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PRINT DATE: 09/01/83

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) - CRITICAL HARDWARE  
NUMBER: 05-6N-2035-X**

**SUBSYSTEM NAME: EPD&C - AUXILIARY POWER UNIT**

**REVISION: 1 08/30/83**

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	<b>PART NAME VENDOR NAME</b>	<b>PART NUMBER VENDOR NUMBER</b>
LRU	: PANEL R2	V070-730277
SRU	: SWITCH, TOGGLE	ME452-0102-7253

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**PART DATA**

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**EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:  
SWITCH, TOGGLE, 2 POLE 3 POSITION - AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) START  
INJECTOR COOL CONTROL CIRCUIT**

**REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: 32V73A2S16  
32V73A2S17  
32V73A2S18**

**QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 3  
THREE**

**FUNCTION:  
PROVIDES START/RUN, INJECTOR COOL COMMAND TO APU CONTROLLER.**

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) - CRITICAL FAILURE MODE  
NUMBER: 05-6N-2035-01**

REVISION# 1 08/30/93

SUBSYSTEM NAME: EPD&C - AUXILIARY POWER UNIT

LRU: PANEL R2

CRITICALITY OF THIS

ITEM NAME: SWITCH, TOGGLE

FAILURE MODE: 1R2

**FAILURE MODE:**

FAILS OPEN, SHORT-TO-CASE (GROUND)

**MISSION PHASE:**

PL	PRELAUNCH
LO	LIFT-OFF
DO	DE-ORBIT
LS	LANDING SAFING

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:	102	COLUMBIA
	103	DISCOVERY
	104	ATLANTIS
	105	ENDEAVOUR

**CAUSE:**

PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PROCESSING ANOMALY

**CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO**

REDUNDANCY SCREEN	A) PASS
	B) PASS
	C) PASS

**PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:**

A)

B)

C)

**- FAILURE EFFECTS -**

**(A) SUBSYSTEM:**

LOSS OF APU START/RUN AND INJECTOR COOL COMMAND

**(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):**

LOSS OF APU

**(C) MISSION:**

ABORT DECISION REQUIRED - LOSS OF ONE OF THREE APU'S

**(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):**

NO EFFECT ON LOSS OF FIRST APU

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CRITICAL FAILURE MODE  
NUMBER: 05-6N-2035-01

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:  
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER LOSS OF SECOND APU.

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-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

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(A) DESIGN:  
REFER TO APPENDIX A, ITEM NO. 1 - TOGGLE SWITCH

(B) TEST:  
REFER TO APPENDIX A, ITEM NO. 1 - TOGGLE SWITCH

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST - APU 1/2/3 CONTROLLER TEST THROUGH GROUND CONNECTION PERFORMED EVERY FLOW OR AFTER LRU RETEST OF APU ASSEMBLY, AFTER LRU RETEST OF CONTROLLER ASSEMBLY OR AFTER CIG RETEST.

(C) INSPECTION:  
REFER TO APPENDIX A, ITEM NO. 1 - TOGGLE SWITCH

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:  
REFER TO APPENDIX A, ITEM NO. 1 - TOGGLE SWITCH

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:  
REMAINING APU'S COMMANDED TO HIGH SPEED AND AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN IS INHIBITED TO PROTECT AGAINST NEXT FAILURE.

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- APPROVALS -

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EDITORIALLY APPROVED : RI  
EDITORIALLY APPROVED : JSC  
TECHNICAL APPROVAL : VIA CR

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9/7/93