

Subsystem: HPOTP B500 - 4750000-700
Functional Assy: Structural Section B50004

Critical Item List
Prepared by: M.T. Spencer
Approved by: R.L. Pugh
CIL Item: 0403

Page: 102
Issue Date: December 23, 1993
Rev. Date: December 08, 1995

CIL Item Code: 0403
FMEA Item Code: 0403
Function: Load Transmission
System/Subsystem: HPOTP B500 - 4750000-700

Analyst: M.T. Spencer
Approved by: R.L. Pugh
Rev. No.:
Rev. Date: December 08, 1995
Effectivity:
Hazard Ref.: See Listings Below

Operating Phase	Failure Mode, Description and Effect	Criticality
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Operating Phase:
s,m,c

Failure Mode:

Loss of load transfer capability.

Failure Cause(s):

- A. In 232 or 234 Fracture of the preburner hag or inner hag due to vibration, over pressure, thermal, plumbing loads, or material/mfg defect.
- B. In 22 ASD, Fracture of the main pump hag due to vibration, over pressure, thermal, plumbing loads, or material/weld/mfg defect.
- C. In 114-02, Fracture of turbine inlet hag due to vibration, thermal growth, over temp, excessive loads, or material/mfg defect.
- D. In 058 Fracture of the main turbine housing (TCVS) due to vibration, thermal growth, excessive loads, or material/mfg defect.
- E. In 13 Fracture of outlet duct due to vibration, thermal growth, over temp, excessive loads, turbine blade failure, or material/mfg defect.
- F. In 35 Fracture or loss of torque of any of the following threaded fasteners due to excessive load, thermal growth, corrosion, or material/mfg defect.
 - In 14 Nut
 - In 82 Nut
 - In 67 Nut
 - In 62 Nut
 - In 117 Nut
 - In 180 Nut
 - In 88 Nut
 - In 55 Nut
 - In 28 Nut
 - In 81 Nut
 - In 186 Nut
 - In 73 Deflector
 - In 177 Bolt
 - In 235 Nut
 - In 118 Bolt
 - In 127 Bolt
 - In 128 Bolt
 - In 40 Bolt
 - In 245 Bolt
 - In 128 Bolt
 - In 131 Bolt
 - In 132 Bolt

Criticality:

1

Hazard Ref:

- A) C1S/ARWC (AT) 2A1.1
- B) C1S/ARWC (AT) 1A1.1.B.2.4
- C) C1S/ARWC (AT) 1A1.1.B.2.4
- D) C1S/ARWC (AT) 1A1.1.B.2.4
- E) C1S/ARWC (AT) 1A1.1.B.2.4
- F) C1S/ARWC (AT) 1A1.1.B.2.4, 4A1.2, 4A2, 4A3, 4A4, 4A6.2

B - 519

Critical Item List

Subsystem: HPOTP B500 - 4750000-700

Prepared by: M.T. Spencer

Page: 103

Functional Assy: Structural Section B50004

Approved by: R.L. Pugh

Issue Date: December 23, 1993

CIL Item: 0403

Rev. Date: December 08, 1995

- f/n 134 Bolt
- f/n 138 Bolt
- f/n 145 Bolt
- f/n 176 Bolt
- f/n 181 Bolt
- f/n 190 Bolt
- f/n 199 Bolt
- f/n 252 Bolt
- f/n 035 Tiebolt
- f/n 130 Screw
- f/n 22-28-14 Stud
- f/n 22-28-16 Stud
- f/n 287 Bolt
- f/n 090 Stud
- f/n 22-28-18 Stud
- f/n 22-28-12 Insert
- f/n 22-28-13 Insert
- f/n 24-02-03 Insert
- f/n 244-03 Insert
- f/n 060 Insert
- f/n 013 Nut

Failure Effect:

Rotor shift with rub in the pump or turbine stages with possible uncontained failure and/or fire.

System:

Uncontained engine damage

Mission/Vehicle:

Loss of vehicle

Redundancy Screens:

Does not apply since it is a single point failure

B - 520

Subsystem: HPOTP B500 - 4750000-700
Functional Assy: Structural Section B50004

Critical Item List

Prepared by: M.T. Spencer
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CIL Item: 0403

Page: 104
Issue Date: December 23, 1993
Rev. Date: December 08, 1995

Part Name/No.	Design Considerations	Document Ref
In 232 Preburner hsg	<p>FAILURE CAUSE A. The Preburner pump hsg is forged Inconel 718 (PWA-SP 1146), which was selected for its high cryogenic strength, ductility, and experience in a LOX environment. This housing provides the inlet area to the impeller, the exit area to the preburner pump, support for the various seals, and maintains the required clearance for the impeller.</p> <p>Race track slots engage pins in the main pump housing for alignment of the preburner and main pump housings.</p> <p>This part is a pressure vessel, and the mission life is 350 cycles.</p> <p>The cast discharge volute inner housing which is utilized as a flow guide only is Micro-Cast Inconel 718 (PWA-SP 1490-2) for its high strength and experience in a LOX environment, and is supported by a spanner nut fit to the P/B housing.</p> <p>This part meets CEI requirements.</p> <p>DVS 4.1.2.8 Structural design analysis can be found in FR-20729-02, and FR-20730-02.</p>	
In 022 Main pump hsg	<p>FAILURE CAUSE B. The main hsg is made up of a welded assembly which includes the left, center, and right side parts made of cast PWA-SP 1490 (Microcast Inconel 718) which was chosen for its high strength, and experience in a LOX environment. This material has a proven history in a LOX environment. LOX testing of this material appears in Appendix 52 of the P&W MCL Manual. The welded on turbine side housing is wrought super A286, and was chosen for its high strength and resistance to hydrogen embrittlement.</p> <p>The four main pump welds are all fully inspectable, as well as the core support welds.</p> <p>Materials Control Plan FR-19673-5 describes the EB Weld Development Program which will demonstrate the process to ensure the successful fabrication/assembly of this housing.</p> <p>The part on the pump side sees LOX, and on the turbine side H₂.</p> <p>The housing provides the LOX flowpath geometry for the inlet independently for the inducers and main impeller, and discharge.</p> <p>This structure also provides the backbone for the pump to transmit induced loads to the hot gas manifold. It also provides support for the various seals, roller bearing, TEBB, passage for the interpropellant seals, and maintains the required clearance for the inducers, main impeller, and thrust balance system thro support of the inner hsg. assembly.</p> <p>To retain radial and circumferential positioning of the pre burner structural housing, 5 pins are tight fit into the main pump housing, and fit into the race track holes in the pre burner housing.</p> <p>The preburner housing and the damper/PEBB support are bolted to this housing, as well as the turbine discharge duct.</p> <p>The Main Housing does not meet CEI LCF life limits, but does meet Fracture Mechanics life, so no life or inspection limits have been imposed (DAR 0189).</p> <p>DVS 4.1.2.9 Structural design analysis can be found in FR-20729-09, and FR-20730-01.</p>	

B - 521

DAR NO. 0189

Subsystem: HPOTP B500 - 4750000-700
Functional Assy: Structural Section B50004

Critical Item List
Prepared by: M.T. Spencer
Approved by: R.L. Pugh
CIL Item: 0403

Page: 105
Issue Date: December 23, 1993
Rev. Date: December 08, 1995

In 114-02
Turbine Inlet Hsg.

FAILURE CAUSE C. The turbine inlet hsg defines the inner and outer flowpath walls, and provides the passage as well as the support for the hydrogen cooling transfer tubes to the inner support and turbine disk.

The thin outer wall (deflector /In 276) which is AMS 5608 (Haynes 188) is a full hoop carrying shell which provides a support wall for the 12 cantilevered struts which are all the same size for even load distribution and have the O.D. of the core closed off by the outer wall to eliminate core breakout KTs. Outer wall thickened areas at the leading and trailing edges are optimized to reduce the concentrated stresses. The inner flowpath is split radially between struts and is supported by the struts. These features are all incorporated to eliminate the cracking experienced during development.

Vent holes in the outer flow path wall allow hot gas path bleed into the nose cavity to reduce thermal stress, and reduce the delta P on the inner support. The holes have been sized to allow sufficient flow while being small enough to prevent the ingestion of bolts or nuts.

Dual function pins transfer the load from the inner dome to the inlet case, and hold the seal concentric with the seal land.

The inlet hsg is bolted to the outer case, and is made of PWA-SP 1489 material (Micro-Cast Mar-M-247) and was selected for its strength in elevated temperature hydrogen, and thermal shock. This is essentially a spherical shell that is split along its length in 12 pieces between the struts. The inner dome (heatshield /In 114-07) is PWA-SP 1143 (Incoloy 809), and was selected for its resistance to hydrogen embrittlement, and low alpha which reduces thermal stresses.

To uncouple thermally driven stresses from the turbine inlet housing, the inlet dome utilizes a radially free dome and wave washer spacer (/In 279) configuration.

The inlet housing LCF life is less than CEI requirements, but Fracture Mechanics Life is greater than CEI, so no inspection limits are imposed (DAR 0181).

LCF life of the I.D. load ring (/In 114-04) also does not meet CEI life, but the Fracture Mechanics Life is greater than CEI, so no inspection limits are imposed (DAR 0182).

DVS 4.1.4.1.5.1, and .2 tests which require proof pressure, and vibration tests have been completed, and can be found in FR-20729-50 and FR-20730-49.

DVS 4.1.4.2.5.1 test which requires resonance testing has been completed, and is documented in FR-20730-53, 54, 55, 66, and 60.

DVS 4.1.2.8 which requires structural design analysis of the inlet was completed in 4/89, and is documented in FR-20729-06A.

In 059
Main turbine housing

FAILURE CAUSE D. This housing transfers the loads from the inlet housing and turbine vanes to the outlet duct. This housing also provides four cooling passages for transfer to the roller bearing and IPS package. In four locations cooling hole meters are provided for blade tip shroud position control.

Material used is PWA-SP 1074 (IN 100) which was selected for its high strength in elevated temperature hydrogen.

This is a fracture critical part, and will meet the requirements of the fracture control plan FR-10793-2 and safe life fracture mechanics requirements and be properly traced throughout the life of the part.

This part does not meet CEI requirements, so life and inspection limits have been imposed (DAR 0184).

DAR NO. 0181

DAR NO. 0182

DAR NO. 0184

B - 522

Critical Item List

Subsystem: HPOTP B500 - 4750000-700
Functional Assy: Structural Section B50004

Prepared by: M.T. Spencer
Approved by: R.L. Pugh
CPL Item: 0403

Page: 106
Issue Date: December 23, 1993
Rev. Date: December 08, 1995

DVS 4.1.2.9 requires structural design analysis of the main turbine housing, and has been completed and is documented in FR-20729-08.

l/n 013
Outlet Duct

FAILURE CAUSE E. The outlet duct assembly is a one piece casting with an attached M-100 flowpath ring that directs the turbine discharge to the hot gas manifold. 22 struts are provided for support with 14 for studs to attach to the pump hog, and 4 with tubes and seals for cooling H2 flow which mates with the cooled passages of the turbine case.

The midspan splitter is cast as a full ring and then sliced between each strut to eliminate thermally induced fatigue in the splitter fillet radii. The turbine-side endwall is also sliced radially between each strut and then cut circumferentially to create a thermally compliant flow guide.

Development testing has demonstrated a loose snap condition, between the flow guide and the turbine discharge inner wall, as well as a cracking condition. To correct this, the flowguide has been separated from the outlet duct by making it an independent piece. This flowguide is identified as l/n 282, and is made of PWA-SF 1143 (Inconel 909) material. Gaskets are provided at both the forward and aft joints (l/n 283 & 284) which are made of AMS 5644 (Waspaloy).

The duct must transmit the thrust and torque from the turbine stators to the pump hog.

Engine level testing revealed a downstream impact on the engine tuning vane durability. A redesign to the duct airfoil was accomplished to eliminate this problem.

Material is PWA-SF 1489.

This is a fracture critical part and will meet the requirements of the fracture control plan FR-19793-2 and safe life fracture mechanics requirements and be properly traced throughout the life of the part.

This part does not meet CEI requirements, and inspection limits have been imposed (DAR 0188).

DAR NO. 0188

DVS 4.1.2.9 which requires structural design analysis of the Outlet Duct can be found in FR-20729-07.

DVS 4.1.2.11 which requires a turbine exit flowpath analysis was completed in 6/97, and is documented in FR-20804-91.

DVS 4.1.3.2.4.2 which requires a turbine exit air flow characterization has been completed, and is documented in FR-20833-4 & -5.

DVS 4.1.4.1.6.2 which requires proof pressure test, and vibration tests have been completed, and can be found in FR-20729-07A.

l/n 131 (typical)
Threaded fasteners

FAILURE CAUSE F. Adequate function of the beam lock insert locking feature will be assured by the Fastener Reuse Plan. This plan requires thread gaging per MIL-S-8879, replacement of lubricants, and inspection of locking features. Rejected fasteners will be mutilated.

Deformed thread nuts are used because they provide adequate locking for single use applications.

Threaded fasteners utilized in the pump end were selected for their strength and compatibility in a LOX environment. These include find numbers 40, 022-28-18, 134, 128, and 138 which are all AMS 7468 which is MP35N. The flange l/n 035 is PWA-SP88 (Inco 718) which was also selected for cryogenic capability.

Find numbers 127, 245, and 287 are all AMS 5731 which is A-288, and was selected for it's ductility and cryogenic strength.

B - 523

Critical Item List

Subsystem: HPOTP B500 - 4750000-700
Functional Assy: Structural Section B50004

Prepared by: M.T. Spencer
Approved by: R.L. Pugh
CFL Item: 0403

Page: 107
Issue Date: December 23, 1993
Rev. Date: December 08, 1995

PWA 1146 which is Inco 718 was selected for it's proven history in LOX, and is utilized for flnd numbers 28, 55, 81, and 235.

Threaded fasteners utilized in the turbine section were selected for their strength and ductility, and good resistance to hydrogen embrittlement. These include flnd numbers 022-28-15, 118, 128, 130, 131, 132, 190, and 252, all of which are made of AMS 5731 which is A286. AMS 5732 (also A-286) is utilized for flns 87, 98, 014, 117, 160, and 169, while AMS 7482 is used for fln 022-28-14.

The external threaded fasteners are also AMS 5731 for it's strength and ductility, and include flnd numbers 145, 176, 177, and 199, except nut fln 082 which is AMS E844 (MP35N).

Analysis of the major fastener torque values was completed using a spreadsheet and friction factor test results. The torque ranges are incorporated on the top assembly drawing to preclude joint loosening.

The Inconel 718 inserts are used in oxygen and below -260 degs F in H2 to avoid embrittlement.

The A-286 insert used in the turbine has a fine external thread to avoid misassembly.

The materials used for the nuts include AMS 5732, AMS 5884, and PWA-SP 1146. Each material was selected for its strength in the environment used.

The bolt materials include AMS 7486, and AMS 5731. As with the nuts, the materials were selected relative to strength and environment.

Tab and cup washers are used primarily to lock spanner nuts. Tab washers were not used in the primary flow path to eliminate the possibility that a fibrous tab could enter the flow path.

Interference fit threaded studs are used where there are small differences in the coefficient of thermal expansion, and assures a reasonably consistent fit over the operating range of the pump. Key locked studs were used where a low alpha of the housing coupled with the high alpha of the stud did not lend itself to interference fit.

These parts meet CEI requirements.

Critical Item List

Subsystem: HPOTP B500 - 4750000-700
 Functional Assy: Structural Section B50004

Prepared by: M.T. Spencer
 Approved by: R.L. Pugh
 CIL Item: 0403

Page: 108
 Issue Date: December 23, 1983
 Rev. Date: December 08, 1985

Inspection and Test

Possible Cause	Significant Characteristics	Inspection and Test	Document Ref
Failure Cause A f/n 1, 232 P/B hsg 2, 234 Inner hsg P/B hsg	Material Integrity	Material integrity is verified per specification requirements. Contamination control is verified per specification, Weld repair per specification.	1. PWA-SP 1146 2. PWA-SP 1490-2 1. PWA-SP 36180-4 2. PWA-SP 36158
	INSPECTION		
	Raw Material	Sonic - f/n 232 per QAD X-ray f/n 234 per QAD	SP-XRM Master
	Finished Material	FPI - f/n 232 per QAD FPI - f/n 234 per QAD ECI - f/n 232 per QAD	SP-FPM Master SP-FPM Master SP-ECM Master
Assembly Integrity		Torques are verified per assembly drawing. Cleanliness of components is verified per specification.	FEI 013, & 016 PWA-SP 80
		Leak check of preburner housing with GHe verified per assembly drawing.	
	In-Process Testing	Proof pressure test at room temperature per specification.	FEI 005
Failure Cause B f/n 022 Main hsg and volute	Material Integrity	Material integrity is verified per specification requirements for 22-28-02, 03, and 04 Material integrity is verified per specifications for 22-28-08. Contamination control is verified per specification for item 22-28-12, 18, & 22, and Item 22-28-11	PWA-SP 1490 PWA-SP 1052 PWA-SP 36180-4
	Heat Treat	Heat treat is verified per specification, and drawing requirements. Heat treat is verified per specification and drawing note	PWA-SP 11-31, & 1490 PWA-SP 11 and note
Weld Integrity		Weld integrity is verified per specification requirements. EDMR Weld repair is verified per specification for f/ns 22-28-02, 03, & 04.	PWA-SP 16-22, PWA-SP 16-33, PWA-SP 16-2233, PWA-SP 97-5 PWA-SP 36158-4
INSPECTION			
Raw Material		Sonic - housing 22-28-08 per QAD X-ray - housings 22-28-02, 03, & 04 per QAD	SP-XRM Master

Critical Item List

Subsystem: HPOTP B500 - 4750000-700
 Functional Assy: Structural Section B50004

Prepared by: M.T. Spencer
 Approved by: R.L. Pugh
 CIL Item: 0903

Page: 109
 Issue Date: December 23, 1993
 Rev. Date: December 08, 1995

	Finished Material	FPI - Cast material - Ins. 22-28-02, 03, and 04 per QAD FPI - Wrought material - In 22-28-09 per QAD FPI - Unmechanical welds - In 22 per QAD FPI - Mechanical welds - In 22 per QAD	SP-FPM Master SP-FPM Master SP-FPM Master SP-FPM Master
		ECI - Ins. 22-28-02, 03, and 04 per QAD ECI - In 22-28-08 per QAD Coolant passage min wall thickness is verified per drawing requirements.	SP-ECM Master SP-ECM Master
		X-ray - In 22 per QAD	BP-XRM Master
	Assembly Integrity	Cleanliness of components is verified per specification.	REI 013 PWA-SP 90
	In-Process Testing	Proof pressure test to reflect the proof factors per specification.	REI 005
	HIP	HIP is verified per specification	PWA-SP 4, PWA-SP 1480
Failure Cause C In 114-02 Turbine Inlet Hsg	Material Integrity	Material integrity is verified per specification requirements.	PWA-SP 1489
	Heat Treat	Heat treat is verified per specification, and drawing requirements	PW 11-19, & 1459
	INSPECTION		
	Raw Material	X-ray per QAD	SP-XRM Master
	Finished Material	FPI per QAD	SP-FPM Master
	Assembly Integrity	Locating pins for inner wall are drilled at assembly.	REI 013
Supporting hardware 0403c In 114-02-02 Ring	Material Integrity	Material integrity is verified per specification.	PWA-SP 1074
	INSPECTION		
	Raw Material	Sonic per QAD	
	Finished Material	FPI per QAD ECI per QAD	SP-FPM Master SP-ECM Master

Critical Item List

Subsystem: HPCTP B500 - 4750000-700
 Functional Assy: Structural Section B50004

Prepared by: M.T. Spencer
 Approved by: R.L. Pugh
 CIL Item: 0403

Page: 110
 Issue Date: December 23, 1993
 Rev. Date: December 08, 1995

Supporting hardware 0403c In 114-4 Seal	INSPECTION		
	Finished Material	FPI per QAD	SP-FPM Master
Supporting hardware 0403c In 114-5 Seal	Material Integrity	Material integrity is verified per specification.	PWA-SP 1143
Supporting hardware 0403c In 114-6 Ring		Material integrity is verified per specification and drawing requirements.	PWA-SP 1074
Supporting hardware 0403c In 114-7 Heatshield		Material integrity is verified per specification. EDMR	PWA-SP 1143 PWA-SP 97-6
	INSPECTION		
	Raw Material	Sonic per QAD	
	Finished Material	FPI per QAD	SP-FPM Master
Supporting hardware 0403c In 270 Deflector	Material Integrity	Material integrity is verified per specification requirements.	AMS 560B
	INSPECTION		
	Finished Material	FPI per QAD	SP-FPM Master
Failure Cause D In 059 Turbine case	Material Integrity	Material integrity is verified per specification requirements.	PWA-SP 1074
	INSPECTION		

Critical Item List

Subsystem: HPOTP B500 - 4750000-700
 Functional Assy: Structural Section B50004

Prepared by: M.T. Spencer
 Approved by: R.L. Pugh
 CIL Item: 0403

Page: 111
 Issue Date: December 23, 1988
 Rev. Date: December 08, 1996

	Raw Material	Sonfo - housing per QAD	
	Finished Material	ECI - assembly per QAD	SP-ECM Master
		FPI - at the detail or assembly level per QAD	SP-FPM Master
Failure Cause E In 013 Outlet duct	Material Integrity	Material integrity is verified per specification requirements.	PWA-SP 1488, PWA-SP 1074
	Heat Treat	Heat treat is verified per specification, and drawing requirements.	PWA-SP 11-1B, & 1489
	INSPECTION		
	Raw Material	X-ray per QAD	SP-XRM Master
		Sonic per QAD	
	Finished Material	FPI per QAD	SP-FPM Master
		ECI per QAD	SP-ECM Master
Supporting hardware 0403e In 202 Flowguide	Material Integrity	Material integrity is verified per specification	AMS 1143
	INSPECTION		
	Raw Material	Sonic per QAD	
	Finished Material	FPI per QAD	SP-FPM Master
Failure Cause F In 131 (typical) Fasteners	Material Integrity	Material integrity is verified per specification and drawing requirements. 1. Find nos. 177, 116, 127, 128, 245, 131, 132, 145, 176, 181, 190, 198, 287, 252, 130, or 22-28-15. 2. Find nos. 13, 14, 60, 67, 160, 88, 117 or 169. 3. Find no. 62 4. Find no. 65, 28, 62, 73, 91, 235, 062, or 073 5. Find nos. 128, 40, 134, 136, or 22-26-18 6. Find nos. 35 7. Find nos. 22-28-12, 22-28-13, 24-02-03, 60, or 244-03 8. Find no. 60	1. AMS 5731 2. AMS 6732, or 5737 3. AMS 5844 4. PWA 1148 5. AMS 7469 6. PWA-SP 96 7. AMS 5662 8. AMS 7482 10. AMS 7482

Critical Item List

Subsystem: HPOTP B500 - 4750000-700
 Functional Assy: Structural Section B50004

Prepared by: M.T. Spencer
 Approved by: R.L. Pugh
 CIL Num: 0403

Page: 112
 Issue Date: December 23, 1993
 Rev. Date: December 08, 1995

9. Deleted
 10. Find no. 22-28-14

Heat Treat Heat Treat in 13 is verified per drawing requirements.

INSPECTION

Raw Material Sonic - Find nos. 14, 55, 91, 169, , 177, 128, 035, 245, 129, 134, 145, 176, 190, 199, 267 per QAD
 Sonic - Find nos. 073 per QAD
 Sonic - Find no. 22-28-14 per QAD

Finished Material FPI - Find nos. 177, 116, 127, 40, 245, 131, 129, 132, 134, 138, 176, 199, 190, 267, 252, 60, 22-28-14, 22-28-15, 22-28-18, 130, 181 per QAD SP-FPM Master
 FPI - Find nos. 14, 62, 82, 067, 160, 96, 169, 145, 062 per QAD SP-FPM Master
 FPI - Find nos. 28, 91, 073, 235, 85 per QAD SP-FPM Master
 ECI - Find nos. 91, 128, 035, 134, 55 per QAD SP-ECM Master

Assembly Integrity Torque values for the following find numbers will be verified per drawing requirements: REI 013
 Find Nos. - 062, 067, 134, 145, 138, 035, 235, 040, 082, 128, 199, 176, 177, 035

All fasteners shall be installed in accordance with REI 016 to insure joint integrity. REI 013

Where accessible, the locking features of the locking devices shall be visually inspected for evidence of cracks, tears, creases, or steps. REI 013

All Cause General Quality Requirements: Supplier Quality Assurance requirements are included in PW-QA-6079, and include such requirements as first piece layout. This requires the documentation of dimensions on all characteristics represented on the delivered article. PWA-SP 300

Inspection Methods Sheets for use in the inspection of purchased parts and assemblies contain the necessary information to insure that the requirements of the QADs, engineering drawings, and referenced documents are satisfied. For shop fabricated parts, the sheets are audited by Inspection Methods.

The purchase orders for vendor supplied parts must comply with PWA-SP 300, 'Control of Materials Processes and Parts', which requires the vendor to provide material, process, and dimensional information to the Quality Department.

Acceptance Acceptance test will be conducted as required by contract, to demonstrate specified performance. DR SE-13

Maintenance Shaft rotation torque check is performed after engine operation, or HPOTP installation/reinstallation. OMR30 - V41CBO050

B - 528 01

Critical Item List

Subsystem: HPOTP B530 - 4750000-700
Functional Assy: Structural Section B500D4

Prepared by: M.T. Spencer
Approved by: R.L. Pugh
CIL Item: 0403

Page: 113
Issue Date: December 23, 1993
Rev. Date: December 08, 1995

Turbine end ball bearing, pump end ball bearing, and roller bearing inspection is performed on a contingency basis as a result of any anomaly experienced during engine operation, or as a consequence of handling.

Turbine end bearing drying is initiated within 48 hours of landing or test termination.

OMRSD - V41CBO.065

Clearliness

Cleanliness of components will be assured by compliance to Contamination Control Specification.

PWA-SP80

All Cause
(n : 059 TOVS, 013 TAD)

Waivers

The TOVS does not meet CEI life requirements, so a life limit and inspection requirement has been imposed (DAR 0184)

DAR NO. 0184

The TAD does not meet CEI requirements, so life and inspection limits have been imposed (DAR 0188).

DAR NO. 0188