

SAA09FY12-006
REV. BB/L: 389.00
SYS: 175-TON
BRIDGE
CRANE, VAB
AUG 20 1993Critical Item: Relay, Main Hoist
Find Number: 1HS
Criticality Category: 2

| | | | |
|----------|-------------------|--------------|--------------------------|
| SAA No: | 09FY12-006 | System/Area: | 175-Ton Bridge Crane/VAB |
| NASA | NA | PM/N/ | K60-0528/ |
| Part No: | | Name: | 175-Ton Bridge Crane/VAB |
| Mfg/ | General Electric/ | Drawing/ | 67-K-L-11348/ |
| Part No: | CR120A06002AA | Sheet No: | 13 |

Function: The relay energizes to open the normally closed (N.C.) contact which deenergizes relay 1FW to allow the hoist to operate in the high speed mode.

Critical Failure Mode/Failure Mode No: Contact Fails Open/09FY12-006.098

Failure Cause: Corrosion, binding mechanism

Failure Effect: The N.C. contact will open, deenergizing relay 1FW, which places resistors 1FWR and RES A in series with the DC motor field windings. The field will be weakened by the reduction of current through the windings. The hoist will be in the high speed mode configuration. The worst case scenario would be lowering an External Tank (ET) or the aft end of an orbiter in the coarse speed mode (maximum coarse speed is 10 ft/min), the failure occurring causing the hoist speed to increase to approximately three times the commanded speed, resulting in the ET or the aft end of the orbiter striking the VAB floor or transporter resulting in possible damage to a vehicle system. Time to effect: seconds.

ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE

Design:

| <u>Contact Ratings</u> | <u>Actual</u> |
|------------------------|------------------|
| 300 volts | 120 volts |
| 10 amps | Testing required |

- * Contact Material: Silver Cadmium Oxide, Self-cleaning.
- * This relay was off-the-shelf hardware selected by the crane manufacturer for this application.

Attachment
S0502348L
Sheet 13 of 132

AUG 20 1993

Test:

- OMRSD file VI requires verification of proper performance of hoist operational test annually.
- OMI Q3008, Operating Instructions, requires all crane systems to be operated briefly in all speeds to verify satisfactory operation before lifting operations.

Inspection:

- OMI Q6003, Maintenance Instructions, requires annual inspection of contacts and contact members for burning, pitting, proper alignment, and discoloration caused by overheating; visual check of closing coils for deteriorated insulation and evidence of overheating or burning.

Failure History:

- The PRACA database was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.
- The GIDEP failure data interchange system was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.

Operational Use:

- **Correcting Action:**
 - 1) The failure can be recognized via the Selsyn (positions change) that is in view of both operators.
 - 2) When the failure indication is noticed, the operator can stop all crane operations by pressing the E-Stop button.
 - 3) Operationally, the crane must be operated in the line or float speed mode if a critical load is within 10 feet of any structure.
 - 4) Operators are trained and certified to operate these cranes and know and understand what to do if a failure indication is present.
 - 5) During all critical lifts, there is at least one remote Emergency Stop (E-Stop) operator observing the load lift, and can stop the crane if a failure indication is noticed.
- **Timeframe:**
 - Estimated operator reaction time is 3 to 10 seconds.