CIL

EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/31/2001

Page 1

_ __ __ __ __ __ __ __

Date: 4/24/2002

NAME		FAILURE		
P/N	05.78	MODE &		
Ω.T. X	CRIT	CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
		103FM16		
LOWER ARM AND BLADDER ITEM 103 (1) LEFT (1) RIGHT 	2/1RB) -	103FM16 Loss of fabric restraint. Separation of seam or hole in fabric. Defective thread, restraint material.	END ITEM: Opening in fabric restraint exposing bladder. Loss of restraint circumferential load carrying capability. GFE INTERFACE: Loading and abrading of bladder. MISSION: None. CREW/VEHICLE: None with single failure. Loss of crewman with loss of bladder. TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: Minutes. TIME AVAILABLE: Days. TIME REQUIRED: Days. REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS	 A. Design - The lower arm restraints are fabricated from 6.4 ounce dacron fabric which exhibits a minimum tensile strength of 300 lbs. (warp) and 250 lbs (fill). At 4.4 psid (normal operating pressure) the hoop load is 12.6 lbs/in giving the restraint fabric an ultimate safety factor of 23.8 for warp and 19.9 Tor fill. At 5.5 psid (max operating pressure) the restraint fabric provides ultimate safety factors of 19.1 for warp and 15.9 for fill. At 8.8 psid (max BTA operating pressure) the restraint fabric provides ultimate safety factors of 11.9 for warp and 9.9 for fill. S/AD minimum safety factors for softgoods at 4.4 psid is 2.0 for ultimate. At both 5.5 psid and 8.8 psid the S/AD minimum safety factors for softgoods is 1.5 for ultimate. The basic seam employed in the construction of the arm restraints is a double row of top stitching over a single row of joint stitching. Structural testing has determined that seam strength is equal to or better than the strength of the restraint material. The lower arm bladder assembly is formed from a series of patterned pieces of urethane coated nylon oxford fabric, seamed together by dielectric heat, to which flanges are also heat sealed. The bladder seams and flanges are reinforced by heat sealed overtaping to enhance structural integrity. The solution coated bladder is protected internally in known areas of high wear by an additional heat sealed abrasion layer. The following paragraph applies to the solution coated nylon. Testing has shown that the bladder fabric minum tensile strength is 105 lbs/inch (fill) and 140 lbs/inch (warp). The tearing strength is 3.5 lbs/inch in fill and 6.0 lbs/inch, the minimum safety factor s are 6.6 and 4.2 against a S/AD design minimu ultimate safety factor at a 4.8 psid (max MTA persting pressure). The fabric ultimate safety factors are 6.6 and 4.2 against hoop loads of 15.1 and 25.2 lbs, respectively. The S/AD required minimum ultimate safety factor at 5.5 and 8.8 psid is 1.5. Testing has demonstrated
				a S/AD design minimum ultimate safety factor of 2.0 at 4.4 psid (normal operating pressure). At 5.5 psid (max failure pressure) and at 8.8 psid (max BTA operating pressure), the fabric ultimate safety factors are 10.8 and 6.7 against hoop loads of 15.7 and 25.2 lbs, respectively. The S/AD required

CIL EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST 5/30/20			5/30/2002 SU	PERSEDES 12/31/2001 Page 2 Date: 4/24/2002	Page 2 Date: 4/24/2002
NAME	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
		103FM16		minimum ultimate safety factor at 5.5 and 8.8 psid is 1.5. Testing has demonstrated that the breaking strength of the bladder seams meets or exceeds that of the bladder fabric.	
				B. Test - Acceptance: Component - see inspection for acceptance. PDA: The following test is conducted at the arm assembly level in accordance with I Document 0111-710112: Visual examination for structural damage following a proof pressure test at 8. + 0.2 - 0.0 psig for a minimum of 5 minutes conducted with the TMG removed. Certification:	LC 0
				The lower arm restraint assembly was successfully tested (manned) during SSA certification testing to duplicate 458 hours operational life (Ref. ILC Report 0111-711330). The following usage, reflecting requirements of significance to the lower arm restraint assembly, was documented during certification:	I
				Requirement S/AD Actual Shoulder Rotations 29348 60000 Elbow Flex/Ext 49660 102000 Don/Doff Cycles 98 400 Pressure Hours 458 916	
				The lower arm restraint assembly was successfully subjected to an ultimate pressure of 13.2 psid during SSA certification testing (Ref. ILC Report 0111-711330). This is 1.5 times maximum BTA operating pressure based on 8.8 psid.	
				C. Inspection - Components and material manufactured to ILC requirements at an approved suppli are documented from procurement through shipping by the supplier. ILC incomin receiving inspection verifies that the materials received are as identified in the procurement documents, that no damage has occurred during shipment and tha supplier certifications have been received which provide traceability information.	er g t
				MIP's are performed for inspection of sewn seams during the arm restraint manufacturing process to assure that this particular failure cause is preclude from the fabricated item.	d
				During PDA the following inspection points are performed at the arm assembly level in accordance with ILC Document 0111-710112: 1. Inspection for fabric or material degradation. Inspection of seams for broken or frayed stitches. 2. Visual inspection for structural damage following proof pressure test conducted with TMG removed.	
				D. Failure History - None.	

CIL EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST			5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/31/2001		Page 3 Date: 4/24/2002
NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
		103FM16			
				E. Ground Turnaround - None for every component within its limited life requirements.	
				Additionally, every 4 years or 229 hours of manned press restraint and bladder assemblies are removed from the arm to a complete visual inspection (interior and exterior s damage and degradation.	urized time, the arm m assembly and subjected urfaces) for material
				F. Operational Use - Crew Response - Pre EVA: No response, single failure undetectable by cr EVA: No response, single failure undetectable by crew. Training - No training specifically covers this failure of Operational Consideration - Not applicable.	ew. Continue EVA prep. Continue EVA. mode.

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-103 ARM ASSEMBLY

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

Prepared by: __________

Approved by: SSA/SSM

M. Snyden HS - Reliability

K. Munfard 4/24/02 HS - Engineering Manager

~ 6/24/02

no 4/27/02 an MASA

02 NASA Crew.

than I Mill 74-02