

- 1) CIL ITEM : F200-0K-02
- 2) FMEA CODE : F200-0K
- 3) COMPONENT : HPOTP INTERMEDIATE SEAL PURGE CONTROL VALVE SOLENOID
- 4) PART NUMBER : RE1493
- 5) SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM : CONTROLLER/F200
- 6) FAILURE MODE : FAILURE TO PROVIDE CURRENT TO MAINTAIN SOLENOID ENERGIZED

- 7) PREPARED : SSME RELIABILITY
- 8) APPROVED :
- 9) DATE : 06-19-96
- 10) REVISION/CHANGE : -001/0
- 11) EFFECTIVITY : -05
- 12) HAZARD REFERENCE : SEE LISTINGS BELOW
- 13) CCB #

ME3-01-3285

PHASE	FAILURE DESCRIPTION/EFFECT	CRITICALITY
<p>S 4-2</p>	<p>FAILURE TO MAINTAIN BOTH COIL DRIVERS ENERGIZED RESULTS IN A REDLINE SHUTDOWN AND THE EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN (EMSD) SOLENOID DE-ENERGIZED ENABLING IMSL PURGE THROUGH THE PURGE SEQUENCE PAV. PNEUMATIC ENGINE SHUTDOWN. MISSION SCRB. LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO HPOTP FAILURE MAY RESULT IF HPOTP IMSL PURGE FAILURE IS NOT DETECTED.</p> <p>REDUNDANCY SCREENS: CONTROLLER SYSTEM - SENSOR SYSTEM: UNLIKE REDUNDANCY</p> <p>A: PASS. REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEMS ARE CAPABLE OF CHECKOUT DURING NORMAL GROUND TURNAROUND. B: FAIL. LOSS OF A REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEM IS NOT DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT. C: PASS. LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEMS COULD NOT RESULT FROM A SINGLE CREDIBLE EVENT.</p>	<p>IR HAZARD REF: ME-C15,M</p>
<p>M 4-2</p>	<p>FAILURE TO MAINTAIN BOTH COIL DRIVERS ENERGIZED RESULTS IN A REDLINE SHUTDOWN AND AN EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN (EMSD) SOLENOID DE-ENERGIZED ENABLING IMSL PURGE THROUGH THE PURGE SEQUENCE PAV. ENGINE SHUTDOWN. MISSION ABORT. LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO HPOTP FAILURE MAY RESULT IF HPOTP IMSL PURGE FAILURE IS NOT DETECTED.</p> <p>REDUNDANCY SCREENS: CONTROLLER SYSTEM - SENSOR SYSTEM: UNLIKE REDUNDANCY</p> <p>A: PASS. REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEMS ARE CAPABLE OF CHECKOUT DURING NORMAL GROUND TURNAROUND. B: FAIL. LOSS OF A REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEM IS NOT DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT. C: PASS. LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEMS COULD NOT RESULT FROM A SINGLE CREDIBLE EVENT.</p>	<p>IR HAZARD REF: ME-C15,M</p>
<p>C 4-2</p>	<p>FAILURE TO MAINTAIN BOTH COILS ENERGIZED RESULTS IN EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN SOLENOID DE-ENERGIZED RESPONSE, ENABLING IMSL PURGE THROUGH THE PURGE SEQUENCE PAV. LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO HPOTP FAILURE MAY RESULT IF LOSS OF HPOTP IMSL PURGE IS NOT DETECTED.</p> <p>REDUNDANCY SCREENS: CONTROLLER SYSTEM - SENSOR SYSTEM: UNLIKE REDUNDANCY</p> <p>A: PASS. REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEMS ARE CAPABLE OF CHECKOUT DURING NORMAL GROUND TURNAROUND. B: FAIL. LOSS OF A REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEM IS NOT DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT. C: PASS. LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEMS COULD NOT RESULT FROM A SINGLE CREDIBLE EVENT.</p>	<p>IR HAZARD REF: ME-C1A,C</p>

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CIL ITEM: F200-BK-02	DESIGN	DOCUMENT REF.
ALL CAUSES: OUTPUT ELECTRONICS: SOLENOID VALVE DRIVER OR FALSE COMMAND PROCESSED TO THE DRIVER (1)		(1) HONEYWELL BLOCK II FMEA VOL V DE-F14
DUAL REDUNDANT COIL DRIVERS ARE PROVIDED FOR EACH SOLENOID VALVE (1). A FAILURE IN BOTH CONTROLLER CHANNELS (MULTIPLE FAILURE), RESULTING IN LOSS OF HOLDING CURRENT TO A SOLENOID COIL, RESULTS IN LIMIT EXCEEDED SHUTDOWN AND DE-ENERGIZING OF THE EMSD SOLENOID, ENABLING IMSL PURGE THROUGH THE PURGE SEQUENCE PRESSURE ACTUATED VALVES (2). THE CONTROLLER (WITH SOFTWARE) IS CONFIGURED TO DETECT AND RESPOND PROPERLY TO OUT OF QUALIFICATION LIMIT FAILURES, IMPLEMENT THE APPROPRIATE REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT RESPONSE, AND COMMAND A SAFE ENGINE STATE WHEN CONTROLLER REDUNDANCY IS LOST (2). HOWEVER, THE CONTROLLER (WITH SOFTWARE) IS NOT CAPABLE OF DETECTING OR RESPONDING TO A FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN THE LIMITS BEING MONITORED FAILING WITHIN ENGINE REDLINE LIMITS OR WITHIN NORMAL ENGINE OPERATING CONDITIONS (2).		(1) DSHG8977A1 (2) CP406ND008 3.1.3:4 3.2.1:6.3 3.2.3:2.3 3.2.3:3 3.2.3:6 3.2.4
ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL, AND ELECTROMECHANICAL PARTS FOR THE CIRCUITS INVOLVED IN THIS FUNCTION HAVE BEEN SELECTED FROM THE CLASS S OR EQUIVALENT APPROVED PARTS SELECTION LIST (1), QUALITY ASSURANCE AND SCREENING REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH RELIABILITY MICROCIRCUITS (2), AND THE SPECIFICATION CONTROL DRAWING FOR MICROCIRCUITS, MONOLITHIC SILICON, AND TRANSISTOR-TRANSISTOR LOGIC (TTL) FAMILY OF DEVICES (3). PRIOR TO INSTALLATION ON THE CARD ASSEMBLIES, COMPONENTS ARE SUBJECTED TO A BURN-IN PERIOD WHERE PARTS ARE EXERCISED AT TEMPERATURES IN EXCESS OF NORMAL CONTROLLER OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, BUT LESS THAN COMPONENT MAXIMUM SPECIFIED OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, TO SCREEN FOR INFANT MORTALITY (4). IN ADDITION TO THESE REQUIREMENTS, ALL COMPONENTS ARE DERATED FROM THE MAXIMUM RATING AT OPERATING EXTREMES (5). CLEANLINESS AND ALL PROCESSES USED DURING MANUFACTURE ARE CONTROLLED BY SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS (5).		(1) B5M03928, B5M03929 (2) B5M02704 (3) B5M03766 (4) B5M03876 (5) DSHG8977A1
THE CONTROLLER DESIGN MEETS ALL CEI FAIL-OPERATE/FAILSAFE REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS FAILURE MODE (1). REDUNDANT CONTROLLER CHANNEL FUNCTIONS ARE PHYSICALLY SEPARATED WITHIN THE CONTROLLER HOUSING (2). CIRCUITS ARE DESIGNED TO PREVENT BRIDGING (2), ALL EEE PARTS ARE REQUIRED TO HAVE CONFORMAL COATING, AND INTERNAL WIRING IS INSULATED TO PREVENT SHORT CIRCUITS FROM CONDUCTIVE CONTAMINATION (3). ALL ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS ARE CONTAINED WITHIN THE CASE STRUCTURE WHICH IS PRESSURIZED WITH A POSITIVE PRESSURE INERT GAS BACKFILL TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION (2). WHERE APPLICABLE, ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE SHIELDING IS PROVIDED AND CIRCUIT INTERCONNECTS USE TWISTED PAIR WIRING (2). ALL CIRCUIT CARDS ARE KEYS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CONNECTION LOCATIONS TO PRECLUDE IMPROPER INSTALLATION (2). RAMP CLAMPS ARE UTILIZED TO PRECLUDE VIBRATION INDUCED CARD FAILURES (2). DESIGN OF CIRCUIT CARDS AND DETERMINATION OF COPPER PATH TRACE SPACING, WEIGHT, AND WIDTH IS CONTROLLED BY SPECIFICATION (2). EACH UNIT (PRODUCTION AND RECYCLE) IS REQUIRED TO PASS A FUNCTIONAL ACCEPTANCE TEST UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS BEYOND THOSE SEEN DURING NORMAL FIELD OPERATION WITHOUT DEGRADATION OF HARDWARE LIFE EXPECTANCY (2). A WORST CASE CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY NOMINAL OPERATION AT SPECIFICATION LIMITS (4). AN ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED BY HONEYWELL TO ASSURE NO SINGLE POINT COMPONENT FAILURES ARE INHERENT TO THE CONTROLLER DESIGN (5).		(1) CPJ20R0003B (2) DSHG8977A1 (3) B5M03928 (4) ES24472-01 (5) HONEYWELL BLOCK II FMEA VOL I

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DESIGN QUALIFICATION TESTING OF THE CONTROLLER ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN PERFORMED INCLUDING: FAULT INSERTION TESTING (1), ASSEMBLY THERMAL CYCLING (2), CASE AND ASSEMBLY VIBRATION TESTING (3), ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TESTING (4), ACOUSTICAL NOISE TESTING (5), CASE ULTIMATE PRESSURE TESTING (6), AND ASSEMBLY BREAK OPEN INSPECTION (7).			(1) TR34079202 TR34080202 TR34080250 TR34080259 (2) TR34080203 TR34080207 (3) TR34080204 TR34080205 TR34080206 TR34087499 (4) TR34080209 (5) TR34080210 (6) TR34085021 (7) TR34085022
[CIL ITEM: F200-BK-02]		INSPECTION AND TEST	
POSSIBLE CAUSES	SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS	INSPECTION(S)/TEST(S)	DOCUMENT REF.
ALL CAUSES:	RE1493 - CONTROLLER		RE1493
	ASSEMBLY INTEGRITY	CLEANLINESS REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION DURING MANUFACTURING OF THE CONTROLLER ASSEMBLY. ENVIRONMENT CONTROLS (TEMPERATURE, HUMIDITY) ARE ENFORCED DURING ASSEMBLY AND TESTING PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. TO PREVENT COMPONENT DAMAGE, STATIC ELECTRICAL DISCHARGE POTENTIAL IS CONTROLLED DURING MANUFACTURING PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RC1493 DSHG8977A1 DSHG8977A1
	MATERIAL INTEGRITY	MATERIAL INTEGRITY IS VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RC1493

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POSSIBLE CAUSES	SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS	INSPECTION(S)/TEST(S)	DOCUMENT REF.
		PROTECTIVE FINISHES AND MATERIAL SELECTION TO PREVENT DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS FROM ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE, STRESS CORROSION, AND ELECTROLYTIC CORROSION ARE VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RC1493 NSFC-SPEC-250
		FLAMMABILITY REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RC1493
	INTEGRITY OF ELECTRONICS	THE FOLLOWING PROCESSES ARE VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION DURING MANUFACTURING OF THE CARD ASSEMBLIES: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CONSTRUCTION OF PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS. - INSTALLATION OF TERMINALS. - PLASTICS AND ELASTOMERS FOR ELECTRONIC ENCAPSULATION. - SOLDERED ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS. - POST-SOLDERING INSPECTION FREE OF SPLATTER AND CONTAMINATION. - ELECTRICAL BONDING. - COMPONENT LEAD AND INTERCONNECTION MATERIAL SELECTION. - FREE OF CONTAMINATION AFTER CONFORMAL COATING. 	RL10005 RL10007 RL10008 RL10009 RC1493 BSM03928 RC1493
	WELD INTEGRITY	ALL WELDS ARE VERIFIED TO DRAWING AND SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RL10011
	PRE-CLOSEOUT TESTING AND INSPECTION	THE FOLLOWING TESTS ARE PERFORMED AT THE CARD/COMPONENT LEVEL DURING MANUFACTURING: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PARTIAL IMPACT NOISE DETECTION (PIND) TEST ON HYBRID MICROCIRCUITS AND CAVITY TYPE DEVICES. - ULTRASONIC SCAN TEST FOR DELAMINATION CERAMIC ON CAPACITORS (CGR05 AND CCR06). - BURN-IN PERIOD FOR ELECTRICAL PARTS. - INSULATION RESISTANCE AND CONTINUITY TEST. - DIELECTRIC WITHSTANDING VOLTAGE. - FUNCTIONAL TEST. - X-RAY OF CONTROLLER INTERNAL CABLES AND WIRES. 	OSHG8977A1 OSHG8977A1 BSM03928 OSHG8977A1 OSHG8977A1 OSHG8977A1 OSHG8977A1

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POSSIBLE CAUSES	SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS	INSPECTION(S)/TEST(S)	DOCUMENT REF.
		<p>THE FOLLOWING INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED ON THE COMPLETED ASSEMBLY PRIOR TO FINAL CLOSURE:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CLEANLINESS. - CARD DIMENSIONS ARE VERIFIED AT CARD ASSEMBLY. - CHASSIS CAVITY INSPECTION FOR CONTAMINATION. - ELECTRICAL INTERFACE CONNECTORS. - CARD INSTALLATION AND CONFIGURATION AUDIT. - CONFORMAL COATING OF EEE PARTS. 	<p>RC1493 DSHG8977A1 RC1493 RC1493 DSHG8977A1 BSW0392B</p>
	ACCEPTANCE TESTS	<p>THE FOLLOWING TESTS ARE PERFORMED BY HONEYWELL DURING ACCEPTANCE TESTING:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - HERMETIC SEAL AND PRESSURIZATION PORT LEAK TEST. - FUNCTIONAL TEST INCLUDING: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - OUTPUT INTERFACE, - CHECKOUT, - OPERATION, - CONTROLLER CHECKOUT. - HIGH TEMPERATURE OPERATION. - LOW TEMPERATURE OPERATION. - VIBRATION TESTING. - FINAL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 	<p>RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493 RC1493</p>
	HOT FIRE ACCEPTANCE TESTING (GREEN RUN)	<p>CONTROLLED OPERATION IS VERIFIED THROUGH ENGINE HOT FIRE ACCEPTANCE TESTING.</p>	<p>RL00461</p>
	HERMETIC SEAL INTEGRITY	<p>INTERNAL PRESSURE IS MONITORED DURING CONTROLLER OPERATION.</p>	<p>QNRSD V41AND.040</p>
	FLIGHT FLOW TESTING	<p>THE FOLLOWING TESTS ARE PERFORMED DURING FLIGHT FLOW VEHICLE PROCESSING AND AFTER ANY MAINTENANCE OR REPLACEMENT:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CONTROLLER CHECKOUT. - PNEUMATIC CHECKOUT. - FLIGHT READINESS TEST. - SELF-TEST. 	<p>QNRSD V41AND.035 QNRSD V41ASD.020 QNRSD V41ASD.030-A CP406R0008</p>

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CIL ITEM: F200-BK-02			
		INSPECTION AND TEST	
POSSIBLE CAUSES	SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS	INSPECTION(S)/TEST(S)	DOCUMENT REF.
	PRE-FLIGHT CHECKOUT	THE FOLLOWING TESTS ARE PERFORMED DURING LAUNCH COUNTDOWN (LAST TEST): - PRE-CRYO LOADING CHECKOUT INCLUDING CONTROLLER AND PNEUMATICS CHECKOUT. - SELF-TEST.	ONRSD 500FAD.213 CP406R0008
FAILURE HISTORY: COMPREHENSIVE FAILURE HISTORY DATA IS MAINTAINED IN THE PROBLEM REPORTING DATABASE (PRANS/PRACA). REFERENCE: NASA LETTER SA21/88/308 AND ROCKETDYNE LETTER B0RC0976).			

OPERATIONAL USE: NOT APPLICABLE.