

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - MAIN PROP. FMEA NO 05-6J -2091 -1 REV: ^{5/5} 04/26/88
 ASSEMBLY : AFT LCA - 3 CRIT. FUNC: 1R
 P/N RI : MC477-0261-0002 CRIT. HDW: 2
 P/N VENDOR: VEHICLE 102 103 104
 QUANTITY : 1 EFFECTIVITY: X X X
 : ONE PHASE(S): PL X LO X OO DO LS
 :

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-PASS C-PASS
 PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY: APPROVED BY (NASA):
 DES J BROWN DES [Signature] EPDC SSM [Signature]
 REL F DEFENSOR [Signature] REL [Signature] 5-6-88 MPS SSM [Signature] 5-17-88
 QE [Signature] D MASAI QE [Signature] 5-6-88 MPS REL [Signature] 5/13/88
 QE [Signature]

ITEM:

CONTROLLER HYBRID DRIVER (HDC), TYPE I, LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSE SOLENOID (LV76).

FUNCTION:

CONDUCTS MDM CLOSE COMMAND B TO SERIES RPC AND HDC III TO CONTROL POWER TO LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE SOLENOID (LV76). 56V76A123AR J1(45).

FAILURE MODE:

LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO CONDUCT, FAILS TO TURN "ON".

CAUSE(S):

PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PROCESSING ANOMALY, THERMAL STRESS.

EFFECT(S) ON:

(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY

(A) LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER PATHS TO LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSE SOLENOID. DEGRADATION OF REDUNDANCY AGAINST INADVERTENT DEACTUATION OF CLOSE SOLENOID.

(B,C,D) NO EFFECT - FIRST FAILURE.

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SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - MAIN PROP.

FMEA NO 05-6J -2091 -1

REV: 04/26/88

5/5
DET 5-13

(E) CASE I: 1R/2, 1 SUCCESS PATH AFTER FIRST FAILURE.

TIME FRAME - PRELAUNCH.

1) HDC FAILS "OFF".

2) PARALLEL POWER PATH FAILS "OFF" (HDC, RPC, DIODE) CAUSING LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PV19) TO OPEN.

FAILURES WILL RESULT IN CONTINUED BLEED FLOW RESULTING IN LOSS OF LO2 OVERBOARD WITH FAILURE OF BLEED DISCONNECT (PD13) TO CLOSE. BLEED DISCONNECT IS NOT CERTIFIED FOR CLOSURE UNDER FLOW CONDITIONS AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A REDUNDANT INHIBIT AGAINST OVERBOARD FLOW. POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF DISCONNECT HOUSING AND/OR DOWNSTREAM BLEED SYSTEM DUE TO WATER HAMMER. RESULTS IN LOSS OF APPROXIMATELY 3000 LBS OF PROPELLANT WHICH IS INSUFFICIENT TO CAUSE PREMATURE SSME SHUTDOWN.

POSSIBLE AFT COMPARTMENT OVERPRESSURIZATION. FIRE/EXPLOSIVE HAZARD BOTH INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR TO THE VEHICLE. NO LCC EXISTS FOR VERIFICATION OF VALVE POSITION PRIOR TO T-0. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

CASE II: 1R/3, 2 SUCCESS PATHS AFTER FIRST FAILURE.

TIME FRAME - ASCENT.

1) HDC FAILS "OFF".

2) PARALLEL POWER PATH FAILS "OFF" (HDC, RPC, DIODE) CAUSING LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PV19) TO OPEN.

3) BLEED DISCONNECT (PD13) FAILS TO CLOSE/REMAIN CLOSED.

RESULTS IN LOSS OF APPROXIMATELY 3000 LBS. OF PROPELLANT WHICH IS NOT ENOUGH TO CAUSE PREMATURE SSME SHUTDOWN. POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLCSION HAZARD IN FLIGHT. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A-D) FOR DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE

REFER TO APPENDIX B, ITEM NO. 1 - HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER.

(B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

COMPLETE ELECTRICAL VERIFICATION V41ABO.200F EVERY FLIGHT.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

NO CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.

INSERT

DET 5-13

05-6J-164

INSERT FOR CIL 05-6J-2091-1
EFFECTS SECTION (E)

IF THE LO2 BLEED VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE BEFORE T-0 THE LO2 BLEED DISCONNECT WOULD BE CLOSING WITH AN OXYGEN FLOW OF 4.1 LBS/SEC. THIRTY-TWO PERCENT OF THIS FLOW WILL BE VAPOR. THE LO2 BLEED DISCONNECT IS NOT CERTIFIED FOR CLOSURE UNDER FLOW. HOWEVER, THE CLOSURE IS AT ONE "G" ACCELERATION RATE (T-0 UMBILICAL SEPARATION RATE) WHICH LIMITS THE IMPACT ENERGY ON THE VESPEL SEAL TO A LEVEL WHICH IS BELOW THE LO2/VESPEL IGNITION LEVEL (NOT PREVIOUSLY TESTED WITH THIS CONDITION). THE WATER HAMMER TOWARDS EFFECT GENERATED DURING THIS CLOSURE HAS BEEN CALCULATED TO BE APPROXIMATELY 60 PSIG. SYSTEM PROOF PRESSURE LEVEL IS 286 PSIG.