

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - MAIN PROP. FMEA NO 05-6J -2348 -2 REV: 11/04/87

ASSEMBLY : APT PCA-6 CRIT. FUNC: 1R
 P/N RI : JANTX1N1204RA CRIT. HDW: 3
 P/N VENDOR: VEHICLE 102 103 104
 QUANTITY : 2 EFFECTIVITY: X X X
 : TWO PHASE(S): PL LO X OO DO LS
 : 1 PER LH2/LO2 17" DISCONNECT LATCH

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS

PREPARED BY:	APPROVED BY:	APPROVED BY (NASA):
DES J BROWN	DES <u>[Signature]</u>	EPDC SSM <u>[Signature]</u>
REL F DEFENSOR	REL <u>[Signature]</u> 12-5-87	MPS SSM <u>[Signature]</u>
QE D MASAI	QE <u>[Signature]</u> 11/1/87	EPDC REL <u>[Signature]</u> ML Peterson
		MPS REL <u>[Signature]</u> 11/1/88
		QE <u>[Signature]</u> 11/1/88

ITEM:
 DIODE, CROSSOVER (12 AMP), LH2/LO2 17-INCH FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE LATCH LOCK SOLENOID POWER.

FUNCTION:
 PREVENTS INADVERTENT MDM COMMAND OR PREMATURE HDC I OUTPUT FROM ACTUATING LATCH LOCK SOLENOID PREMATURELY. DIODE ISOLATES REDUNDANT POWER WHICH ENERGIZES THE LATCH LOCK SOLENOID FOR THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE. ISOLATES REDUNDANT POWER BETWEEN RPC OUTPUTS. 56V76A136A2CR41, CR44.

FAILURE MODE:
 SHORTS, INTERNAL SHORT, CURRENT LEAKAGE

CAUSE(S):
 PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK

EFFECT(S) ON:
 (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY
 (A) DEGRADATION OF REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE LOCK SOLENOID POWER.
 (B,C,D) NO EFFECT - FIRST FAILURE.

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(E) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER THIRD FAILURE (SECOND FAILURE - PREMATURE LOCK COMMAND B OR HDC I OUTPUT CAUSING LOCK SOLENOID TO FAIL ON. THIRD FAILURE - DURING ET/ORBITER UMBILICAL RETRACTION, BACKUP MECHANICAL LINKAGE FAILS, PREVENTING FLAPPER CLOSURE) RESULTING IN INABILITY TO CLOSE THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE PRIOR TO UMBILICAL RETRACTION. FOR NOMINAL, ATO, AND AOA MISSIONS ET SEPARATION IS DELAYED FOR SIX MINUTES TO VENT RESIDUAL PROPELLANT THROUGH FAILED DISCONNECT. THIS IS TO PREVENT ORBITER/ET RECONTACT DUE TO PROPULSIVE VENTING AT SEPARATION. POSSIBLE TILE AND DOOR DAMAGE AT THE ORBITER/ET UMBILICAL AREA DUE TO CRYO IMPACT. FOR RTLS, TAL, AND MISSIONS WHERE OMS BURN CANNOT BE DELAYED ET STRUCTURAL SEPARATION IS INITIATED IMMEDIATELY AND ORBITER/ET RECONTACT IS LIKELY. ALSO RESULTS IN LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY DURING MANIFOLD REPRESS CAUSING POSSIBLE LOSS OF CRITICAL AFT COMPARTMENT ENTRY PURGE. FAILS B SCREEN BECAUSE NO INSTRUMENTATION IS AVAILABLE TO DETECT FAILURE.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A-D) DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE:

REFER TO APPENDIX F, ITEM NO. 2 - DIODE, POWER-STUD MOUNTED.

(B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

COMPLETE ELECTRICAL VERIFICATION, V41ABO.155D, 165D EVERY FLIGHT

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

FOR NOMINAL MISSIONS, CREW WILL PERFORM MANUAL ET STRUCTURAL SEPARATION AFTER SIX MINUTE DELAY PERIOD. FOR RTLS, VEHICLE SOFTWARE PERFORMS ET STRUCTURAL SEPARATION AFTER A SIX SECOND (MAXIMUM) DELAY. FOR TAL OR MISSIONS WHERE OMS BURN CANNOT BE DELAYED CREW WILL MANUALLY INITIATE ET STRUCTURAL SEPARATION WITHOUT DELAY.