CIL

EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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NAME P/N OTY		FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEP		
		104EM127				
QTY WAIST BEARING, ITEM 104 A/L 10057-03 (1) OR A/L 10043-04 (1)	2/1R	CAUSES 104FM13Z Waist bearing seal gas leakage. Contamination wear or deterioration of the pressure seals, inadequate seal squeeze.	END ITEM: None for a single failure. For dual seal failure, suit gas leakage to ambient. GFE INTERFACE: None for a single failure. For a dual seal failure, depletion of primary 02 supply and SOP. Rapid depressurizatio n of SSA beyond SOP makeup capability. MISSION: None for a single failure. CREW/VEHICLE: None for single failure. Loss of crewman with loss of both primary and secondary pressure seals. TIME TO EFFECT	A. Design - Contamination is pre teflon environmental seals fit into matin preclude introductio areas. The pressure seals a lubricated with Bray separator/spacers. maximum of .038" of When pressurized, th ensure a maximum bea in- lbs when install B. Test - Acceptance: The waist bearing is ILC source verificat tested with the bear (+0.2-0.0) psig and bearing is pressuriz seals separately, an less than 6.0 scc/mi and pressurized to 4 torque of less than verified. leakage o PDA: See Acceptance Test Certification: The dual seal waist (manned) to duplicat Redesigned Dual Seal reflecting requireme during certification Requirement 	Cluded from er seals, one or g grooves in t n of contamina re made from p co 814z oil to Each seal cross seal squeeze t e seals expand ring leak of (ed in the lowe subjected to ion. the prin ing in the test held for 5 mir ed to 4.3 +/- d subjected to n. the bearin .3 +/- 0.1 psi 80 in-lbs and f less than 40 Procedures. bearing success e operational Waist Bearing nts of signifi : S/AD 458	<pre>httering the waist bearing assembly by two h each side of the bearing assembly. These the inner and outer races and form a barrier to ation into the pressure seals and ball raceway bolyester polyurethane and are lightly o preclude wear. Vespel balls act as ball as section provides minimum of .028" and to maintain positive operational pressure. I to seal firmly against the bearing races to 5.0 sccm and a torque that will not exceed 110 ber torso. testing per Airlock ATP 10043 of airlock with mary and secondary seals are proof pressure st fixture. The fixture is pressurized to 8.0 nutes. Following proof pressure testing, the 0.1 psig, testing the primary and secondary ocycle rotation. leakage is verified to be bag is installed on the ILC lower torso fixture ig. testing both seals separately, breakaway running torque of less than 110 in-lbs are 5.5 sccm is verified. ssfully passed SSA certification testing life (Ref. "1153 Hour Cert Report for g, ILC Doc 0111-719428). The following usage, lcance to the waist bearing, was documented Actual </pre>
			/ACTIONS: Seconds.	Pressure Cycles Waist Rotations Walking Steps	300 2466 4320	1080 7200 77760*
			TIME AVAILABLE: N/A	* The walking steps were accomplished during the Enhanced Certification Testing (Ref. ILC Doc 0111-711330). In addition, the bearing has been subjected to screening tests where the bearing is bench cycled to a crew familiarization test profile with constant leakage monitoring. The bearing passed this test with both seals functioning and with one seal intentionally disabled.		
			TIME REQUIRED: N/A REDUNDANCY SCREENS:			

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NAME		FAILURE		
P/N		MODE &		
QTY	CRIT	CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
		104FM137		
		10419132		
			A-PASS	Both seals in the cert bearing have been subjected to a proof pressure test at
			B-N/A	8.0 psi.
			C-PASS	
				C. Inspection -
				components and material manufactured to ill requirements at an approved supplier
				are documented from procurement through shipping by the supplier. It's incoming
				the programment documents that no demage bas occurred during abipment and that
				supplier certifications have been received which provides traceability
				information
				The following MIP's are performed during the waist assembly manufacturing
				process to assure the failure cause is precluded from the fabricated item:
				1. Visual inspection of the pressure seal and environmental seals for gouges,
				nicks, tears or degradation.
				2. Verification of cleanliness to VC level.
				3. Visual inspection after proof and leakage testing for deformation, defects
				or damage.
				-
				During PDA, the following points are performed at the LTA assembly level in
				accordance with ILC Document 0111-70028J:
				1. Visual inspection for VC level cleanliness and material degradation.
				2. Visual inspection for structural damage following proof pressure test.
				3. Verification of bearing torque less than IIO in-1b at 4.3 +/- 0.1 psig.
				D. Failure Nistory
				D. Failure History -
				No history of this failure mode to date (leakage beyond sor makeup capability). Failures have occurred with the single seal aluminum hearing $(J/1, 969_{-}08)$ that
				ware within SOD make-up canability
				JEFWIL104-C001 (07/28/80) Waist bearing leak Improper assembly
				J-EMUI-104-005 (12/07/83). Waist bearing leak (4500 SCCM) in chamber.
				Insufficient seal squeeze. Wide-lip seal was incorporated per ECO-851-0008.
				J-EMU-104-006 (03/23/84). Waist bearing leak (6,400 SCCM) in chamber. See (2)
				above.
				I-EMU-104-C006 (02/13/85). Waist bearing seal leak. Incomplete removal of mold
				flash. Note added to drawing to inspect seal with magnification.
				J-EMU-104010 (04/12/85). Audible leak approx 71,000 SCCM. Improper
				installation of seal. Procedures changed to require bearing rotation (720
				degree) prior to test.
				J-EMU-104013 (2/11/86) spare waist bearing separator seals shipped to jsc
				without leakage test. leakage requirement added to all separator seal drawings.
				J-EMU-104014 (2/11/86). See J-104013
				J-EMU-104015 (2/11/86). See J-104013
				J-EMU-104017 (2/11/80). See J-104013
				$\frac{1}{1-FM} = \frac{1}{1-01} \left(\frac{2}{11} \right) \left(\frac{1}{2} \right) \left(\frac{1}{100} \right) = \frac{1}{100} \left(\frac{1}{100} - \frac{1}{100} \right) \left(\frac{1}{100} - \frac{1}{100} - \frac{1}{100} - \frac{1}{100} \right) \left(\frac{1}{100} - \frac{1}{100} - \frac{1}{100} - \frac{1}{100} \right) \left(\frac{1}{100} - \frac{1}$
				J = EMU = 104 - 019 (2/11/86) See $J = 104 - 013$
				J-EMU-104-020 (2/11/86). See J-104-013
				J = EMU = 104 - 021 (2/11/86). See $J = 104 - 013$
				B-EMU-104A016 (8-4-87) Foreign substance molded into separator seal. ECO 871-
				0530 improves bearing seal inspection methods.
				B-EMU-104-A020 (4/28/88). waist bearing leak during 11 ft vacuum chamber
				treadmill test. Corrective Action: See B-EMU-104-T001.

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NAME		FAILURE		
P/N OTY	CDIM	MODE &	ελτιίρε εττρά	DATTONALE FOD ACCEDTANCE
QII	CKII	CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RAIIONALE FOR ACCEFIANCE
		104FM137		
		104FM13Z		 B-EMU-104-A021 (5/9/88). See B-104-T001 B-EMU-104-A022 (5/11/88). See B-104-T001 B-EMU-104-A022 (5/11/88). See B-104-T001 B-EMU-104-A022 (8/15/88) Secondary waist bearing seal failed leakage test due to contamination in seal groove generated when installing clamping ring screws. LTA assembly steps reordered per ECG 881-0844 to install clamping ring screws. LTA assembly steps reordered per ECG 881-0844 to install clamping ring screws. LTA assembly steps leading of the state of

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-104 LOWER TORSO ASSEMBLY (LTA)

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

Approved by: WASA - SSA

M. Snyler HS - Reliability

<u>R. Munford</u> 4/24/02 HS - Engineering Manager

5/2/02 12 N/AS/ACCERT

5.29.02

h 5-30-02

6/04/02 ASAU Crew

1/3/02 ASAM Program Manager