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PRINT DATE: 05/30/90

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CRITICAL HARDWARE

NUMBER: 05-6VE-2101-X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: EPD&C - ECLSS - WASTE WATER MANAGEMENT

REVISION : 2 05/30/90

	PART NAME VENDOR NAME	PART NUMBER VENDOR NUMBER
LRU :	PANEL ML868	VS70-733902
SRU :	CIRCUIT BREAKER	MC454-0026-2030

PART DATA

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:
CIRCUIT BREAKER (3 AMP) - WASTE WATER DUMP ISOLATION VALVE

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: 80V73A130 CB17

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 1
ONE PER VALVE
ONE PER VEHICLE

FUNCTION:
PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION BETWEEN MAIN BUS AND WASTE WATER DUMP
ISOLATION VALVE.

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NUMBER: 05-6VE-2101-01

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C - ECLSS - WASTE WATER MANAGEMENT REVISION# 2 05/30/90 R
LRU :PANEL ML86B
ITEM NAME: CIRCUIT BREAKER CRITICALITY OF THIS FAILURE MODE:2/2

FAILURE MODE:
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT, FAILS TO CLOSE

MISSION PHASE:
00 ON-ORBIT

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY: 102 COLUMBIA
: 103 DISCOVERY
: 104 ATLANTIS

CAUSE:
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
VIBRATION, PROCESSING ANOMALY

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN A) N/A
B) N/A
C) N/A

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:
A)
B)
C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:
LOSS OF POWER TO WASTE WATER DUMP ISOLATION VALVE

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPEN/CLOSE WASTE WATER DUMP ISOLATION VALVE. IF
VALVE IS CLOSED THE ABILITY TO DUMP THE WASTE TANK IS LOST.

(C) MISSION:
MISSION DURATION MAY BE LIMITED BECAUSE OF THE INABILITY TO DUMP
WASTE WATER.

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(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):
NO EFFECT.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

- DISPOSITION RATIONALE -

(A) DESIGN:
REFER TO APPENDIX D, ITEM NO. 1 - CIRCUIT BREAKER.

(B) TEST:
REFER TO APPENDIX D, ITEM NO. 1 - CIRCUIT BREAKER.

VALVE OPERATION VERIFIED IN FLIGHT EVERY FLOW.

(C) INSPECTION:
REFER TO APPENDIX D, ITEM NO. 1 - CIRCUIT BREAKER.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:
REFER TO APPENDIX D, ITEM NO. 1 - CIRCUIT BREAKER.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:
FOR DUMP ISOLATION VALVE FAILED CLOSED, RETURN TO PRIMARY LANDING SITE BEFORE THE WASTE TANK BECOMES HARD FILLED. FOR DUMP ISOLATION VALVE FAILED OPENED, NO CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED.

- APPROVALS -

- RELIABILITY ENGINEERING: D. ANVARI
- RELIABILITY SUPERVISOR : M. HOVE
- DESIGN ENGINEERING : J. L. PECK
- DESIGN SUPERVISOR : G. ANDERSON
- QUALITY SUPERVISOR : J. COURSEN
- NASA RELIABILITY :
- NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER :
- NASA EPD&C RELIABILITY :
- NASA QUALITY ASSURANCE :
- NASA EPD&C SUBSYS. MGR :

: D.A.
 : Richard C. Hov 5-31-90
 : J. Peck
 : G. Anderson 5-31-90
 : J. Course 6-5-90
 : William G. Hov 6/15/90
 : William G. Hov 6-26-90
 : William G. Hov 6/15/90
 : William G. Hov
 : William G. Hov 6/15/90