CIL

EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/31/2001

Date: 4/24/2002

NAME		FAILURE MODE &				
ĴTY	CRIT	CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEN	PTANCE	
		104FM16				
BRIEF/WAIST ASSEMBLY, ITEM 104 	2/1R	Loss of primary axial restraint bracket, front.	END ITEM: Loss of primary axial restraint.	 A. Design - The waist bearing front primary bracket is fabricated from 17-4 stainless steel. The brackets are machined or cast/machined, ultrasonic cleaned, passivated and either electropolished or dry hone finished. During tensile testing of the aluminum waist bearing, the front primary axial restraint bracket exhibited a minimum strength of 3900 lbs. demonstrating a minimum safety factor of 5.8 against a S/AD limit load of 677 lbs. The required S/AD minimum safety factor for waist hardware is 2.0. The bracket attachment screws are fabricated from A-286 stainless steel and are procured to MS or NAS specifications. Analysis showed that the primary screws have a factor of safety of 7.6 for ultimate tensile failure. Loss of the waist bearing front bracket screw is precluded in design by adherence to standard engineering torque requirements for screw installation and the use of thread lock adhesive. 		
07/08/09/10/11/12 (1)		Defective Material: Bracket,	GFE INTERFACE: Axial load will be			
		helicoil or thread lock adhesive. Missing screw.	transferred to secondary bracket. MISSION: None.			
		CREW/VEHICLE: Design requirements for proper installation of he None with assembly procedures when the helicoils are instal				
			single failure. Loss of crewman with loss of	B. Test - Acceptance: Component - See Ins		
			secondary restraint bracket.	accordance with ILC	Document (
		TIME TO EFFECT Proof pressure test at 8.0 + 0.2 - 0.0 psig fo /ACTIONS: with the TMG removed. Minutes.				0.2 - 0.0 psig for a minimum of 5 minutes conducte
		Certification:TIMEThe waist bearing primary restraint brackets were suchAVAILABLE:during SSA certification to duplicate operational limitDays.Memorandum EM-83-1083).The following usage, reflecting requirements of sign				uplicate operational life (Ref. ILC Engineering
			TIME REQUIRED: Hours.	restraints was docu		
			REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A-PASS	Requirement	S/AD	Actual
			B-N/A C-PASS	 Waist Cycles Waist Rotations	 1234 2466	22176 12236
				Pressure Cycles Don/Doff Cycles Pressure Hours	300 98 458	2045 445 1646
				Walking Steps	4320	77760
				are documented from	n procuremer	actured to ILC requirements at an approved supplic nt through shipping by the supplier. ILC incoming that the materials received are as identified in

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· – – – –		104FM16				
				<pre>the procurement documents, that no damage has occurred during shipment and th supplier certifications have been received which provide traceability information. The bracket castings are radiographically inspected to detect the presence of flaws prior to machining and magnetic particle inspected after machining. The brackets that are machined from plate stock are magnetic particle inspected to detect the presence of flaws.</pre>		
				The following MIP's are performed during the brief/ process to assure the failure cause is precluded fr 1. Verification of loctite application. 2. Verification of presence of screws during torqu 3. Helicoil installation is verified during source 4. Visual inspection for defective material upon c test.	om the fabricated item: ing operations. inspection at the supplier	
				During PDA, the following inspection points are performed at the LTA level in accordance with ILC Document 0111-710112: 1. Visual inspection for material degradation. 2. Visual inspection for structural damage following proof pressure		
				D. Failure History - None.		
				E. Ground Turnaround - None, for every component within its limited life r	equirements.	
				Every four years or 229 hours of manned pressurized maintenance the primary and secondary axial restrai reinstalled during which time screw torque and loct	nt brackets are removed and	
				F. Operational Use - Crew Response - Pre/post-EVA : If not detected, no response. If de troubleshoot problem. If no success, use spare LTA EVA prep. EVA : Single failure not detectable, no response. Special Training - No training specificaly covers this failure mode. Operational Considerations - Not applicable.		

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-104 LOWER TORSO ASSEMBLY (LTA)

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

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NASA MOD

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