CIL

EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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Date: 4/24/2002

NAME		FAILURE			
P/N	ODIT	MODE &			
Õ.T. A	CRIT	CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
		104FM31			
BOOT FABRIC ATTACHMENT RING ITEM 104 (1) LEFT (1) RIGHT 	2/1R	Loss of primary axial restraint bracket, lower. Defective material; bracket, retention screws, primary pin missing or loose screws.	END ITEM: Loss of primary axial restraint. GFE INTERFACE: Axial load will be transferred to secondary restraint bracket. MISSION: None.	 A. Design - The restraint bracket and primary pin are fabricated from 17-4 stainless steel bar stock. The bracket and pin are heat treated to a condition H-1050, ultrasonically cleaned, passivated and either electropolished or dry hone finished. Two threaded 17-4 stainless steel pins are utilized to retain the 17- 4 stainless steel pin which has a 16 finish to preclude restraint webbing abrasion. Tensile testing of the restraint bracket pin demonstrated a minimum ultimate strength of 1640 lbs and a yield strength of 1480 lbs. At 4.4 psid (normal operating pressure) the S/AD limit load is 838 lbs, giving the bracket pin a safety factor of 2.0 for ultimate and 1.8 for yield. At 5.5 psid (max failure pressure) and 8.8 (max BTA operating pressure) the bracket pin provides safety factors for ultimate of 2.7 and 8.5 respectively. The S/AD minimum safety factor for hardware at 4.4 psid is 2.0 for ultimate and 1.5 for yield. At both 5.5 psid and 8.8 psid the S/AD minimum safety factor for hardware is 1.5 for 	
			CREW/VEHICLE: None with single failure. Loss of crewman with loss of secondary restraint bracket. TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: Minutes.	<pre>ultimate. B. Test - Acceptance: Component - See Inspection. PDA: The following tests are conducted at the boot level in accordance with ILC Document 0111-710112: 1. Proof pressure test at 8.0 + 0.2 - 0.0 psig to verify no structural damage. Certification: The fabric attachment ring was successfully tested (manned) during SSA certification to duplicate 458 hours operational life (Ref. ILC Report 0111- 711330). The following usage, reflecting requirements of significance to the ring, was documented during certification:</pre>	
			TIME AVAILABLE: Days. TIME REQUIRED: Hours. REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A-PASS	RequirementS/ADActualAnkle Flexion/Extension1161424000Don/Doff98400Pressure Hours458916Walking Steps432077760The Fabric Attachment Ring primary/secondary axial restraint brackets were successfully subjected to an ultimate pressure of 13.2 psig during SSA	
			B-N/A C-PASS	<pre>certification (Ref. ILC Document 0111-711330). This is 1.5 times maximum BTA operating pressure based on 8.8 psi. C. Inspection - Components and material manufactured to ILC requirements at an approved supplier are documented from procurement through shipping by the supplier. ILC incoming receiving inspection verifies that the materials received are as identified in the procurement documents, that no damage has occurred during shipment and that supplier certifications have been received which provide traceability information.</pre>	

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				During PDA, the following inspection points are performed at the LTA assembly level per ILC Document 0111-710112: 1. Visual inspection for damage, wear or material degradation. 2. Visual inspection for damage following proof-pressure test.	
				D. Failure History - None.	
				E. Ground Turnaround - None, for every component within its limited life requir	rement.
				Every four years or 229 hours manned pressurized time du boot, the primary and secondary axial restraint brackets reinstalled.	aring inspection of the s are removed and
				F. Operational Use - Crew Response - Pre/post-EVA : If not detected, no response. If detecte troubleshoot problem. If no success, use spare if avail prep. EVA : Single failure not detectable, no response. Special Training - No training specifically covers this failure mode. Operational Considerations -	ed audibly or tactily, able or terminate EVA

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-104 LOWER TORSO ASSEMBLY (LTA)

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

Prepared by: AS - Project Engineering

M. Snylin HS - Refiability

<u>Ala Playel for kor</u>u HS - Engineering Manager

Approved by: 1344-10

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s/nor

NASA MOD

<u>5/23/02</u> 6/04/02 MASA-Grew,

6/3/02

MASArwProgram Manager