

10/28/87

INTRODUCTION TO APPENDIX F

THE FOLLOWING CHART SHOWS THE MODE TYPE VERSUS FAILURE MODES AND CAUSES WHICH WERE COMPLETED IN DERIVING THE FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA'S).

APPENDIX F ITEM NUMBER	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6
FAILURE MODE / Failure Cause	JANIX 1M1148R	JANIX 1M1204RA	JANIX 1M1246	JANIX 1M5551	JANIX 1M1148-1	JANIX 1M1247
OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT (a) Structural Failure Mechanical Stress Vibration (c) Electrical Stress (d) Thermal Stress (e) Processing Anomaly	X	X	X	X	X	X
SHORT (END TO END) (a) Structural Failure Mechanical Stress Vibration (b) Contamination (c) Electrical Stress (d) Thermal Stress (e) Processing Anomaly	X	X	X	X	X	X
SHORT TO STRUCTURE (GROUND) (a) Structural Failure Mechanical Stress Vibration (b) Contamination (c) Electrical Stress (d) Thermal Stress (e) Processing Anomaly	X	X				

TABLE 1

NOTE: RATIONALE IS PROVIDED FOR THE JANIX1M1148-1, A METALLURGICAL BOND DICER, WHICH HAS DEMONSTRATED ITSELF TO BE A RELIABLE PART ON THE ORBITER PROGRAM. THIS RATIONALE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO THE JANIX1M1148 (NO DASH ONE) WHICH HAS HAD A FAILURE HISTORY OF THERMAL COMPRESSION BOND FAILURES.

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APPENDIX F ITEM 5 - DIODE, AXIAL LEAD
JANTXVIN4148-1

RETENTION RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN, (B) TEST, (C) INSPECTION, (D) FAILURE HISTORY.

(A) DESIGN

THE PART IS A SILICON SEMICONDUCTOR DIODE. THE SILICON CHIP IS CONNECTED TO THE PART'S EXTERNAL TERMINALS UTILIZING A METALLURGICAL BONDING PROCESS. THE SILICON SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP IS ENCAPSULATED IN A MOLDED HERMETICALLY SEALED CASE (THE PART CASE IS NONCONDUCTIVE, THUS A SHORT TO CASE IS NOT CONSIDERED AS A FAILURE MODE). THE DEVICE IS DESIGNED, QUALIFIED, TESTED AND INSPECTED TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF MIL-S-19500/116. THE PART APPLICATION IS ANALYZED TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE 25% DERATING CRITERIA OF THE ORBITER PROJECTS PARTS LIST (OPPL). THIS ANALYSIS ASSURES PROPER ELECTRICAL AND THERMAL APPLICATION.

(B) TEST

THE PART IS SCREENED AND QUALIFIED TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF MIL-S-19500 /116. THE FOLLOWING TESTS ARE PERFORMED ON SAMPLE DEVICES REMOVED FROM EACH MANUFACTURING LOT TO DEMONSTRATE QUALIFICATION OF THE LOT:

TEST / INSPECTION	CAUSE CONTROL				
	a	b	c	d	e
SOLDERABILITY		X			X
RESISTANCE TO SOLVENTS	X				X
THERMAL CYCLING (175 TO -65 °C)	X			X	X
HERMETIC SEAL (1x10 ⁻⁸ CC/SEC)	X	X			X
ELECTRICAL FUNCTIONAL		X	X	X	X
OPERATIONAL LIFE (25 °C, 340 HR)	X	X	X	X	X
DESTRUCTIVE PHYSICAL ANALYSIS	X	X			X
THERMAL SHOCK (100 TO 0 °C)	X			X	X
TERMINAL STRENGTH	X				X
MOISTURE RESISTANCE	X				X
EXTERNAL VISUAL	X				X
SHOCK	X				X
VIBRATION	X				X
ACCELERATION (20,000-G)	X				X
SALT ATMOSPHERE (CORROSION)	X				X
OPERATIONAL LIFE	X				X
FINAL ELECTRICAL FUNCTIONAL	X	X	X	X	X

QUALIFICATION TESTS (LOT SAMPLE)

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APPENDIX F ITEM 5 CONT'D

TESTS AND INSPECTIONS PERFORMED ON ALL PARTS DEMONSTRATE PROCESSES AND CONTROLS ARE ADEQUATELY PROVIDING A RELIABLE PRODUCT:

TEST / INSPECTION	CAUSE CONTROL				
	a	b	c	d	e
INTERNAL VISUAL INSPECTION	X	X			X
HIGH TEMPERATURE LIFE	X			X	X
THERMAL CYCLING	X			X	X
ACCELERATION	X				X
HERMETIC SEAL	X	X			X
BURN-IN (175 °C, 96 HR)		X	X	X	X
ELECTRICAL FUNCTIONAL		X	X	X	X

QUALITY CONFORMANCE TESTS (ALL PARTS)

(C) INSPECTION

THE PART HAS REQUIRED INSPECTIONS DURING MANUFACTURING PROCESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF MIL-S-19500/116. IN ADDITION, THE PART SUPPLIER IS REQUIRED TO HAVE QUALITY CONTROL (QC) PRACTICES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF MIL-S-19500 APPENDIX D. THE REQUIREMENTS ARE TO ASSURE ADEQUATE PROCESS CONTROLS ARE IMPOSED BY THE PART SUPPLIER ON THE PARTS MANUFACTURING PROCESS. THE PROCESSES AND CONTROLS ARE ROUTINELY REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY THE QUALIFYING AGENCY (DEFENSE ELECTRONIC SUPPLY CENTER).

RECEIVING INSPECTION (FAILURE CAUSE b,c,e)

INSPECTION OF INCOMING MATERIALS, UTILITIES AND WORK-IN PROCESSES (WAFERS, PACKAGES, WIRE, WATER PURIFICATION) IS REQUIRED OF THE PART SUPPLIER.

CLEANLINESS CONTROL (FAILURE CAUSE b)

THE PART SUPPLIER IS REQUIRED TO HAVE CLEANLINESS AND ATMOSPHERE CONTROL IN CRITICAL WORK AREAS TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF FED-STD-209.

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APPENDIX F ITEM 5 CONT'D

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION (FAILURE CAUSE a,b,e)

THE PART SUPPLIER IS REQUIRED TO HAVE INSPECTION CRITERIA, FINAL LOT DISPOSITION AND RECORDS RETENTION. THE MANUFACTURER IS ALSO REQUIRED TO SUBMIT A PROGRAM PLAN ESTABLISHING A MANUFACTURING FLOW CHART, INTERNAL AUDIT ACTIVITIES AND EXAMPLES OF DESIGN, MATERIAL EQUIPMENT STANDARDS AND PROCESS INSTRUCTIONS FOR APPROVAL BY THE QUALIFYING AGENCY. THE SUPPLIER IS ALSO REQUIRED TO PERFORM A INTERNAL VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE DEVICE PRIOR TO FINAL PART SEAL.

CRITICAL PROCESSES (FAILURE CAUSE b,e)

THE PART SUPPLIER MUST HAVE REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLS ON MATERIALS PREPARATION (LAPPING, POLISHING, ETCHING, AND CLEANING); BONDING CRITERIA; REWORK CRITERIA; DIE ATTACHMENT AND SUPPORT; DESIGN, PROCESSING, MANUFACTURING, TESTING, AND INSPECTION DOCUMENTATION AND CHANGE CONTROL; PERSONNEL TRAINING; MASKING; PHOTORESIST REGISTRATION; OXIDATION OR PASSIVATION; METALLIZATION AND FILM DEPOSITION; SEALING PROCESSES, FAILURE / DEFECT ANALYSIS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION; AND INVENTORY CONTROL.

TESTING (FAILURE CAUSE a,c,d,e)

THE PART SUPPLIER MUST HAVE TEST EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE AND CALIBRATION CONTROLS WHICH HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY THE QUALIFYING AGENCY. SUPPLIER MUST ALSO MAINTAIN QUALITY CONTROL INSPECTION TEST DOCUMENTATION AND FINAL LOT DISPOSITION.

HANDLING/PACKAGING (FAILURE CAUSE a)

THE DEVICES ARE PACKAGED AND HANDLED TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF MIL-S-19491. THE SUPPLIER IS REQUIRED TO INCLUDE TRACEABILITY (PRODUCT LOT IDENTIFICATION).

(D) FAILURE HISTORY

FAILURE MODE: SHORT, OPEN

SHUTTLE PROGRAM PART FAILURE HISTORY INDICATES NO REPORTED FAILURES FOR THIS DEVICE TYPE. A REVIEW OF GIDEP PRIOR MILITARY PART FAILURE HISTORY REVEALS NO UNCORRECTED GENERIC ISSUES EXIST.

11/02/87 (8:42pm)

APPENDIX F ITEM 5 CONT'D

PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

APPROVED BY (NASA):

DESIGN
RELIABILITY
QUALITY

I. CHASE
M. HOVE
J. COURSEN

DES: I. Chase SSM W.C. Stearns 11/3/87
REL: M. Hove REL: W.C. Stearns
QE: J. Courson for Ridgeport QE: W.C. Stearns