

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - COMM. & TRACK. FMEA NO 05-6PK-20210 -1 REV:12/9/87

ASSEMBLY : PNL R15  
 P/N RI : MC454-0026-2030  
 P/N VENDOR:  
 QUANTITY : 1  
 : ONE  
 :

VEHICLE	102	103	104
EFFECTIVITY:	X	X	X
PHASE(S):	PL	LO	CO X DO LS

CRIT. FUNC: 2  
 CRIT. HDW: 2

PREPARED BY:		REDUNDANCY SCREEN:	A-	B-	C-
DES	R DAVIS	APPROVED BY:			
REL	M ALVAREZ	DES	<i>[Signature]</i>	APPROVED BY (NASA):	
QE	J COURSEN	REL	<i>[Signature]</i>	SSM	<i>[Signature]</i>
		QE	<i>[Signature]</i>	REL	<i>[Signature]</i>
				QE	<i>[Signature]</i>

SSM *[Signature]* 1-21-88

ITEM:

CIRCUIT BREAKER CBS1, STBD FWD CAM/PAN TILT (STBD MANIPULATOR ARM).

FUNCTION:

PROVIDES +28VDC OVERCURRENT PROTECTION FROM MAIN BUS A TO STBD FWD CAMERA AND PAN TILT UNIT. 32V73A15CBS1.

FAILURE MODE:

FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT, FAILS TO CLOSE.

CAUSE(S):

VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PROCESSING ANOMALY, STRUCTURAL FAILURE.

EFFECT(S) ON:

- (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE
- (A, B) LOSS OF POWER TO STBD FWD CAMERA AND PAN/TILT UNIT.
- (C) LOSS OF CRITICAL VIDEO COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
- (D) NO EFFECT.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A, B, C, D) REFER TO APPENDIX D, ITEM #1, CIRCUIT BREAKER.

(B) TEST

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST - CCTV ELBOW CAMERA VERIFICATION. PERFORMED WHEN ELBOW CAMERA IS INSTALLED PER FLIGHT MANIFEST.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

WHERE POSSIBLE, PROCEDURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED SO THEY CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT CCTV.