

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - MAIN PROP. FMEA NO 05-6J -2344 -2 REV: 11/04/87

ASSEMBLY : AFT PCA-5, 6 CRIT. FUNC: 1R  
 P/N RI : MC477-0263-0002 CRIT. HDW: 3  
 P/N VENDOR: VEHICLE 102 103 104  
 QUANTITY : 4 EFFECTIVITY: .X X X  
 : FOUR PHASE(S): PL LO X OO DO LS  
 : 2 PER LH2/LO2 17" DISCONNECT LATCH

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS

PREPARED BY:	APPROVED BY:	APPROVED BY (NASA):
DES J BROWN	DES <u>[Signature]</u>	EPDC SSM <u>[Signature]</u>
REL F DEFENSOR	REL <u>[Signature]</u> 12-5-87	MPS SSM <u>[Signature]</u>
QE D MASAI	QE <u>[Signature]</u> 11/6/87	EPDC REL <u>[Signature]</u>
		MPS REL <u>[Signature]</u>
		QE <u>[Signature]</u> 11/6/87

ITEM:

CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER (HDC), TYPE III, LH2/LO2 17-INCH FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE LATCH LOCK SOLENOID CONTROL AND POWER.

FUNCTION:

CONDUCTS POWER TO THE LOCK SOLENOID IN EACH REDUNDANT CIRCUIT FOR THE LH2/LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE LATCH LOCK SOLENOID. THE HDC IS IN SERIES WITH A RPC AND DIODE IN EACH CIRCUIT. 56V76A136AR4, AR6; 55V76A135AR3, AR5.

FAILURE MODE:

INADVERTENT OUTPUT, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY, INTERNAL SHORTS.

CAUSE(S):

PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.

EFFECT(S) ON:

(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY

(A) DEGRADATION OF REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE LATCH LOCK POWER.

(B,C,D) NO EFFECT - FIRST FAILURE.

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(E) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER THIRD FAILURE (SECOND FAILURE .  
SERIES RFC FAILS ON RESULTING IN PREMATURE POWER TO LATCH LOCK SOLENOID.  
THIRD FAILURE - DURING ET/ORBITER UMBILICAL RETRACTION, BACKUP MECHANICAL  
LINKAGE FAILS, PREVENTING FLAPPER CLOSURE) RESULTING IN INABILITY TO  
CLOSE THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE PRIOR TO UMBILICAL RETRACTION. FOR  
NOMINAL, ATO, AND AOA MISSIONS ET SEPARATION IS DELAYED FOR SIX MINUTES  
TO VENT RESIDUAL PROPELLANT THROUGH FAILED DISCONNECT. THIS IS TO  
PREVENT ORBITER/ET RECONTACT DUE TO PROPULSIVE VENTING AT SEPARATION.  
POSSIBLE TILE AND DOOR DAMAGE AT THE ORBITER/ET UMBILICAL AREA DUE TO  
CRYO IMPACT. FOR RTLS, TAL, AND MISSIONS WHERE OMS BURN CANNOT BE  
DELAYED ET STRUCTURAL SEPARATION IS INITIATED IMMEDIATELY AND ORBITER/ET  
RECONTACT IS LIKELY. ALSO RESULTS IN LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY DURING  
MANIFOLD REPRESS CAUSING POSSIBLE LOSS OF CRITICAL AFT COMPARTMENT ENTRY  
PURGE. FAILS B SCREEN DUE TO SERIES CIRCUIT CONFIGURATION.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HISTORY (E)OPERATIONAL USE

(A-D) DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE:

REFER TO APPENDIX B, ITEM NO. 1 - HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER. TO BE  
DETERMINED

(B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

COMPLETE ELECTRICAL VERIFICATION, V41A30.155B, D; 165B, D EVERY FLIGHT

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

FOR NOMINAL MISSIONS, CREW WILL PERFORM MANUAL ET STRUCTURAL  
SEPARATION AFTER SIX MINUTE DELAY PERIOD. FOR RTLS, VEHICLE SOFTWARE  
PERFORMS ET STRUCTURAL SEPARATION AFTER A SIX SECOND (MAXIMUM) DELAY.  
FOR TAL OR MISSIONS WHERE OMS BURN CANNOT BE DELAYED CREW WILL  
MANUALLY INITIATE ET STRUCTURAL SEPARATION WITHOUT DELAY.