

ATTACHMENT
SSC 2001 19 067

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - OMS FMEA NO 05-6L -2136 -2 REV: 10/30/87

ASSEMBLY : APT PCA 1 & 2
P/N RI : MC455-0129-0001

CRIT. FUNC: 2R
CRIT. HDW: 3

P/N VENDOR:

VEHICLE 102 103 104

QUANTITY : 2

EFFECTIVITY: X X X

: TWO

PHASE(S): PL X LO X OO X DO LS

: (ONE PER HEATER GROUP)

PREPARED BY:

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS

DES D SOVEREIGN

APPROVED BY:

APPROVED BY (NASA):

REL F DEFENSOR

DES *D. S. Burns*

SSM *[Signature]*

QE J COURSEN

REL *[Signature]*

REL *[Signature]*

QE *[Signature]*

QE *[Signature]*

EPD&C 33M (1) Component 4.2 Stage

ITEM:

RELAY, GENERAL PURPOSE, 12 AMPS, 4 POLES - OMS CROSSFEED LINE HEATER POWER CIRCUIT.

FUNCTION:

UPON RECEIVING A STIMULUS FROM THE ASSOCIATED PANEL SWITCH, THE RELAY OPERATES TO CONNECT OR DISCONNECT MAIN BUS POWER TO VARIOUS OMS CROSSFEED LINE HEATER GROUPS. 54V76A131K2. 55V76A132K3.

FAILURE MODE:

INADVERTENT OPERATION, INADVERTENTLY CLOSING, SHORTS.

CAUSE(S):

PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK.

EFFECT(S) ON:

(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY

(A) ENERGIZES HYBRID DRIVER POWER INPUTS AND ENABLES OMS CROSSFEED LINE HEATER GROUPS.

(B) FIRST FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. BOTH SYSTEMS MAY BE OPERATED SIMULTANEOUSLY SINCE HEATERS ARE THERMALLY CONTROLLED AUTOMATICALLY BY TWO THERMAL SWITCHES (CONTROL AND OVER TEMPERATURE SWITCHES) IN ALL APPLICATIONS.

(C, D) FIRST FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT.

(E) POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO THE PREMATURE ENABLING OF CROSSFEED HEATERS, LEADING TO OVERHEATING. CROSSFEED LINE TEMPERATURE EXCEEDS ENGINE THERMAL LIMITS, NEXT PLS DEORBIT IS REQUIRED. REQUIRES TWO OTHER FAILURES (CONTROL THERMAL SWITCH FAILS CLOSED, OVER TEMPERATURE SWITCH FAILED CLOSED) BEFORE THE EFFECT IS MANIFESTED. FAILURE IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT DUE TO LACK OF MONITORING MEASUREMENTS.

05-6L-53

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM :EPD&C - OMS

FMEA NO 05-6L -2136 -2

REV:10/30/87

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HISTORY (E)OPERATIONAL USE

(A-D) FOR DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE

REFER TO APPENDIX C, ITEM NO. 2 - RELAY, GENERAL PURPOSE.

(B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

V43CA0.020 - CROSSFEED AND HIGH POINT BLEED HEATER CIRCUIT VERIFICATION:
PERFORMED FOR FIRST FLIGHT AND ON CONTINGENCY BASIS (LRU RETEST).
FUNCTIONAL CHECKOUT OF HEATER CONTROL CIRCUITS PER FIGURE V43CA0.020-1.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

NO ACTION FOR FIRST FAILURE - NOT DETECTABLE. IF ENTIRE STRING FAILS,
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION IS REQUIRED.