

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) - CIL HARDWARE
NUMBER:M8-1SS-E046 -X**

SUBSYSTEM NAME: ECLSS - EMU OXYGEN RECHARGE SYSTEM

REVISION: 1 10/22/97

PART DATA

	PART NAME	PART NUMBER
	VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMBER
LRU	:LINES & FITTINGS	M072-643401
LRU	:LINES & FITTINGS	M072-643403
LRU	:LINES & FITTINGS	V828-643050
SRU	:LINES & FITTINGS MULTIPLE SOURCES	MULTIPLE P/N'S

**EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:
EMU OXYGEN RECHARGE LINES, FEEDTHRU'S, AND FITTINGS**

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 1
ONE SET PER SUBSYSTEM

FUNCTION:

THREE FUNCTIONS ARE INCLUDED IN THIS FMEA: (1) PROVIDES A SINGLE SUPPLY PATH OF OXYGEN FROM A MID DECK CONNECTION TO THE EXTERNAL AIRLOCK EMU ECLSS PANEL INTERFACE; (2) WITHIN THE ECLSS PANEL THE OXYGEN LINE SPLITS INTO TWO PATHS TO SUPPLY OXYGEN TO BOTH EMU INTERFACE MECHANICAL FITTINGS; AND (3) PROVIDES A SINGLE PATH OF OXYGEN FROM A TEE IN THE SINGLE EMU O2 LINE TO THE EXTERNALLY MOUNTED EVA MANUAL O2 SHUTOFF VALVE IN THE O2 TRANSFER LINE TO SPACE STATION.

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS: VS28-643001
V828-643050
V828-643051
M072-643403
M072-643416

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEA - CIL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: M8-1SS-E046-02

REVISION#: 0 04/08/97

SUBSYSTEM NAME: ECLSS - EMU OXYGEN RECHARGE SYSTEM

LRU: EMU OXYGEN SUPPLY LINES

CRITICALITY OF THIS

ITEM NAME: LINES, FEEDTHRU'S, & FITTINGS

FAILURE MODE: 1R2

FAILURE MODE:
RESTRICTED FLOW (CLOGGED)

MISSION PHASE: OO ON-ORBIT

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:	103	DISCOVERY
	104	ATLANTIS
	105	ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:
CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, EXCESSIVE VIBRATION

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN A) PASS
 B) N/A
 C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

N/A - REDUNDANCY IS IN STANBY UNTIL REQUIRED.

C)

METHOD OF FAULT DETECTION:

VISUAL OBSERVATION - INCREASED TIME IN FILLING EMU OXYGEN TANKS.

INSTRUMENTATION - EMU OXYGEN PRESSURE ANOMALY ON AWB2D PANEL PRESSURE GAUGE OR ON EMU ITSELF.

REMARKS/RECOMMENDATIONS:

A SINGLE PATH PROVIDES OXYGEN TO THE ECLSS PANEL. WITHIN THE ECLSS PANEL DUAL OXYGEN SUPPLY PATHS ARE PROVIDED TO SERVICE THE EMU'S. EACH EMU CONTAINS TWO PRIMARY AND TWO SECONDARY TANKS ALL OF WHICH ARE FILLED PRIOR TO LAUNCH. WORST CASE SCENARIO IS WHEN RESTRICTED OXYGEN FLOW

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OCCURS, ON THE SINGLE OXYGEN PATH, PRIOR TO FILLING ALL EMU'S FOLLOWING INITIAL EVA.

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

WORST CASE, REDUCED OR LOSS OF OXYGEN TO ALL EMU O2 MECHANICAL FITTINGS.

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

NO INITIAL EFFECT - LOSS OF OXYGEN SUPPLY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF EVA CAPABILITIES SUBSEQUENT TO FIRST EVA SINCE OXYGEN IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR BREATHING PURPOSES.

(C) MISSION:

NO INITIAL EFFECT. WORST CASE, LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM A SECOND PLANNED EVA DUE TO LOSS OF OXYGEN TO ALL EMU'S. LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES ASSOCIATED WITH PLANNED EVA'S SUBSEQUENT TO INITIAL EVA.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

NO EFFECT UNTIL FAILURE OCCURS AFTER INITIAL EVA. THEN, WORST CASE, INABILITY TO PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA TO CORRECT A POTENTIAL CRIT 1 EVENT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE. LOSS OF OXYGEN SUPPLY TO SPACE STATION FOLLOWING A SINGLE FAILURE.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

FIRST FAILURE (RESTRICTED FLOW OF OXYGEN) - WORST CASE IF FAILURE OCCURS ON SINGLE O2 PATH FOLLOWING AN INITIAL EVA. THEN LOSS OF OXYGEN FOR BREATHING PURPOSES WOULD PRECLUDE SUBSEQUENT EVA CAPABILITIES. OXYGEN SUPPLY TO SPACE STATION WOULD ALSO BE LOST FOLLOWING THIS FAILURE. CREW DECISION TO ABORT A SECOND PLANNED EVA WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES ASSOCIATED WITH THE PLANNED EVA - CRITICALITY 2/2 CONDITION. SECOND FAILURE (FAILURE NECESSITATING AN EVA TO PREVENT A POTENTIAL CATASTROPHIC SITUATION) - INABILITY TO PERFORM CONTINGENCY EVA TO CORRECT A CRIT 1 CONDITION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE - CRITICALITY 1R2 CONDITION.

DESIGN CRITICALITY (PRIOR TO DOWNGRADE, DESCRIBED IN (F)): 1R2

(F) RATIONALE FOR CRITICALITY DOWNGRADE:

THERE ARE NO WORKAROUNDS TO CIRCUMVENT A LOSS OF O2 SUPPLY TO EMU SERVICE PANEL AND ISS IF FAILURE OCCURS ON THE SINGLE PATH OF O2 FOLLOWING INITIAL EVA WHEN EMU O2 TANKS ARE EMPTY.

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- TIME FRAME -

TIME FROM FAILURE TO CRITICAL EFFECT: DAYS**TIME FROM FAILURE OCCURRENCE TO DETECTION: SECONDS****TIME FROM DETECTION TO COMPLETED CORRECTING ACTION: N/A****IS TIME REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT CORRECTING ACTION LESS THAN TIME TO EFFECT?
NO****RATIONALE FOR TIME TO CORRECTING ACTION VS TIME TO EFFECT:
THERE IS NO CORRECTIVE ACTION IF CREW DECIDES TO ABORT THE MISSION AS THE
RESULT OF THIS FAILURE.****HAZARD REPORT NUMBER(S): FF-00****HAZARD(S) DESCRIPTION:
INABILITY TO SAFELY PERFORM EVA.**

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:

A RIGID LINE EXTENDS FROM THE MID DECK THROUGH A 578 BULKHEAD FEEDTHRU TO THE MFG BREAK. A FLEX LINE EXTENDS FROM A MECHANICAL FITTING LOCATED AT THE MFG BREAK THROUGH AN EXTERNAL AIRLOCK FEEDTHRU TO THE ECLSS PANEL. WITHIN THE ECLSS PANEL, TWO RIGID LINES EXTEND FROM A TEE TO AN OXYGEN CONTROL VALVE AND FROM EACH OXYGEN CONTROL VALVE TO AN EMU FITTING/QUICK DISCONNECT. ANOTHER RIGID LINE EXTENDS FROM A TEE IN THE ECLSS PANEL EMU O2 LINE TO THE EVA MANUAL O2 SHUTOFF VALVE LOCATED EXTERNALLY TO THE EXTERNAL AIRLOCK.

LINES, FEEDTHRU'S, AND FITTINGS ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE CURRENTLY USED ON THE ORBITER AND EXTENSIVE FLIGHT EXPERIENCE TO DATE PROVIDES CONFIDENCE IN THEIR DESIGN INTEGRITY.

RIGID LINES ARE FABRICATED OF 21-6-9 STAINLESS STEEL WITH A THICKNESS OF 0.016 INCH. FITTINGS ARE DYNATUBES MADE OF 17-4 PH STAINLESS STEEL AND ARE BRAZED INTO THE SYSTEM. 21-6-9 STAINLESS STEEL HAS GOOD CORROSION RESISTANCE, HIGH MECHANICAL PROPERTIES, GOOD IMPACT STRENGTH, AND HIGH STRENGTH TO WEIGHT RATIO. 17-4 PH CONDITION A CRES IS PRECIPITATION HARDENED CORROSION RESISTANT STEEL WHICH HAS A HIGH STRENGTH TO WEIGHT RATIO. BOTH MATERIALS ARE COMPATIBLE WITH GO2. ALL COMPONENTS HAVE A SAFETY FACTOR GREATER THAN FOUR.

FLEXIBLE LINES ARE MADE OF 321 CRES AND 17-4 PH CRES RESPECTIVELY. BOTH OF THESE STAINLESS STEELS ARE CORROSION RESISTANCE AND O2 COMPATIBLE. THE LINE ASSEMBLIES ARE A COMBINATION OF HARDLINE AND FLEX JOINTS WHICH PERMIT CONTROLLED FLEXURES IN THE X, Y, AND Z DIRECTIONS. THE LINE ASSEMBLY, WHILE AT OPERATING PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE, CAN WITHSTAND 800 FLEXURE

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CYCLES IN EACH OF THE THREE ORTHOGONAL AXES WITHOUT LEAKAGE, IMPAIRMENT OR DEGRADATION OF PERFORMANCE.

(B) TEST:

ODS HARDWARE CERTIFIED BY SIMILARITY TO EXISTING ORBITER HARDWARE. ORBITER HARDWARE QUALIFICATION TESTING OF RIGID AND FLEXIBLE LINES IS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) RIGID LINES - PRETEST PROOF (2X OPERATING PRESSURE) AND EXTERNAL LEAK TEST (1 X 10 EXP -6 SCCS HE MAX), BURST TEST (BURST AT GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 4X OPERATING PRESSURE), IMPULSE FATIGUE TEST (TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND CYCLES OF IMPULSE WAVES), FLEXURE FATIGUE TEST (TEN MILLION CYCLES OF FLEXURE), RANDOM VIBRATION, POST TEST LEAK TEST (1 X 10 EXP -6 SCCS HE MAX). DYNATUBE COUPLINGS ARE AUTHORIZED BY RI SPEC MF0004-0100 "MECHANICAL - ORBITER PROJECT PARTS LIST".

(2) FLEXIBLE LINES - VIBRATION TESTING INCLUDES 48 MINUTES OF RANDOM VIBRATION IN EACH OF THE THREE ORTHOGONAL AXES OVER A FREQUENCY RANGE OF 20 TO 2000 HZ AT THE FOLLOWING INTENSITIES: 20 TO 150 HZ, 6 DB/OCTAVE RISE; 150 TO 900 HZ, CONSTANT AT 0.09 G**2/HZ; AND 900 TO 2000 HZ, 9 DB/OCTAVE DECREASE. FOLLOWING VIBRATION LINES SUBJECTED TO A PROOF PRESSURE TEST. DESIGN SHOCK: THREE SHOCK PULSES IN EACH DIRECTION OF THREE ORTHOGONAL AXES, EACH PULSE HAVING AN AMPLITUDE OF 20 G, A DURATION OF 11 MS, AND APPROXIMATED A TERMINAL PEAK SAWTOOTH SHAPE. TRANSIENT SHOCK TEST: WHILE PRESSURIZED LINES SUBJECTED TO ONE SINUSOIDAL SWEEP IN THREE ORTHOGONAL AXES OVER FREQUENCY RANGE OF 5 TO 35 HZ AT A SWEEP RATE OF ONE OCTAVE PER MINUTE AT AN APPLIED ACCELERATION OF 0.25G PEAK. BURST PRESSURE: CRYO O2 - 4200 PSIG, AUX O2 - 5000 PSIG.

ACCEPTANCE TEST (ORBITER O2 FLEXIBLE LINES) - CRYO O2: FLOW RATE OF 10 LB/HR. PROOF PRESSURE AT 2100 PSIG. AUXILIARY O2: FLOW 150 LB/HR, PROOF PRESSURE AT 2500 PSIG. MAX PRESSURE DROP AT OPERATING PRESSURE: CRYO O2 - 0.08 PSI. AUX O2 - 4.62 PSI.

IN-VEHICLE TESTING (ORBITER O2 RIGID/FLEX LINES, FEEDTHRU'S, FITTINGS) - FLOW LIMITER (RESTRICTOR) TEST VERIFIES THE REQUIRED FLOWRATE FROM THE PRSD O2 SYSTEM.

IN-PROCESS AND ACCEPTANCE TEST (EMU OXYGEN RECHARGE SYSTEM) - OXYGEN SYSTEM FLOWRATE PRESSURE TEST: FLOWRATE VERIFIED AT TP140/141 AND TP142/143 AND TO EXTERNAL AIRLOCK OD PANEL WHEN EMU 1 AND 2 OXYGEN SELECTOR VALVES ARE OPEN. FLOWRATE VERIFIED TO BE 200 PSIG MINIMUM FOR TWO MINUTES MINIMUM.

OMRSD - TURNAROUND CHECKOUT TESTING IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

(C) INSPECTION:

RECEIVING INSPECTION

RAW MATERIAL AND PROCESS CERTIFICATIONS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

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CONTAMINATION CONTROL
CORROSION PROTECTION PROVISIONS AND CONTAMINATION CONTROL PLAN ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. CLEANLINESS LEVEL 200A PER MA0110-301 PRIOR TO AND DURING OPERATIONS, 100 ML RINSE TEST VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION
FABRICATION OF PARTS/COMPONENTS PER DRAWING VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. DIMENSIONS AND TORQUES ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. MANUFACTURING PROCESSES, INSTALLATION AND ASSEMBLY ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION
RADIOGRAPHIC INSPECTION OF INDUCTION BRAZES VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CRITICAL PROCESSES
PARTS PASSIVATION AND ELECTRICAL BONDING APPLICATION VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. JOINT/TUBE BRAZING IS VERIFIED BY RADIOGRAPHIC INSPECTION. INERT ARC WELD APPLICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH MA0107-3 VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

TESTING
ATP/QTP/OMRSD TESTING VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.






HANDLING/PACKAGING
HANDLING, PACKAGING, STORAGE, AND SHIPPING PROCEDURES ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:
CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURES, FLIGHT FAILURES, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN PRACA DATA BASE.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:
SINCE EMU OXYGEN TANKS ARE FILLED PRIOR TO LAUNCH, CREW COULD UTILIZE AN EMU THAT CONTAINS A SUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF OXYGEN TO PERFORM AN EVA.

- APPROVALS -

SS & PAE	:	M. W. GUENTHER	:
PAE MANAGER	:	C. A. ALLISON	:
DESIGN ENGINEER	:	K. J. KELLY	:
NASA SS/MA	:		:
NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER	:		:
JSC MOD	:		:

	
	
	
	2-17-98
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