

FMEA
EMU FAILURE MODE, EFFECT ANALYSIS

01/02/90 SUPERFOES / /

ANALYST:

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NAME P/N QTY	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	MISSION PHASE	FAILURE EFFECT	FAILURE DETECTION FLIGHT/GROUND	TIME ID EFFECT/ ACTIONS	CRIT	REMARKS/ HAZARD	REF
WRIST DISCONNECT, (TEN 103 (1) LEFT (1) RIGHT A/L 8813-02/9814-02 (2)	Provides for attachment of restraint and bladder materials of the lower arm. Provides pressure retention and axial load link between glove and lower arm.	103/M22: Failure of one lock. CAUSES: Contamination or foreign matter in latch recess. Defective material; lock subassembly. Impact.	PREEVA EVA POSTEVA	END ITEM: One of the three independent locks is not engaged. GFE INTERFACE: Wrist disconnect can disengage without depressing all three buttons at once. MISSION: None. CREW/VEHICLE: None with single lock/lock failure. None with failure of one primary lock. Loss of crewman with loss of all locks.	FLIGHT: None. GROUND: Yes. FEMU-R-001, Para. 2.2.4.12.5.	None. TIME AVAILABLE: N/A TIME REQUIRED: N/A	3/LB A-PASS B-N/A C-PASS	There are two independent primary locks in addition to the secondary lock/lock. Both would have to fail before inadvertent opening occurred. The standby redundant system is the two other independent locks and rotation.	FEMU-R-001 Para. 2.2.4.12.5