CIL

EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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NAME		FAILURE		
QTY	CRIT	CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
		104FM27		
BRIEF ASSEMBLY, ITEM 104	2/1R	Loss of primary axial restraint crotch buckle.	END ITEM: Loss of primary axial restraint.	A. Design - The crotch buckle is fabricated from 17-4 stainless steel casting. The crotch buckle "D" rings are fabricated from 17-4 Condition A wire and full penetration
(1)				MIL-H-6875 after welding. Finishing operations consist of dry honing, ultrasonic cleaning, and passivation.
		material, weld.	Axial load will be transferred to secondary restraint. Webbing.	Tensile testing of the crotch buckle assembly demonstrated a minimum ultimate strength of 1836 lbs and a yield strength of 1643 lbs. At 4.4 psid (normal operaing pressure) the S/AD limit load is 483 lbs giving the buckle a safety factor of 3.8 for ultimate and 3.4 for yield. At 5.5 psid (max failure pressure), the buckle provides a safety factor for ultimate of 3.8 against a limit load of 485 lbs. At 8.8 psid (max BTA operating pressure), the buckle
			MISSION: None.	provides a safety factor for ultimate of 4.7 against a S/AD limit load of 393 lbs. The S/AD minimum safety factor of hardware at 4.4 psid is 2.0 for ultimate and 1.5 for yield. At both 5.5 psid and 8.8 psid, the S/AD minimum safety factor for hardware is 1.5 for ultimate.
			CREW/VEHICLE:	B. Test -
			None with single failure loss of	Acceptance: Component - See Inspection.
			crewman with loss of secondary	PDA Test - The following tests are conducted at the brief level in accordance with ILC Document 0111-710112:
			restraint. Webbing.	Proof pressure test at 8.0 + 0.2 - 0.0 psig for a minimum of 5 minutes conducted with the TMG removed.
			TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: Minutes.	Certification Test - The crotch buckle was successfully tested (manned) during SSA certification to duplicate 458 hours operational life (Ref. ILC Report 0111-711330). The following usage, reflecting requirements of significance to the crotch buckle,
			TIME AVAILABLE:	was documented during certification:
			Days.	Requirement S/AD Actual
			TIME REQUIRED:	Hip Abd/Add 458 1200
			nours.	Waist Flex/Ext. 1234 2800
			REDUNDANCY	Waist Rotation 2466 6000
			A-PASS	Pressure Hours 458 916
			B-N/A C-PASS	Walking Steps 4320 77760
				C. Inspection -
				supplier are documented from procurement through shipping by the supplier. ILC incoming recieving inspection verifies that the hardware received is as identified in the procurement documents, that no damage has occurred during shipment and that the supplier certificataions have been received which provide
				traceability information. The crotch buckle is x-ray inspected, the crotch buckle rings are inspected using Magnetic particle Technique, and the welds are x-ray inspected. Crotch

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NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
		104FM27		buckle integrity is verified after primary axial restraint tensile loading
				buckie integrity is verified diter primary and reservine constre roading.
				During PDA, the following inspection points are preformed at the Lower Torso Assembly level in accordance with ILC Document 0111-710112: 1. Visual inspection for material degradation. 2. Visual inspection for structural damage following proof pressure test.
				D. Failure History - None.
				E. Ground Turnaround - None, for every component within its limited life requirement.
				Every 4 years or 229 hours of manned pressurized time the lower torso restraint and bladder assembly is removed from the LTA and subjected to complete visual inspection for material degradation or damage.
				F. Operational Use - Crew Response -
				<pre>Pre/post-EVA : If not detected, no response. If detected audibly or tactily, troubleshoot problems. If no success, use spare LTA if available or terminate EVA prep. EVA : Single failure not detectable, no response. Special Training - No training specifically covers this failure mode. Operational Considerations - Not applicable.</pre>

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-104 LOWER TORSO ASSEMBLY (LTA)

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

Prepared by: AS - Project Engineering

M. Snylin HS - Refiability

<u>Ala Playel for kor</u>u HS - Engineering Manager

Approved by: 1344-10

anw s/11/a

s/nor

NASA MOD

<u>5/23/02</u> 6/04/02 MASA-Grew,

6/3/02

MASArwProgram Manager