

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : COMMUNICATION & TRACKING FMEA NO 05-2R -5107 -3 REV:06/27/88

ASSEMBLY : PNL A1A1			CRIT. FUNC: 2
P/N RI : ME452-0093-5025			CRIT. HDW: 2
P/N VENDOR:	VEHICLE	102	103 104
QUANTITY : 1	EFFECTIVITY:	X	X X
: ONE	PHASE(S) :	PL LO	OO X DO LS

PREPARED BY:	REDUNDANCY SCREEN:	A-	B-	C-
DES H D HADDAD	APPROVED BY:	APPROVED BY (NASA):		
REL <i>gjh</i> 7-5-88 J Y HARADA	DES: <i>H D Haddad</i> 2/27/88	SSM:	<i>John J. Hoff</i> 9/9/88	
QE J T COURSEN	REL: <i>Richard P. Seese</i> 8-20-88	REL:	<i>John J. Hoff</i> 7/7/88	
	QE: <i>Don Lowmyer</i> 8/8/88	QE:	<i>W. B. Bontenot</i> 7/8/88	

ITEM:  
ALS7, ROTARY SWITCH, DP4T, ANTENNA STEERING MODE

FUNCTION:  
SELECTS KU-BAND A ANTENNA STEERING MODES - GPC, GPC DESIGNATE, AUTO, AND MANUAL, WHEN THE CONTROL SWITCH, ALS6, IS IN THE "PANEL" MODE. 36V73A1A1S7.

FAILURE MODE:  
SHORT-TO-CASE (GROUND)

CAUSE(S):  
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCESSING ANOMALY.

EFFECT(S) ON:  
(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE

EFFECTS ON ABILITY TO CONTROL, POSITION, OR LOCK ANTENNA GIMBALS - 1R/3

(A,B) LOSS OF ABILITY TO LOCK GIMBALS IN COMM MODE. AFTER LOSS OF RADAR "ON", LOSS OF ABILITY TO LOCK GIMBALS, REAL-TIME DECISION REQUIRED TO PERFORM IN-FLIGHT MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE WITH EVA OR JETTISON THE DEPLOYED ASSEMBLY.

(C,D) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER THREE FAILURES IF DA CANNOT BE SECURED FOR REENTRY OR JETTISONED. REENTRY WITH GIMBALS UNLOCKED MAY CAUSE DAMAGE TO RADIATOR.

EFFECTS ON MISSIONS REQUIRING KU-BAND SYSTEM SUPPORT - 2/2

(A,B,C) LOSS OF ALL MISSION OBJECTIVES REQUIRING KU-BAND COMM DATA PROCESSING OR RENDEZVOUS RADAR.

(D) NO EFFECT.

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EFFECTS ON PROVIDING DATA TO NSP FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATE - 1R/3

(A,B,C,D) LOSS OF ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT PATHS TO SUPPLY DATA TO NSP FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATE. UHF PROVIDES AN INDEPENDENT PATH FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATE. AFTER FOUR FAILURES POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF STATE VECTOR UPDATE. NOTE- A SINGLE FAILURE OF A KU-BAND SPA DASH NUMBER -4001 CAN CAUSE THE LOSS OF POWER TO BOTH NSP'S, RESULTING IN ONLY ONE REMAINING PATH (UHF) TO UPDATE THE STATE VECTOR. THIS FAILURE CAN OCCUR DURING ANY MISSION PHASE. (KU-BAND POWERED ON OR OFF.)

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE-HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A,B,C,D) REFER TO APPENDIX A, ITEM # 2, ROTARY SWITCH

(B) TEST

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST- ALL SWITCH POSITIONS ARE SELECTED AND CORRECT TELEMETRY RESPONSE VERIFIED - PERFORMED EVERY FLIGHT.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

WORKAROUND TO REGAIN ABILITY TO CONTROL, POSITION, OR LOCK ANTENNA GIMBALS.

LOCK GIMBALS AND STOW THE DEPLOYED ASSEMBLY WITH THE NORMAL STOW PROCEDURE WHICH IS PERFORMED IN THE RADAR-PANEL MODE.

WORKAROUND TO REGAIN SUPPORT OF MISSION OBJECTIVES

COMM: NONE. RADAR: ATTEMPT RENDEZVOUS WITH ALTERNATE SENSORS. USE BACK-UP-RENDEZVOUS PROCEDURES.

WORKAROUND TO PROVIDE STATE VECTOR UPDATE

THE STATE VECTOR CAN BE UPDATED VIA THE NORMAL S-BAND COMMUNICATIONS LINK OR VIA UHF/AUDIO.