

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - MAIN PROP. FMEA NO 05-6J -2248 -1 REV:11/04/87

ASSEMBLY : APT PCA-2 CRIT. FUNC: 1R
 P/N RI : JANTX1N1204RA CRIT. HDW: 3
 P/N VENDOR: VEHICLE 102 103 104
 QUANTITY : 2 EFFECTIVITY: X X X
 : TWO PHASE(S): PL X LO X OO DO LS
 : 1 PER LH2/LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS

PREPARED BY:	J BROWN	APPROVED BY:	<i>J. Brown</i>	APPROVED BY (NASA):	
DES		DES		EPDC SSM	<i>[Signature]</i>
REL	F DEFENSOR	REL	<i>F. Defensor</i>	MPS SSM	<i>[Signature]</i>
QE	D MASAI	QE	<i>D. Masai</i>	EPDC REL	<i>[Signature]</i>
				MPS REL	<i>[Signature]</i>

ITEM:

DIODE, BLOCKING (12 AMP), LH2/LO2 17-INCH FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE, OPEN SOLENOID, RPC B OUTPUT DIODE.

FUNCTION:

DIODE USED TO ISOLATE REDUNDANT MAIN BUS B POWER TO AN OPEN SOLENOID. LOCATED AT RPC B OUTPUT AHEAD OF OPEN COMMAND C HDC III. 55V76A132A2CR6, A3CR12.

FAILURE MODE:

OPEN, FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT

CAUSE(S):

PIECE PART MECHANICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS.

EFFECT(S) ON:

(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY

(A) LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER PATHS TO THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVES OPEN SOLENOID.

(B,C,D) NO EFFECT - FIRST FAILURE.

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(E) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER THIRD FAILURE (SECOND FAILURE - LOSS OF SECOND POWER PATH TO OPEN SOLENOID, BISTABLE FEATURE WILL MAINTAIN FEED DISCONNECT VALVE IN OPEN POSITION. THIRD FAILURE - PREMATURE ACTUATION OF CLOSE SOLENOID) RESULTING IN PREMATURE DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSURE WHILE ENGINES ARE RUNNING. SURGE PRESSURE FROM VALVE CLOSURE MAY CAUSE DAMAGE OR RUPTURE TO THE MPS AND/OR ET SYSTEM, DEPENDING ON THE RATE OF CLOSURE. SHUTDOWN OF ALL THREE SSMEs SIMULTANEOUSLY. UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE DUE TO STARVATION CUTOFF. FAILS B SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANT POWER PATH MASKS FAILURE. NOTE - LATCH IS NOT DESIGNED OR CERTIFIED TO HOLD PNEUMATICALLY-CLOSED FLAPPER UNDER FLOW CONDITIONS, THEREFORE, NOT CONSIDERED A VALID SUCCESS PATH FOR THIS SCENARIO.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A-D) FOR DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE:

REFER TO APPENDIX F, ITEM NO. 2 - DICDE, POWER-STUD MOUNTED.

(B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

COMPLETE ELECTRICAL VERIFICATION, V41ABO.150E, 160E EVERY FLIGHT.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

NO CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.

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