

April 19, 1996

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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1) CIL ITEM : F200-AV-02
2) FMEA CODE : F200-AV
3) COMPONENT : PROPELLANT VALVE ACTUATOR FAILSAFE SERVO SWITCH CONTROL
4) PART NUMBER : RE1493
5) SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM : CONTROLLER/F200-NK
6) FAILURE MODE : FAILURE TO REMOVE THE CURRENT TO DE-ENERGIZE A SERVO SWITCH COIL

7) PREPARED : SSME RELIABILITY
8) APPROVED :
9) DATE : 03-19-96
10) REVISION/CHANGE : -001/D
11) EFFECTIVITY : -05
12) HAZARD REFERENCE : SEE LISTINGS BELOW
13) CCBD # : ME3-013285

PHASE	FAILURE DESCRIPTION/EFFECT	CRITICALITY
M 4-2	FAILURE TO DE-ENERGIZE A SERVO SWITCH COIL IN BOTH OF CHANNELS RESULTS IN PNEUMATIC SHUTDOWN VIA POWER DOWN MATRIX. MISSION ABORT. (SEE OPERATIONAL USE.) REDUNDANCY SCREENS: CONTROLLER SYSTEM: LIKE REDUNDANCY A: PASS. REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEMS ARE CAPABLE OF CHECKOUT DURING NORMAL GROUND TURNAROUND. B: PASS. LOSS OF A REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEM IS DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT. C: PASS. LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEMS COULD NOT RESULT FROM A SINGLE CREDIBLE EVENT.	IR HAZARD REF: ME-044

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CCL ITEM: F200-AV-02

DESIGN

DOCUMENT REF.

ALL CAUSES: OUTPUT ELECTRONICS: ON-OFF VALVE DRIVER FAILURE, FALSE COMMAND PROCESSED TO DRIVER (1)

(1) HONEYWELL BLOCK 11
FMEA VOL V OE-F13

DUAL REDUNDANT SERVOSWITCH DRIVERS ARE PROVIDED FOR EACH PROPELLANT VALVE (1). A FAILURE IN EACH CONTROLLER CHANNEL, RESULTING IN INABILITY TO DE-ENERGIZE A SERVOSWITCH, RESULTS IN PNEUMATIC SHUTDOWN VIA POWER DOWN MATRIX (2). THE CONTROLLER (WITH SOFTWARE) IS CONFIGURED TO DETECT AND RESPOND PROPERLY TO OUT OF QUALIFICATION LIMIT FAILURES, IMPLEMENT THE APPROPRIATE REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT RESPONSE, AND COMMAND A SAFE ENGINE STATE WHEN CONTROLLER REDUNDANCY IS LOST (2). HOWEVER, THE CONTROLLER (WITH SOFTWARE) IS NOT CAPABLE OF DETECTING OR RESPONDING TO A FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN THE LIMITS BEING MONITORED FAILING WITHIN ENGINE REDLINE LIMITS OR WITHIN NORMAL ENGINE OPERATING CONDITIONS (2).

(1) DSHG8977A1
(2) CP406R0008
3.1.3:4
3.2.1:6.3
3.2.3:2.3
3.2.3:3
3.2.3:6
3.2.4

ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL, AND ELECTROMECHANICAL PARTS FOR THE CIRCUITS INVOLVED IN THIS FUNCTION HAVE BEEN SELECTED FROM THE CLASS S OR EQUIVALENT APPROVED PARTS SELECTION LIST (1), QUALITY ASSURANCE AND SCREENING REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH RELIABILITY MICROCIRCUITS (2), AND THE SPECIFICATION CONTROL DRAWING FOR MICROCIRCUITS, MONOLITHIC SILICON, AND TRANSISTOR-TRANSISTOR LOGIC (TTL) FAMILY OF DEVICES (3). PRIOR TO INSTALLATION ON THE CARD ASSEMBLIES, COMPONENTS ARE SUBJECTED TO A BURN-IN PERIOD WHERE PARTS ARE EXERCISED AT TEMPERATURES IN EXCESS OF NORMAL CONTROLLER OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, BUT LESS THAN COMPONENT MAXIMUM SPECIFIED OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, TO SCREEN FOR INFANT MORTALITY (4). IN ADDITION TO THESE REQUIREMENTS, ALL COMPONENTS ARE DERATED FROM THE MAXIMUM RATING AT OPERATING EXTREMES (5). CLEANLINESS AND ALL PROCESSES USED DURING MANUFACTURE ARE CONTROLLED BY SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS (5).

(1) 85M03928,
85M03929
(2) 85M02704
(3) 85M03766
(4) 85M03876
(5) DSHG8977A1

THE CONTROLLER DESIGN MEETS ALL CEI FAIL-OPERATE/FAILSAFE REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS FAILURE MODE (1): REDUNDANT CONTROLLER CHANNEL FUNCTIONS ARE PHYSICALLY SEPARATED WITHIN THE CONTROLLER HOUSING (2). CIRCUITS ARE DESIGNED TO PREVENT BRIDGING (2), ALL EEE PARTS ARE REQUIRED TO HAVE CONFORMAL COATING, AND INTERNAL WIRING IS INSULATED TO PREVENT SHORT CIRCUITS FROM CONDUCTIVE CONTAMINATION (3). ALL ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS ARE CONTAINED WITHIN THE CASE STRUCTURE WHICH IS PRESSURIZED WITH A POSITIVE PRESSURE INERT GAS BACKFILL TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION (2). WHERE APPLICABLE, ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE SHIELDING IS PROVIDED AND CIRCUIT INTERCONNECTS USE TWISTED PAIR WIRING (2). ALL CIRCUIT CARDS ARE KEYS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CONNECTION LOCATIONS TO PRECLUDE IMPROPER INSTALLATION (2). RAMP CLAMPS ARE UTILIZED TO PRECLUDE VIBRATION INDUCED CANN FAILURES (2). DESIGN OF CIRCUIT CARDS AND DETERMINATION OF COPPER PATH TRACE SPACING, WEIGHT, AND WIDTH IS CONTROLLED BY SPECIFICATION (2). EACH UNIT (PRODUCTION AND RECYCLE) IS REQUIRED TO PASS A FUNCTIONAL ACCEPTANCE TEST UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS BEYOND THOSE SEEN DURING NORMAL FIELD OPERATION WITHOUT DEGRADATION OF HARDWARE LIFE EXPECTANCY (2). A WORST CASE CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY NOMINAL OPERATION AT SPECIFICATION LIMITS (4). AN ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED BY HONEYWELL TO ASSURE NO SINGLE POINT COMPONENT FAILURES ARE INHERENT TO THE CONTROLLER DESIGN (5).

(1) CP320R00038
(2) DSHG8977A1
(3) 85M03928
(4) ES24472-01
(5) HONEYWELL BLOCK 11
FMEA VOL I

CIL ITEM: F20D-AV-02		DESIGN	DOCUMENT REF.
		DESIGN QUALIFICATION TESTING OF THE CONTROLLER ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN PERFORMED INCLUDING: FAULT INSERTION TESTING (1), ASSEMBLY THERMAL CYCLING (2), CASE AND ASSEMBLY VIBRATION TESTING (3), ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TESTING (4), ACOUSTICAL NOISE TESTING (5), CASE ULTIMATE PRESSURE TESTING (6), AND ASSEMBLY BREAK OPEN INSPECTION (7).	(1) TR34079282 TR34080202 TR34080258 TR34080259 (2) TR34080203 TR34080207 (3) TR34080204 TR34080205 TR34080206 TR34087499 (4) TR34080209 (5) TR34080210 (6) TR34085021 (7) TR34085022
CIL ITEM: F20D-AV-02		INSPECTION AND TEST	
POSSIBLE CAUSES	SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS	INSPECTION(S)/TEST(S)	DOCUMENT REF.
ALL CAUSES:	RE1493 - CONTROLLER		RE1493
	ASSEMBLY INTEGRITY	CLEANLINESS REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION DURING MANUFACTURING OF THE CONTROLLER ASSEMBLY. ENVIRONMENT CONTROLS (TEMPERATURE, HUMIDITY) ARE ENFORCED DURING ASSEMBLY AND TESTING PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. TO PREVENT COMPONENT DAMAGE, STATIC ELECTRICAL DISCHARGE POTENTIAL IS CONTROLLED DURING MANUFACTURING PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RC1493 DSHG8977A1 DSHG8977A1
	MATERIAL INTEGRITY	MATERIAL INTEGRITY IS VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RC1493

CIL ITEM: F200-AV-02		INSPECTION AND TEST	
POSSIBLE CAUSES	SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS	INSPECTION(S)/TEST(S)	DOCUMENT REF.
		PROTECTIVE FINISHES AND MATERIAL SELECTION TO PREVENT DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS FROM ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE, STRESS CORROSION, AND ELECTROLYTIC CORROSION ARE VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RC1493 MSFC-SPEC-25D
		FLAMMABILITY REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RC1493
	INTEGRITY OF ELECTRONICS	THE FOLLOWING PROCESSES ARE VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION DURING MANUFACTURING OF THE CARD ASSEMBLIES: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CONSTRUCTION OF PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS. - INSTALLATION OF TERMINALS. - PLASTICS AND ELASTOMERS FOR ELECTRONIC ENCAPSULATION. - SOLDERED ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS. - POST-SOLDERING INSPECTION FREE OF SPLATTER AND CONTAMINATION. - ELECTRICAL BONDING. - COMPONENT LEAD AND INTERCONNECTION MATERIAL SELECTION. - FREE OF CONTAMINATION AFTER CONFORMAL COATING. 	RL10005 RL10007 RL1000B RL10009 RL10009 RC1493 DSHD3928 RC1493
	WELD INTEGRITY	ALL WELDS ARE VERIFIED TO DRAWING AND SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RL10011
	PRE-CLOSEOUT TESTING AND INSPECTION	THE FOLLOWING TESTS ARE PERFORMED AT THE CARD/COMPONENT LEVEL DURING MANUFACTURING: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PARTIAL IMPACT NOISE DETECTION (PIND) TEST ON HYBRID MICROCIRCUITS AND CAVITY TYPE DEVICES. - ULTRASONIC SCAN TEST FOR DELAMINATION CERAMIC ON CAPACITORS (CKR05 AND CKR06). - BURN-IN PERIOD FOR ELECTRICAL PARTS. - INSULATION RESISTANCE AND CONTINUITY TEST. - DIELECTRIC WITHSTANDING VOLTAGE. - FUNCTIONAL TEST. - X-RAY OF CONTROLLER INTERNAL CABLES AND WIRES. 	DSHG8977A1 DSHG8977A1 DSHD3928 DSHG8977A1 DSHG8977A1 DSHG8977A1 DSHG8977A1

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CIL ITEM: F200-AV-02		INSPECTION AND TEST	
POSSIBLE CAUSES	SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS	INSPECTION(S)/TEST(S)	DOCUMENT REF.
		<p>THE FOLLOWING INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED ON THE COMPLETED ASSEMBLY PRIOR TO FINAL CLOSURE:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CLEANLINESS. - CARD DIMENSIONS ARE VERIFIED AT CARD ASSEMBLY. - CHASSIS CAVITY INSPECTION FOR CONTAMINATION. - ELECTRICAL INTERFACE CONNECTORS. - CARD INSTALLATION AND CONFIGURATION AUDIT. - CONFORMAL COATING OF EEE PARTS. 	<p>RC1493 DSHG8977A1 RC1493 RC1493 DSHG8977A1 BSM03928</p>
	ACCEPTANCE TESTS	<p>THE FOLLOWING TESTS ARE PERFORMED BY HONEYWELL DURING ACCEPTANCE TESTING:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - HERMETIC SEAL AND PRESSURIZATION PORT LEAK TEST. - FUNCTIONAL TEST INCLUDING: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - OUTPUT INTERFACE, - CHECKOUT, - OPERATION, - CONTROLLER CHECKOUT, - HIGH TEMPERATURE OPERATION. - LOW TEMPERATURE OPERATION. - VIBRATION TESTING. - FINAL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 	<p>RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493</p>
	HOT FIRE ACCEPTANCE TESTING (GREEN RUN)	<p>CONTROLLER OPERATION IS VERIFIED THROUGH ENGINE HOT FIRE ACCEPTANCE TESTING.</p>	<p>RL00461</p>
	HERMETIC SEAL INTEGRITY	<p>INTERNAL PRESSURE IS MONITORED DURING CONTROLLER OPERATION.</p>	<p>OMRSD V41AND.040</p>
	FLIGHT FLOW TESTING	<p>THE FOLLOWING TESTS ARE PERFORMED DURING FLIGHT FLOW VEHICLE PROCESSING AND AFTER ANY MAINTENANCE OR REPLACEMENT:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CONTROLLER CHECKOUT. - ACTUATOR CHECKOUT. - FLIGHT READINESS TEST. - SELF-TEST. 	<p>OMRSD V41AND.035 OMRSD V41ASD.010 OMRSD V41ASD.030-A CP406R008</p>

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CIL ITEM: F200-AV-02		INSPECTION AND TEST	
POSSIBLE CAUSES	SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS	INSPECTION(S)/TEST(S)	DOCUMENT REF.
	PRE-FLIGHT CHECKOUT	THE FOLLOWING TESTS ARE PERFORMED DURING LAUNCH COUNTDOWN: - PRE-DRYD LOADING CONTROLLER CHECKOUT. - SELF-TEST.	OMR50 S00FA0.213 CP406R0002
		CONTROLLER OPERATION IS VERIFIED BY THE GROUND LAUNCH SEQUENCER PRIOR TO ENGINE START BY ACCEPTANCE OF COMMANDS PURGE SEQUENCE 4, POWER LEVEL, AND START ENABLE.	LAUNCH COMMIT CRITERIA B6E-4-1126
	CONTINUOUS SELF-TEST	SITE TEST IS PERFORMED EVERY MAJOR CYCLE TO VERIFY HARDWARE INTEGRITY. (LAST TEST)	CP406R0008
FAILURE HISTORY: COMPREHENSIVE FAILURE HISTORY DATA IS MAINTAINED IN THE PROBLEM REPORTING DATABASE (PRAMS/PRACA). REFERENCE: NASA LETTER SA21/BB/308 AND ROCKETDYNE LETTER BR9C09761.			

OPERATIONAL USE: FAILURE MODE CAN BE DETECTED IN REALTIME BY THE FLIGHT CONTROL TEAM WHO WILL EVALUATE EFFECTS UPON VEHICLE PERFORMANCE AND ABORT CAPABILITY. BASED ON THIS EVALUATION THE APPROPRIATE ABORT MODE OR SYSTEM CONFIGURATION WILL BE SELECTED. FAILURE DETECTION CLUES AND ASSOCIATED SSME PERFORMANCE DATA HAVE BEEN COORDINATED BETWEEN THE ENGINEERING AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS ORGANIZATIONS WITH THE RESPONSES DOCUMENTED IN MISSION FLIGHT RULES.