SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - MSBLS GROUND STATION

SUBSYSTEM: GROUND STATION - MSBLS
ASSEMBLY : Shelter
P/N : 517070
:
QUANTITY : 1
:

FMEA NO.: 05-2MO-00008 REV: 11 Jul 89
ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: 1R
CRIT. HDW: 2

VEHICLE	102	103	104	105
EFFECTIVITY:	X	X	X	X

PHASE(S) PL LO OO DO X LS
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-pass B-fail C-pass

PREPARED BY:
DES:
REL:
QE:

APPROVED BY:
DES:
REL:
QE:

APPROVED BY (NASA):
DES:
REL:
QE:

ITEM: Shelter

FUNCTION: Monitors AZ/DME subsystem for proper operation; generates alarm and causes MSBLS shutdown if AZ/DME RF output is lost or is erroneous.

FAILURE MODE: AZ/DME guidance RF output is operating properly, but AZ and/or DME FM/BITE fails so that it is then unable to generate an AZ/DME failure alarm, even if there is a malfunction in the AZ and/or DME RF output.

CAUSE(S): A Shelter LRU fails due to piece part electrical failure. The LRU's which can cause this failure mode (05-2MO-00008) are listed below, with LRU Designator No., LRU P/N, and LRU Name:

LRU No.:	LRU P/N:	LRU Name:
160	501825	Power Supply
322	517076	Panel, Entrance, Signal
324	517079	Cables, Interconn, Interior (inside Shltr)
325	517081	Harness, Rack
430	517082	Control Monitor
550	502332	Field Monitor Circuits, Azimuth/DME
580	502146	DME Unit
710	517080	Cables, Interconn, External (to/from Shltr)
920	518007	Assy, RF (Switching)

EFFECT(S): (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE

(A/B) Correct AZ and DME RF output from the Shelter continues without a break, so there is no apparent effect. However, next failure (if in AZ/DME channel) will cause erroneous AZ and/or DME RF output signal, rather than the intended MSBLS shutdown.

(C) No effect.

(D) No effect first failure; correct AZ and DME signals continue to the Orbiter. Possible loss of crew/vehicle after second failure (lost or erroneous output from shelter) due to degradation of terminal area approach and landing functions.

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - MSBLS GROUND STATION

SUBSYSTEM: GROUND STATION - MSBLS FMEA NO.: 05-2MD-00008 REV: 11 Jul 89

DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE:
(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A) - DESIGN

The MSBLS design was structured from existing/proven ground-based landing systems and upgraded to meet MIL-E-4158, MIL-STD-454 and all subsidiary specifications in effect at the time of manufacture. Military and standard NASA approved parts, materials and processes were used.

The design evolved from a timely and in-depth internal design review process culminating in an optimum reliability/maintainability/performance end-item product. The design review process included studies such as FMEA, electrical and thermal analysis, sneak circuit analysis, worst case studies, tolerance analysis, etc. which resulted in direct impact of the design.

The design was approved via the formal NASA-Eaton PDR, CDR, PCA, FCA and certification process.

(B) - TEST

The MSBLS program consists of an equipment confidence build-up approach starting from 100% screening of components (burn-in and environmental test). Environmental testing of SRU's and 100% temperature/vibration tests at the LRU and equipment rack-level.

In plant ATP for functional performance verification and workmanship will be performed and witnessed by Eaton, NASA and AFPRO on all LRUs and again at system level.

Site testing and certification will be performed on each system after installation. Annual flight tests are conducted to demonstrate continued system compatibility.

Ground Turnaround Test - Verify operation of the MSBLS Ground Station prior to each Orbiter landing.

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - MSBLS GROUND STATION

SUBSYSTEM: GROUND STATION - MSBLS FMEA NO.: 05-2MD-00008 REV: 11 Jul 89

(C) - INSPECTION

Receiving Inspection

Receiving inspection verifies all incoming parts and materials, including the performance of visual and dimensional examinations. All electrical, mechanical and raw material records that certify materials and physical properties per drawing/specification requirements are retained by receiving inspection as required by contract.

Assembly/Installation

All detailed inspections are planned out by the methodization department for all new builds, spares and repairs for the MSBLS Programs. Inspection points are designated to permit inspection before the applicable portions of the assembly become inaccessible and prior to the next assembly operation.

Critical Processes

All processes and certifications are monitored and verified by inspection. The critical processes are soldering, conformal coating, torquing and boresiting, application of adhesives/sealants and application of chemical film.

Testing

All parts of the ATP are observed and verified by QA.

Handling/Packaging

All parts and assemblies are protected from damage or contamination from the point of receiving inspection to final shipment, through methods detailed in a documented procedure. This handling procedure is in effect for all newly built hardware as well as for repair units. QA audits conformance to this procedure in accordance with its internal audit schedule, and all areas are considered under continuous audit by QA with respect to material handling. The maintenance of electrostatic discharge prevention methods is verified by QA through periodic audits. All hardware items are packaged and protected according to contract requirements and are verified by inspection. Evidence of inspection of packaging is recorded on the applicable shipping document.

(D) - Failure History

All field and flight failures were reviewed and there have been no reported failures in the MSBLS-MD or MSBLS-JR alarm circuitry.

SUBSYSTEM: GROUND STATION - MSBLS FMEA NO.: 05-2MO-00008 REV: 11 Jul 89

(E) - OPERATIONAL USE

For lower ceilings (8,000 to 10,000 feet) or night operations, redundant MSBLS (single-fault tolerance) is required for landing on a concrete runway. MSBLS is also mandatory for daylight landings on the lakebed with reduced ceilings, but is not required to be redudant. Deorbit is not attempted if the ceiling is less than 8,000 feet to ensure good visibility at low altitude. If radar tracking data (available at Edwards, KSC, and Northrop only) and ground communications are available, the MCC can attempt to resolve a MSBLS dilemma. Remote control operators are trained to evaluate system health and recognize probable failure modes from the Remote Control Unit Display. The Remote Control Unit Display is monitored to determine the nature of the malfunction (hard failure, intermittent, or random) and advise the chain of command on the status and the estimated time to restore operation.