD CARRYING CAPABILITY.
- (B) DAMAGE TO VEHICLE STRUCTURE.
- (C,D) PROBABLE LOSS OF MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE IF NOSE GEAR COLLAPSES.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A) DESIGN

DESIGNED TO FATIGUE LOAD SPECTRUM FOR LANDING, TAXI, AND GROUND HANDLING CONDITIONS. DESIGNED TO LANDING IMPACT LOADS (SPIN-UP AND SPRING BACK INCLUDING CROSSWIND DRIFT CONDITIONS) USING A MINIMUM SAFETY FACTOR OF 1.0 TO YIELD STRENGTH OF MATERIAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED CRITER FOR COMMERCIAL/MILITARY AIRCRAFT. DESIGNED TO A MINIMUM SAFETY FACTOR (1.4 FOR TAXI AND GROUND HANDLING LOADS FOR 32K AND 65K PAYLOAD CONFIGURATIONS. MATERIAL PROCESSES BARE PARTS NOT EXPOSED TO CORROSIVE ACID ENVIRONMENT IN PLATING SHOP MORE THAN 30 DAYS AND PARTS SHOT PEENE: AFTER MACHINE OPERATIONS TO PREVENT STRESS CORROSION ON 300 M MATERIALS

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(B) TEST

QUALIFICATION TESTS:

CERTIFICATION INCLUDES ULTIMATE STRENGTH TEST, SHOCK STRUT DROP TESTS, STATIC LOADS TEST, DYNAMIC TESTS AND 400 DEPLOYMENT CYCLES. THE LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY WAS CERTIFIED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE NLG/MI MECHANISM INSTALLATION (LANDING GEAR OPERATION) - 32 CYCLES OF THE LANDING GEAR DURING ALT, 15 DEVELOPMENT CYCLES AND 353 QUALIFICATION LICYCLES FOR A TOTAL OF 400 CYCLES. (THE LANDING GEAR WAS CYCLED FROM UF AND LOCKED TO DOWN AND LOCKED EACH TIME).

HIGH TEMP TESTS; 3 CYCLES AT 140 DEG F COLD TEMP TESTS; 3 CYCLES AT -35 DEG F TO -40 DEG F

THE LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY WAS ALSO TESTED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE NLG SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY DURING DROP TESTS - TEN DROP TESTS WERE PERFORMED TO SATISFY THE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY. MAXIMUM VERTICAL LOAD WAS 109,400 LBS. MAXIMUM SINK SPEED WAS 13.6 FPS.

FATIGUE LOAD SPECTRUM TESTS WERE CONDUCTED FOR LANDING, LANDING ROLLOUT BRAKING AND TURNING LOAD CONDITIONS - THE STRUT WAS SUBJECTED TO CYCLIC APPLICATION OF VERTICAL, FORE/AFT AND SIDE LOADS IN EACH CONDITION.

ACCEPTANCE TESTS: ACCEPTANCE INCLUDES VERIFICATION THAT CERTIFIED MATERIALS AND PROCESSES WERE USED. ACCEPTANCE TESTS ALSO VERIFY DIMENSIONS, WEIGHTS AND FINISHES.

OMRSD: NLG ZONAL DETAIL VISUAL INSPECTION; THE LOCK BRACE IS INSPECTED FOR CONDITION AND SECURITY.

FREQUENCY - ALL VEHICLES AT GROUND TURNAROUND.

(C) INSPECTION

RECEIVING INSPECTION

INSPECTION VERIFIES ALL RAW MATERIALS TO COMPLY WITH MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS THROUGH PERIODIC COUPON ANALYSIS.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

ALL CLEANLINESS LEVELS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

ALL MATERIALS PROCESSES VERIFIED BY MIP'S PRIOR TO NEXT MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS. TORQUE VALUES SPECIFIED ON DRAWINGS ARE VERIFIED AT THE TIMES ASSEMBLY LEVEL.

CRITICAL PROCESSES

INSPECTION VERIFIES HEAT TREATMENT AND SHOT PEENING PER MIL-S-13165.

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NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION
PENETRANT INSPECTION IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

TESTING ATP IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

PACKAGING/HANDLING HANDLING AND PACKAGING REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

- (D) FAILURE HISTORY NONE.
- (E) OPERATIONAL USE NONE

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