

**SSME FA/CIL
REDUNDANCY SCREEN**

Component Group: Propellant Valves
 CIL Item: D130-04
 Component: Fuel Preburner Oxidizer Valve
 Part Number: RS008267
 Failure Mode: Structural failure.

Prepared: P. Lowrimore
 Approved: T. Nguyen
 Approval Date: 8/30/99
 Change #: 1
 Directive #: CCBD ME3-01-5226
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Phase	Failure / Effect Description	Criticality Hazard Reference
PSMCD 4.1	Oxidizer flow to preburner reduced; high pressure oxidizer leakage into aft compartment. Loss of vehicle. Redundancy Screens: SINGLE POINT FAILURE: N/A.	1 ME-C3P,D, ME-C3S, ME-C3M, ME-C3A,C

SSME FMEA/CIL
DESIGN

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Design / Document Reference

FAILURE CAUSE: A: Fracture of housing or end cap.

THE FPOV HOUSING (1) AND CAP (2) ARE MADE FROM HEAT TREATED INCONEL 718 (1). THE HIGH STRENGTH AND RELATIVELY LOW THERMAL EXPANSION-CONTRACTION CHARACTERISTICS ARE PRIMARILY THE REASON FOR SELECTING INCONEL 718. INCONEL 718 EXHIBITS CRYOGENIC DUCTILITY AND HIGH MODULUS OF ELASTICITY. IT IS CORROSION RESISTANT AND HAS HIGH RESISTANCE TO STRESS CORROSION CRACKING (3). THE ROUGH MACHINED HOUSING IS HYDROSTATIC PRESSURIZED (4) AND THE FINAL MACHINED HOUSING AND CAP ARE PROOF PRESSURE TESTED TO ASSURE PART INTEGRITY (5). THE HIGH CYCLE AND LOW CYCLE FATIGUE LIFE OF THE FPOV MEETS CEI REQUIREMENTS (6). THE MINIMUM FACTORS OF SAFETY FOR THE FPOV MEET CEI REQUIREMENTS (7). THE FPOV WAS CLEARED FOR FRACTURE MECHANICS/NDE FLAW GROWTH SINCE IT CONTAINS NO FRACTURE CRITICAL PARTS (8). THE FPOV HAS COMPLETED DESIGN VERIFICATION TESTING (9), INCLUDING VIBRATION (10), AND ENDURANCE TESTS (11).

(1) RS008236; (2) RS008266; (3) RSS-8582; (4) RL00185; (5) RL00472; (6) RL00532, CP320R0003B; (7) RSS-8546, CP320R0003B; (8) NASA TASK 117; (9) DVS-SSME-515, (10) RSS-515-24; (11) RSS-515-17

**SSME FME MIL
INSPECTION AND TEST**

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Failure Causes	Significant Characteristics	Inspection(s) / Test(s)	Document Reference
A	HOUSING CAP HOUSING FORGING MATERIAL INTEGRITY	MATERIAL INTEGRITY IS VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. TWO TRANSVERSE AND ONE LONGITUDINAL TENSILE SPECIMENS ARE TAKEN FROM THE HOUSING FORGING AT LOCATIONS SPECIFIED ON DRAWING. SPECIMENS ARE TESTED TO ESTABLISH CONFORMANCE TO THE REQUIRED MECHANICAL PROPERTIES. THE HOUSING AND CAP HEAT TREAT IS VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. THE HOUSING IS PROOF PRESSURE TESTED AFTER ROUGH MACHINING. THE HOUSING AND CAP ARE PENETRANT INSPECTED AFTER FINAL MACHINING.	RS002236 RS008286 RS008303 RS008303
	ASSEMBLY INTEGRITY	THE ASSEMBLED VALVE IS PRESSURE FUNCTIONAL, AND LEAK TESTED.	RA0611-020 RL00185
	HOT-FIRE ACCEPTANCE TESTING (GREEN RUN)	VALVE OPERATION IS VERIFIED THROUGH HOT-FIRE ACCEPTANCE TESTING. THE VALVE IS HELIUM SIGNATURE LEAK TESTED. (LAST TEST)	RA0115-116 RL00472 RL00461 QMRSD 500000 950

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Failure History: Comprehensive failure history data is maintained in the Problem Reporting database (PRAMS/PRACA)
 Reference: NASA letter SA21786/308 and Rocketdyne letter 69RC09761.
 Operational Use: Not Applicable.

SSME F FA/CIL
WELD JOINTS

Component Group: Propellant Valves
 CIL Item: D130
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Component	Basic Part Number	Weld Number	Weld Type	Class	Root Side Not Access	Critical Initial Flaw Size Not Detectable		Comments
						HCF	LCF	
BELLOWS	RS008230	3,4	GTAW	II	X	X		
BELLOWS	RS008230	5,7	GTAW	I				
SHAFT	RS008252	1,2	EBW	II	X	X		