

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - MAIN PROP. FMEA NO 05-6J -2077 -1 REV:11/04/87

ASSEMBLY : APT PCA-4, 5, & 6	CRIT. FUNC: 12
P/N RI : JANTXIN1204RA	CRIT. HDW: 3
P/N VENDOR:	VEHICLE 102 103 104
QUANTITY : 12	EFFECTIVITY: X X X
: TWELVE	PHASE(S): PL X LO X OO DO LS
: 4 PER PREVALVE	

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS		
PREPARED BY:	APPROVED BY:	APPROVED BY (NASA):
DES J BROWN	DES <i>[Signature]</i>	EPDC SSM <i>[Signature]</i>
REL F DEFENSOR	REL <i>[Signature]</i> 12-5-87	MPS SSM <i>[Signature]</i>
QE D MASAI	QE <i>[Signature]</i> 11/5/87	EPDC REL <i>[Signature]</i>
		MPS REL <i>[Signature]</i>
		QE <i>[Signature]</i>

ITEM:
DIODE, ISOLATION (12 AMP), LO2 PREVALVE 1, 2, & 3, OPEN SOLENOID POWER, REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER OUTPUT.

FUNCTION:
DIODES USED TO ISOLATE REDUNDANT MAIN BUS POWER TO AN OPEN SOLENOID. LOCATED AT REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER OUTPUT AHEAD OF HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER IN EACH OF TWO OPEN SOLENOID CIRCUITS.
LO2 PREVALVE 1 - 54V76A134A4CR30, A4CR36, & 55V76A135A4CR34, A4CR35,
LO2 PREVALVE 2 - 55V76A135A4CR30, A4CR36, & 56V76A136A4CR34, A4CR35,
LO2 PREVALVE 3 - 54V76A134A4CR34, A4CR35, & 56V76A136A4CR30, A4CR36.

FAILURE MODE:
OPENS, FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT POWER.

CAUSE(S):
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS.

EFFECT(S) ON:
(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY
(A) LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER PATHS TO OPEN SOLENOID.
(B,C,D) NO EFFECT - FIRST FAILURE

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(E) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER THE THIRD FAILURE (SECOND FAILURE - LOSS OF SECOND POWER PATH TO OPEN SOLENOID, BISTABLE FEATURE MAINTAINS PREVALVE IN OPEN POSITION. THIRD FAILURE - PREMATURE ACTUATION OF CLOSE SOLENOID) RESULTING IN PREMATURE LO2 PREVALVE CLOSURE WHILE ENGINE IS RUNNING. UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE DUE TO STARVATION CUTOFF. FAILS B SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANT POWER PATH MASKS FAILURE. NOTE - BISTABLE FEATURE NOT DEMONSTRATED BY TEST (CERTIFIED BY ANALYSIS). A FULL FLOW DETENT VERIFICATION TEST IS SCHEDULED FOR GPY 1988.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A-D) FOR DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE

REFER TO APPENDIX F, ITEM NO. 2 - DIODE, POWER-STUD MOUNTED.

(B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

MDM COMMAND REDUNDANCY, V41AEO.380B,F,H,J; 400B,F,H,J; 420B,F,H,J
EVERY FLIGHT.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

NO CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.