

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL FMEA NO 06-3C -0201 -4 REV:08/23/8
ASSEMBLY : FREON THERMAL LOOP CRIT. FUNC: 1R
P/N RI : MC250-0001-0040/0540 CRIT. HDW: 2
P/N VENDOR: SV755517 VEHICLE 102 103 104
QUANTITY : 1 EFFECTIVITY: X X X
: ONE PER VEHICLE PHASE(S): PL LO X OO X DO X LS

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-PASS C-PASS
PREPARED BY: DES O. TRAN *OAS* APPROVED BY DES *[Signature]* APPROVED BY (NASAT): SSM *[Signature]*
REL D. RISING *DR* REL *[Signature]* REL *[Signature]*
QE W. SMITH *WS* QE *[Signature]* QE *[Signature]*

ITEM:
INTERCHANGER, WATER/FREON INTERFACE.

FUNCTION:
THE INTERCHANGER TRANSFERS CABIN WASTE HEAT FROM EITHER THE PRIMARY OR SECONDARY WATER COOLANT LOOPS TO THE FREON COOLANT LOOPS.

FAILURE MODE:
INTERNAL LEAKAGE, WATER TO WATER.

CAUSE(S):
CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION.

EFFECT(S) ON:
(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE
(A) TRANSFER OF COOLANT FROM ONE WATER LOOP TO THE OTHER UNTIL PRESSURE IN BOTH LOOPS IS EQUALIZED.
(B) NO EFFECT.
(C) POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION. EARLY MISSION TERMINATION FOR FIRST FAILURE.
(D) SECOND ASSOCIATED FAILURE (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF ONE WATER COOLANT LOOP) WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL CABIN COOLING AND MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:
(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A) DESIGN
THE INTERCHANGER IS MADE FROM STAINLESS STEEL AND NICKEL BRONZE ALLOYS, WHICH ARE CORROSION RESISTANT AND COMPATIBLE WITH FREON 21 AND WATER, AND CONTAINS NO MOVING PARTS SUBJECT TO WEAR. THE FLOW HEADERS ARE MACHINED FROM A SINGLE PIECE STAINLESS STEEL BAR. THE HEADERS ARE WELDED TO THE CORE, WHICH IS MADE OF STACKED PLATE-FIN STAINLESS STEEL PARTING SHEETS (THICKNESS = 0.005 INCH). DESIGN PROOF PRESSURE OF 1.5 AND BURST PRESSURE OF 2.0 TIMES MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE.

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(B) TEST

QUALIFICATION TEST - QUALIFICATION TESTED FOR 100 MISSION LIFE. THE INTERCHANGER WAS SUBJECTED TO A PROOF/RUPTURE TEST FOR QUALIFICATION. DESIGN PROOF IS 760 PSIG AND UNIT DID NOT RUPTURE UNTIL 2440 PSIG. (MAXIMUM WATER COOLANT LOOP OPERATING PRESSURE IS 90 PSIG). VIBRATION TESTED AT 0.075 G²/HZ FOR 52 MIN/AXIS, SHOCK TESTED AT +/- 20 G EACH AXIS.

ACCEPTANCE TEST - CORE IS LEAK TESTED PRIOR TO INSTALLING THE HEADERS AND AGAIN IN ATP.

OMRSD - WATER COOLANT LOOPS LEAK CHECKED PRIOR TO EACH FLIGHT. FLUID C CONTROLLED TO SE-S-0073.

(C) INSPECTION

RECEIVING INSPECTION

RAW MATERIAL AND PURCHASED COMPONENTS REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. PARTS PROTECTION IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

SYSTEMS FLUID ANALYSES FOR CONTAMINATION ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. CONTAMINATION CONTROL PLAN IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. CONTAMINATION CONTROL PROCESSES AND CLEAN AREAS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

MANUFACTURING, INSTALLATION, AND ASSEMBLY OPERATIONS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. SHEET METAL PARTS ARE INSPECTED AND VERIFIED BY INSPECTION SURFACE FINISHES VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. DIMENSIONS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CRITICAL PROCESSES

WELDING IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. ALL WELDS ARE STRESS RELIEVED AFTER WELDING, VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. BRAZING IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION

HEADER WELDS TO THE TUBES ARE PENETRANT AND X-RAY INSPECTED. OTHER WELDS (MOUNTING PADS AND HEADER WELDS TO THE CORES) ARE PENETRANT AND 10X MAGNIFICATION VISUALLY INSPECTED. BRAZES ARE VERIFIED BY PROOF AND LEAK TESTS.

TESTING

INSPECTION VERIFIES THAT RESULTS OF ACCEPTANCE TESTING AND FLOWRATES ARE WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS.

HANDLING/PACKAGING

HANDLING AND PACKAGING REQUIREMENTS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY

NO FAILURE HISTORY.

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(E) OPERATIONAL USE

GROUND CONTROLLER WILL IDENTIFY HARDWARE FAILURE. WATER PUMP INLET PRESSURES AND ACCUMULATOR QUANTITIES WILL CONVERGE. A LEAK IN EITHER WATER LOOP WILL CAUSE LOSS OF BOTH LOOPS. THEREFORE, FAILURE IS TREATED AS LOSS OF ONE WATER LOOP. ENTRY AT NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.