SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM :EPD&C - COMM. & TRACK. FMEA NO 05-6PK-20115 -1 REV:12/9/97

ASSEMBLY :PNL R15
P/N RI :MC454-0026-2030
P/N VENDOR:
QUANTITY :1
:ONE
:

CRIT. FUNC: 2
CRIT. HDW: 2

VEHICLE EFFECTIVITY:	102	103	104
	X	X	X

PHASE(S): PL LO OO X DO LS

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A- B- C-

PREPARED BY:
DES R DAVIS
REL M ALVAREZ
QE J COURSEN

APPROVED BY:
DES 12/17/97
REL 12-18-97
QE

APPROVED BY (NASA):
SSM
REL
QE

ITEM:
CIRCUIT BREAKER C339, PORT FWD BAY CAMERA AND PAN/TILT.

FUNCTION:
PROVIDES +28VDC OVERCURRENT PROTECTION FROM MAIN BUS B TO PORT FWD BAY CAMERA AND PAN/TILT UNIT. 32VT3A15CB39.

FAILURE MODE:
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT, FAILS TO CLOSE.

CAUSE(S):
VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PROCESSING ANOMALY, STRUCTURAL FAILURE.

EFFECT(S) ON:
(A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (D)CREW/VEHICLE

(A,B) LOSS OF POWER TO PORT FWD BAY CAMERA AND PAN/TILT UNIT.

(C) LOSS OF CRITICAL VIDEO COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

(D) NO EFFECT.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:
(A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HISTORY (E)OPERATIONAL USE

(A,B,C,D) REFER TO APPENDIX D, ITEM #1, CIRCUIT BREAKER.

(B) TEST
GROUND TURNAROUND TEST - VERIFIES CCTV PAYLOAD BAY MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO. PERFORMED WHEN FLIGHT MANIFEST REQUIRES USE OF MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE
WHERE POSSIBLE, PROCEDURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED SO THEY CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT CCTV.