

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - COMM. & TRACK. FMEA NO 05-6PK-20215 -2 REV: 12/9/87

ASSEMBLY : PNL A7A1
P/N RI : ME452-0102-7105
P/N VENDOR:
QUANTITY : 1
: ONE
: :

VEHICLE	102	103	104
EFFECTIVITY:	X	X	X
PHASE(S):	PL LO	OO X DO	LS

CRIT. FUNC: 2
CRIT. HDW: 2

PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY: REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A- B- C-
DES *REL* R DAVIS DES *REL* APPROVED BY (NASA):
REL *Ma* M ALVAREZ REL *REL* SSM *REL*
QE J COURSEN QE *REL* RT *REL* SSN *Ma B line 121-88*

ITEM:
SWITCH, TOGGLE, SPOT TV CAMERA PAN COMMAND, POSITIONS ARE LEFT-CTR-RIG:
(MOMENTARY).

FUNCTION:
THE MOMENTARY LEFT POSITION PROVIDES A SIGNAL TO THE RCU WHICH COMMANDS
THE PAN/TILT UNIT OF THE ASSIGNED CAMERA TO ROTATE LEFT. THE SWITCH
RETURNS TO THE CENTER (CTR) POSITION UPON RELEASE AND STOPS CAMERA
MOTION. THE MOMENTARY RIGHT POSITION SIGNALS THE RCU WHICH COMMANDS TO
PAN/TILT UNIT OF THE ASSIGNED CAMERA TO ROTATE RIGHT. 36V73A7A1S44.

FAILURE MODE:
FAILS CLOSED, PREMATURE CLOSED, SHORT TO GROUND, CONTACT TO CONTACT
SHORT.

CAUSE(S):
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PROCESSING ANOMALY, POOR
PART FAILURE.

EFFECT(S) ON:
(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE
(A, B) LOSS OF PANEL CONTROL FOR THE PAN FUNCTION.
(C) LOSS OF MISSION CRITICAL VIDEO RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
(D) NO EFFECT.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:
(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE
(A, B, C, D) REFER TO APPENDIX A, ITEM #1, TOGGLE SWITCH.
(B) TEST
GROUND TURNAROUND TEST - VERIFY TV CAMERA PAN CONTROL FROM THE DE
PANEL - PERFORMED TO SUPPORT FLIGHT MANIFEST.

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(E) OPERATIONAL USE

WHERE POSSIBLE, PROCEDURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED SO THEY CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT CCTV.