

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - COMM. & TRACK. FMEA NO 03-6PK-20219 -1 REV: 12/9/87

ASSEMBLY : PNL A7A1						CRIT. FUNC: 2
P/N RI : ME432-0102-7201						CRIT. HDW: 2
P/N VENDOR:		VEHICLE	102	103	104	
QUANTITY : 1		EFFECTIVITY:	X	X	X	
: CNE		PHASE(S):	FL	LD	OO X DO	LS
:						

PREPARED BY:		REDUNDANCY SCREEN:	A-	B-	C-
DES <i>[Signature]</i>	R DAVIS	APPROVED BY:	APPROVED BY (NASA):		
REL <i>[Signature]</i>	M ALVAREZ	DES <i>[Signature]</i> 12/17/87	SEM	<i>[Signature]</i>	
QE	J COURSEN	REL <i>[Signature]</i> 12-18-87	REL	<i>[Signature]</i>	
		QE <i>[Signature]</i>	QE	<i>[Signature]</i>	

55m in B case 1-21-88

ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE, DPDT, KEEL TV CAMERA POWER, POSITIONS ARE ON-OFF.

FUNCTION: THE ON POSITION ENABLES POWER TO THE KEEL TV CAMERA. THE OFF POSITION DISABLES POWER (STED RMS WRIST ELBOW). 16V73A7A1S53.

FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN, PREMATURE OPEN.

CAUSE(S): VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PROCESSING ANOMALY, PIECE PART FAILURE.

EFFECT(S) ON:

- (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE
- (A, B) LOSS OF PANEL CONTROL FOR POWER TO THE KEEL TV CAMERA.
- (C) POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES DUE TO LOSS OF CRITICAL VIDEO.
- (D) NO EFFECT

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

- (A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE
- (A, B, C, D) REFER TO APPENDIX A, ITEM #1, TOGGLE SWITCH.
- (B) TEST
GROUND TURNAROUND TEST - VERIFY KEEL TV CAMERA SELECTION FROM THE D & C PANEL. PERFORMED TO SUPPORT FLIGHT MANIFEST.
- (E) OPERATIONAL USE
WHERE POSSIBLE, PROCEDURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED SO THEY CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT CCTV.