

**SSME FM 'CIL
INSPECTION AND TEST**

Component Group: Ducts and Lines
 CIL Item: K502-01
 Part Number: RES1222
 Component: Nitrogen Supply Hose
 FMEA Item: K502
 Failure Mode: Fails to contain GN2.

Prepared: D. Early
 Approved: T. Nguyen
 Approval Date: 7/25/00
 Change #: 1
 Directive #: CCBD ME3-01-5638

Page: 1 of 1

Failure Causes	Significant Characteristics	Inspection(s) / Test(s)	Document Reference
A, B	FLEX LINE, NITROGEN SUPPLY		RES1222
	MATERIAL INTEGRITY	MATERIAL INTEGRITY IS VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RC1316
	WELD INTEGRITY	ALL WELDS ARE INSPECTED TO DRAWING AND SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS PER WELD CLASS. INSPECTIONS INCLUDE: VISUAL, DIMENSIONAL, PENETRANT, RADIOGRAPHIC, ULTRASONIC, AND FILLER MATERIAL, AS APPLICABLE.	RL10011 RA0607-094 RA0115-116 RA0115-006 RA1115-001 RA0115-127
	HEAT TREAT	LINE HEAT TREAT IS VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RA1611-002
	ASSEMBLY INTEGRITY	THE LOT COMPARISON TEST IS PERFORMED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS INCLUDING: - PROOF PRESSURE. - BENDING MOMENT. - FLEXUAL ENDURANCE. - VACUUM LEAK. - SECTIONING.	RC1316 RC1316 RC1316 RC1316 RC1316
	ACCEPTANCE TESTING	A BALL CHECK IS PERFORMED ON EACH LINE PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. LINE IS PROOF PRESSURE TESTED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. LINE IS MASS SPECTROMETER LEAK TESTED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RC1316 RC1316 RC1316
	FLIGHT FLOW TESTING	THE EXTERNAL SURFACE IS VISUALLY INSPECTED PRIOR TO EACH LAUNCH. (LAST TEST)	OMRSD V41BU0.030

Failure History: Comprehensive failure history data is maintained in the Problem Reporting database (PRAMS/PRACA)
 Reference: NASA letter SA21/88/308 and Rocketdyne letter 88RC09761.

Operational Use: Not Applicable.

SSME FMEA/CIL
DESIGN

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Design / Document Reference

FAILURE CAUSE: A: Parent material failure or weld failure.
B: Damaged/defective bellows assembly.

THE LINE ASSEMBLY (1) AND BELLOWS ARE MANUFACTURED UTILIZING INCONEL 718. INCONEL 600 WAS USED FOR THE WIRE BRAID ON THE FLEXIBLE HOSE MEMBERS. INCONEL 718 WAS SELECTED FOR ITS STRENGTH, RESISTANCE TO STRESS CORROSION, CORROSION RESISTANCE, HIGH/LOW CYCLE FATIGUE CHARACTERISTICS, AND WELDABILITY (2). MATERIALS ARE HEAT TREATED TO DEVELOP FULL MATERIAL STRENGTH AND HARDNESS. THE BRAID MATERIAL WAS SELECTED FOR ITS STRENGTH AND CORROSION RESISTANCE (2). FLANGE SECTIONS INCORPORATE RADIUS JOINTS TO REDUCE STRESS CONCENTRATIONS. OFFSET LIMIT REQUIREMENTS ARE ESTABLISHED TO REDUCE STRESS CONCENTRATIONS AND IMPROVE WELD GEOMETRY. TUBING STOCK IS DRAWN TO MAINTAIN SURFACE REGULARITY. THE MAXIMUM BEND MOMENT DURING PRESSURIZATION IS SPECIFIED FOR PROPER DUCT LOADING. BRAID IS MULTI-LAYERED INTERWOVEN WIRE FOR TENSILE REINFORCEMENT TO THE PRESSURE CARRYING BELLOWS. EXTERNAL RINGS ARE USED TO IMPROVE WELD QUALITY AND SUPPORT THE WIRE BRAID AT THE SPOOL-TO-BRAID INTERFACE. INSTALLATION IS CONTROLLED FOR ANGULARITY AND OFFSET PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS (3). MINIMUM FACTORS OF SAFETY MEET CEI REQUIREMENTS (4). HIGH AND LOW CYCLE FATIGUE LIFE MEET CEI REQUIREMENTS (5). THE FLEXIBLE LINE HAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED THE BENDING MOMENT, FLEXURAL ENDURANCE, ULTIMATE PRESSURE, SECTIONING, PROOF PRESSURE, AND VIBRATION DVS TESTING (6). ANALYSIS/TESTING SHOWED NO POTENTIAL BELLOW EXCITATION OF RESONANCE DUE TO FLOW INDUCED VIBRATION (6). THE LINE ASSEMBLY PARENT MATERIAL WAS CLEARED FOR FRACTURE MECHANICS/NDE FLAW GROWTH, SINCE THEY ARE NOT FRACTURE CRITICAL PARTS (7). TABLE K502 LISTS ALL THE FMEA/CIL WELDS AND IDENTIFIES THOSE WELDS IN WHICH THE CRITICAL INITIAL FLAW SIZE IS NOT DETECTABLE, AND THOSE WELDS IN WHICH THE ROOT SIDE IS NOT ACCESSIBLE FOR INSPECTION. THESE WELDS HAVE BEEN ASSESSED AS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT BY RISK ASSESSMENT (8).

(1) RES1222; (2) RSS-8575, RSS-8582; (3) I.L. 0126-8066; (4) RSS-8546, CP320R0003B; (5) RL00532, CP320R0003B; (6) RSS-511-9, RSS-511-31, RSS-511-45, RSS-511-47, RSS-511-48; (7) NASA TASK 117; (8) RSS-8756

SSME EA/CIL
REDUNDANCY SCREEN

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Phase	Failure / Effect Description	Criticality Hazard Reference
P 4.1	GN2 leakage into aft compartment. Engine oxidizer system purge falls below acceptable limits for inerting propellant leakage at ICD limits. Potential open air fire. Loss of vehicle.	1 ME-A1P
Redundancy Screens: SINGLE POINT FAILURE: N/A		

SSME FMEA/CIL
WELD JOINTS

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 Page: 1 of 1

Component	Basic Part Number	Weld Number	Weld Type	Class	Root Side Not Access	Critical Initial Flaw Size Not Detectable		Comments
						HCF	LCF	
LINE	RES1222	1,4,7,10	GTAW	II	X			
LINE	RES1222	2,3,8,9	GTAW	II	X			
LINE	RES1222	5,6	GTAW	I	X	X		
LINE	RES1222	11	GTAW	I	X			
LINE	RES1222	12	GTAW	I	X	X		
LINE	RES1222	13	GTAW	I	X	X		
LINE	RES1222	14	GTAW	I	X			