CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)

SYSTEM:	Thermal Protection System	FUNCTIONAL CRIT:	1
SUBSYSTEM:	Components	PHASE(S):	a, b
REV & DATE:	J, 12-19-97	HAZARD REF:	T.02
DCN & DATE:			
ANALYSTS:	B. Burkes/R. Lauto		

FAILURE MODE: Loss of SOFI Material

FAILURE EFFECT:
a) Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to excessive delta pressure across forward LH2 dome.
b) Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to overpressure causing structural failure of Intertank.

TIME TO EFFECT: Seconds

FAILURE CAUSE(S):
A: Material Deficiency
B: Process Deficiency

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: Not Applicable

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION: This foam provides thermal protection for the LO2 feedline flex section inside the Intertank from prelaunch environments.

FMEA ITEM CODE(S)	PART NO.	PART NAME	QTY	EFFECTIVITY
5.8.2.1	8D973D28406	Feedline, LO2 Flex, TPS Appl	1	LWT-54 & Up

REMARKS:

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)
CONTINUATION SHEET

SYSTEM:	Thermal Protection System	REV & DATE:	J, 12-19-97
SUBSYSTEM:	Components	DCN & DATE:	
FMEA ITEM CODE(S):	5.8.2.1		

RATIONALE FOR RETENTION

STP1513, 1536, 3004, 3008 and 5013 are applicable to this FMEA Item Code. See Page 1 for Retention Rationale specified by these GTP's. The following additional Retention Rationale is also applicable to this FMEA Item Code:

DESIGN:

No additional Rationale for Retention is applicable.

TEST:

The LO2 Flex Feedline TPS Application is certified. Reference MCS's MHC-ET-TM08-L-1008, T504 and T507. Refer to the MCS(s) for effectivity data applicable to specific part numbers and material type.

INSPECTION:

Launch Site:

Inspect LO2 Feedline - Visually Inspect for TPS integrity (CH250 File IV).

FAILURE HISTORY:

Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies and other failures experienced during ground processing activity can be found in the PRACA data base.