CIL

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EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST		5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/31/2001			Date: 3/27/2002
NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
		104FM28T			
LEG FABRIC ATTACHMENT RING ITEM 104 (1) LEFT (1) RIGHT	<b>2</b> /1R	104FM28T Loss of primary adjustable bracket pin.  Defective material; bracket, adjustable pin, retention screws.	END ITEM: Loss of primary axial load restraining capability.  GFE INTERFACE: Axial load will be transferred to secondary restraint.  MISSION: None.  CREW/VEHICLE: None with single failure. Loss of crewman with loss of secondary restraint.  TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: Minutes.  TIME AVAILABLE: N/A  TIME REQUIRED: N/A  REDUNDANCY	A. Design - The adjustable primary bracket is fabricated from 17- brackets are machined, ultrasonic cleaned, passivated or dry hone finished. The primary adjustable link is stainless steel and has a 16 finish to preclude prima adjustable link is retained by a stainless steel pin single screw.  Tensile testing of the restraint bracket pin demonstr strength of 1655 lbs and a yield strength of 1493 lbs operating pressure) the S/AD limit load is 574 lbs, g safety factor of 2.9 for ultimate and 2.6 for yield. pressure) and 8.8 psid (max BTA operating pressure) t safety factors for ultimate of 4.5 and 5.8 respective safety factor for hardware at 4.4 psid is 2.0 for ult At both 5.5 psid and 8.8 psid the S/AD minimum safety for ultimate.  B. Test - Acceptance: See inspection.  PDA: During PDA, the following inspection points are perfo level in accordance with ILC Document 0111-710112. In VC level. Verification of proper engagement and opera  Certification: The fabric attachment ring was successfully tested (m certification to duplicate 458 hours operational life 711330). The following usage, reflecting requirement ring, was documented during certification:  Requirement S/AD Actual	and either electropolished fabricated from 17-4 ry webbing abrasion. The that is held in place by a  ated a minimum ultimate . At 4.4 psid (normal iving the bracket pin a At 5.5 psid (max failure he bracket pin provides ly. The S/AD minimum imate and 1.5 for yield. factor for hardware is 1.5  rmed at the LTA assembly spection for cleanliness to tion.  anned) during SSA (Ref. ILC Report 0111-
			SCREENS: A-PASS B-N/A	Walking Steps 4320 77760  C. Inspection -	
				=	

C-PASS

Components and material manufactured to ILC requirements at an approved supplier are documented from procurement through shipping by the supplier. ILC incoming receiving inspection verifies that the materials received are as identified in the procrurement documents, that no damage has occurred during shipment and that supplier certifications have been received which provides traceability information.

The following MIPs are performed during the brief assembly manufacturing process to assure that the failure causes are precluded from the fabricated item: 1. Visual inspection upon completion of the restraint webbing pull test for signs of damage.

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NAME FAILURE

P/N MODE & OTY CRIT CAUSES FAILURE EFFECT RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE

104FM28T

During PDA, the following inspection points are performed at the arm assembly level per ILC Document 0111-710112:

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- 1. Inspection for cleanliness to VC level.
- 2. Visual inspection for damage, wear or material degradation.
- 3. Visual inspection for damgage following proof-pressure test.
- D. Failure History -None.

## E. Ground Turnaround -

Inspected for non-EET processing pre FEMU-R-001, Pre-Flight visual inspection. None for EET processing. Additionally, every 4 years chronological time or 229 hours of manned pressurized time, the fabric attachment ring is disassembled, cleaned, inspected, lubricated and reassembled.

F. Operational Use -

Crew Response -

PreEVA/PostEVA: If not detected, no response. If detected audibly or tactilly, troubleshoot problem. If no success use spare EMU available. EVA: Single failure not detectable, no response.

Training -

No training specifically covers this failure mode.

Operational Consideration -Not applicable.

## EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-104 LOWER TORSO ASSEMBLY (LTA)

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

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Soe Janu 6/04

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