

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) - CIL HARDWARE
 NUMBER: 05-3-12130 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: DISPLAYS & CONTROLS

REVISION: 1 08/27/97

PART DATA

PART NAME	PART NUMBER
VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMBER
: FLT DK AVNS INSTL AREA	
LRU : DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT	MC409-0023-000X

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:
 DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT (DDU)

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: 30V73A1
 30V73A2

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 2
 2 REQD (1 CMDR SIDE, 1 PILOT SIDE)

FUNCTION:

DECODES, PROCESSES, AND DRIVES SUBSYSTEM AND SENSOR SIGNALS TO BE DISPLAYED ON THE ADI, AMI, AVVI, AND HSI. DDU ALSO PROVIDES POWER TO THE ADI SERVOS AND TO EACH RHC, THC (COMMANDER SIDE ONLY), RPTA, SBTC, BFC, AND NWS (PILOT SIDE ONLY).

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SUBSYSTEM NAME: DISPLAYS & CONTROLS

LRU: DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT

CRITICALITY OF THIS

ITEM NAME: DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT

FAILURE MODE: 1R3

FAILURE MODE:

LOSS OF SIGNAL OUTPUT TO THE COMMANDER'S OR PILOT'S DEDICATED DISPLAYS.

MISSION PHASE:

PL	PRE-LAUNCH
LO	LIFT-OFF
OO	ON-ORBIT
DO	DE-ORBIT
LS	LANDING/SAFING

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:	102	COLUMBIA
	103	DISCOVERY
	104	ATLANTIS
	105	ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

VIBRATION, SHOCK, LOSS OF INPUT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE.

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN	A) PASS
	B) PASS
	C) FAIL

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

C)

SCREEN "C" FAILS BECAUSE BOTH COMMANDER AND PILOT DDU'S ARE COOLED BY ONE COMMON AIR DUCT, THE LOSS OF WHICH COULD CAUSE THE FAILURE OF BOTH DDU'S DUE TO OVER-TEMPERATURE.

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

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(A) SUBSYSTEM:

ALL DEDICATED DISPLAYS AT THE COMMANDER'S OR PILOT'S STATION WILL BE LOST

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT.

(C) MISSION:

FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

SUCCESS PATHS INCLUDE UTILIZING REDUNDANT FORWARD DDU AND DISPLAYS AND DURING MAJOR MODE 305 THE HUD IS AVAILABLE.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:

EEE PARTS ARE SELECTED FROM OR IN ACCORDANCE WITH MF0004-400 (OPPL) REQUIREMENT. THE HOUSING IS ENVIRONMENTALLY SEALED. UNIT IS DESIGNED TO FLIGHT VIBRATION REQUIREMENTS. THE DDU SHALL HAVE A MINIMUM USEFUL LIFE OF 25,000 HOURS. THIS IS EQUIVALENT TO 100 ORBITAL MISSIONS IN A 10-YEAR PERIOD FROM DATE OF DELIVERY. AVERAGE ORBITAL MISSION DURATION WILL BE 7 DAYS; HOWEVER, DDU DESIGN SHALL NOT PRECLUDE THE CAPABILITY TO EXTEND ORBITAL STAY-TIME UP TO A TOTAL OF 30 DAYS. PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE, SERVICING, REPAIR, AND REPLACEMENT OF PARTS SHALL BE CONSISTENT WITH THE SELLER'S TRADEOFF RESULTS, AS APPROVED BY THE BUYER. THE LRU SHALL CONTAIN THE NECESSARY BUILT-IN-TEST CAPABILITY TO DETECT AND REPORT FAILURES WHICH AFFECT OPERATION. THIS BUILT-IN-TEST CAPABILITY IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE INTEGRATED AVIONICS SHALL PROVIDE THE MEANS FOR ACCOMPLISHING FUNCTIONAL PATH FAILURE DETECTION DURING FLIGHT, ALONG WITH THE NECESSARY LRU FAULT ISOLATION TO SUPPORT GROUND TURNAROUND REQUIREMENTS. THE BUILT-IN-TEST CAPABILITY SHALL PROVIDE A 0.95 PROBABILITY OF FAILURE DETECTION.

(B) TEST:

ACCEPTANCE REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE:

EXAMINATION OF PRODUCT
INSULATION RESISTANCE TEST
PERFORMANCE

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ACCEPTANCE THERMAL TEST (ATT)
ACCEPTANCE VIBRATION TEST (AVT)
BONDING TEST

AVT

20 TO 80 HZ	INCREASING AT 3 DB/OCTAVE TO 0.04 G SQUARED/HZ AT 80 HZ
80 TO 350 HZ	CONSTANT AT 0.04 G SQUARED/HZ
350 TO 2000 HZ	DECREASING AT 3 DB/OCTAVE FROM 0.04 G SQUARED/HZ AT 350 HZ

ATT

THE DDU SHALL BE THERMAL CYCLED FROM PLUS 70 DEG. F TO PLUS 100 DEG. F TO 0 DEG. F TO 70 DEG. F WITH CONTINUITY MONITORED THROUGHOUT. RATE OF CHANGE SHALL NOT EXCEED 240 DEG. F PER HOUR, NOR LESS THAN 60 DEG. F PER HOUR. DWELL AT EACH LIMIT TEMPERATURE SHALL BE THE TIME REQUIRED TO STABILIZE THE UNITS TEMPERATURE PLUS THE TIME REQUIRED TO CONDUCT ANY PERFORMANCE TEST; HOWEVER, THE MINIMUM TIME SHALL NOT BE LESS THAN 1 HOUR. INPUTS SHALL BE PROVIDED TO ALL FUNCTIONS SO THEY ARE ACTIVE DURING THERMAL TESTS.

QUALIFICATION TESTS INCLUDE:

ACCEPTANCE TEST
POWER
EMC
CABIN ATMOSPHERE
THERMAL CYCLE
VIBRATION
ACCELERATION
THERMAL VACUUM
OPERATING LIFE
SHOCK

QAVT

20 TO 80 HZ	INCREASING AT 3 DB/OCTAVE TO 0.067 G SQUARED/HZ AT 80 HZ
80 TO 350 HZ	CONSTANT AT 0.067 G SQUARED/HZ
350 TO 2000 HZ	DECREASING AT 3 DB/OCTAVE FROM 0.067 G SQUARED/HZ AT 350 HZ

DURATION FIVE TIMES AVT MINUTES PER AXIS

QTT

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THE DDU SHALL BE THERMALLY CYCLED FIVE TIMES FROM: PLUS 70 DEG. F TO PLUS 120 DEG. F, TO MINUS 20 DEG. F, TO PLUS 120 DEG. F, TO PLUS 70 DEG. F. RATE OF CHANGE SHALL NOT EXCEED 240 DEG. F PER HOUR, NOR BE LESS THAN 1 DEG. F PER MINUTE. TIME DURATION AT EACH EXTREME TEMPERATURE SHALL BE SUFFICIENT TO ACHIEVE THERMAL STABILIZATION PLUS THE TIME REQUIRED TO CONDUCT FUNCTIONAL TEST, BUT SHALL NOT BE LESS THAN 2 HOURS.

ACCELERATION

PLUS AND MINUS 5 G'S IN ALL MAJOR AXES.

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT TESTING IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

(C) INSPECTION:

RECEIVING INSPECTION

RECEIVING INSPECTION PERFORMS A VISUAL EXAMINATION OF INCOMING PARTS. CERTIFICATION RECORDS AND TEST REPORTS ARE MAINTAINED CERTIFYING MATERIALS AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

QC VERIFIES THAT REQUIRED PROCEDURES AND SHOP PRACTICES ARE UTILIZED FOR CONTAMINATION CONTROL. ENVIRONMENTAL SEALING OF UNIT VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

DETAILED INSPECTION IS PERFORMED ON ALL PARTS PRIOR TO NEXT ASSEMBLY.

CRITICAL PROCESSES

ALL CRITICAL PROCESSES AND CERTIFICATIONS ARE MONITORED AND VERIFIED BY INSPECTION I.E.; SOLDERING, ADHESIVE BONDING, CHEM FILM, ANODIZING, CONFORMAL COATING, STRIPPING, SWAGING, AND TORQUE VALUES.

TESTING

ALL PARTS OF THE ATP ARE OBSERVED AND VERIFIED BY QC, INCLUDING AVT, ATT, FUNCTIONAL TEST.

HANDLING/PACKAGING

IN-PROCESS OPERATIONS ARE VERIFIED BY QC TO PROTECT PARTS AND PRECLUDE MISHANDLING. PARTS PACKAGING IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION TO APPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURES, FLIGHT FAILURES, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATA BASE.

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(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

THE FULLY AUTOMATIC FLIGHT MODE IS ALSO AVAILABLE AS A CONTINGENCY, IF
REQUIRED.

- APPROVALS -

EDITORIALLY APPROVED	: BNA	: <u>J. Kumura 8/28/97</u>
EDITORIALLY APPROVED	: JSC	: <u>Adam O'Leary 9/12/99</u>
TECHNICAL APPROVAL	: VIA APPROVAL FORM	: 05-CIL-024_05-3