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EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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MODE & CAUSES 104FM35 Loss of fabric restraint. Separation of seam or hole in restraint fabric. Defective thread or fabric.	FAILURE EFFECT END ITEM: Opening in fabric restraint exposing bladder. Loss of restraint circumferential load carrying capability. GFE INTERFACE:	A. Design - The restraint is fabricated from 6.4 ounce dacron fabric which exhibits a minimum tensile strength of 300 lbs. (warp) and 250 lbs. (fill). Material strength is 20 (fill) to 24 (warp) times greater than the hoop load of 12.5 lbs. predicted at normal operating pressure (4.4 psid). At 5.5 psid (max failure pressure) the material strength is 15.8 (fill) to 19 (warp) times greater than the hoop load of 15.8 lbs. At 8.8 psid (max BTA operating pressure, the material strength is 9.9 (fill) to 11.9 (warp) times greater than the hoop load of 25.3 lbs.
Loss of fabric restraint. Separation of seam or hole in restraint fabric. Defective thread or	Opening in fabric restraint exposing bladder. Loss of restraint circumferential load carrying capability.	The restraint is fabricated from 6.4 ounce dacron fabric which exhibits a minimum tensile strength of 300 lbs. (warp) and 250 lbs. (fill). Material strength is 20 (fill) to 24 (warp) times greater than the hoop load of 12.5 lbs. predicted at normal operating pressure (4.4 psid). At 5.5 psid (max failure pressure) the material strength is 15.8 (fill) to 19 (warp) times greater than the hoop load of 15.8 lbs. At 8.8 psid (max BTA operating pressure, the material strength is 9.9 (fill) to 11.9 (warp) times
restraint. Separation of seam or hole in restraint fabric. Defective thread or	Opening in fabric restraint exposing bladder. Loss of restraint circumferential load carrying capability.	The restraint is fabricated from 6.4 ounce dacron fabric which exhibits a minimum tensile strength of 300 lbs. (warp) and 250 lbs. (fill). Material strength is 20 (fill) to 24 (warp) times greater than the hoop load of 12.5 lbs. predicted at normal operating pressure (4.4 psid). At 5.5 psid (max failure pressure) the material strength is 15.8 (fill) to 19 (warp) times greater than the hoop load of 15.8 lbs. At 8.8 psid (max BTA operating pressure, the material strength is 9.9 (fill) to 11.9 (warp) times
	Loss of bladder protection. Bladder exposed to TMG. Loading and abrading of bladder. MISSION: None. CREW/VEHICLE: None with single failure. Loss of crewman with loss of bladder. TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: N/A TIME AVAILABLE: N/A TIME REQUIRED: N/A REDUNDANCY	The basic seam employed in boot restraint construction is one row of join stitching and two rows of top stitching. Seams are formed using size "F" polyester thread per V-7-28D type II, class I with a lock stitch type 301 per FED-STD-751A. Seams are terminated by backtacking and searing of thread ends. Seam strength, as determined by testing, is equal to or better than the restraint material. A TMG serves to protect the restraint fabric and stitching from abrasion and puncture. The boot bladder assembly is formed from a series of patterned pieces of urethane coated nylon oxford fabric, seamed together by dielectric heat, to which flanges are also heat sealed. The bladder seams and flanges are reinforced by heat sealed overtaping to enhance structural integrity. The solution coated bladder is protected internally by an additional heat sealed abrasion layer. There are two types of bladder fabric. One is constructed of a base nylon fabric with a solution coated urethane. The other is constructed of the same base nylon with a urethane laminate coating. The following paragraph applies to the solution coated nylon. Testing has shown that the bladder fabric is aligned with the warp parallel to the hoop load that would be sustained by the bladder in the event of a restraint fabric failure. Based on a predicted hoop load of 12.7 lbs, the minimum safety factor for hoop stress is 11.0 at 4.4 psid (normal operating pressure). At 5.5 psid (maximum failure pressure) the predicted hoop load is 15.8 lbs with a safety factor for hoop stress of 8.8. At 8.8 psid (maximum BTA operating pressure) the predicted hoop load is 25.3 lbs with a safety factor for hoop stress of 5.5. Testing has demonstrated that the tensile strength of the bladder seams meets or exceeds that of the bladder fabric.
	SCREENS: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS	The following paragraph applies to the laminate coated nylon. Testing has shown that the bladder fabric minimum tensile strength is 170 lbs/inch (fill) and 180 lbs/inch (warp) and 3.5 lbs/inch minimum. The bladder fabric is aligned with the warp parallel to the hoop lad that would be sustained by the bladder in the event of a restraint fabric failure. Based on predicted hoop load of 12.7 lbs, the minimum safety factor for hoop stress is 14.2 at 4.4 psid (normal operating pressure). At 5.5 psid (maximum failure pressure) the predicted hoop load is 15.8 lbs with a safety factor for hoop stress of 11.3. At 8.8 psid (maximum BTA
		exposed to TMG. Loading and abrading of bladder. MISSION: None. CREW/VEHICLE: None with single failure. Loss of crewman with loss of bladder. TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: N/A TIME AVAILABLE: N/A TIME REQUIRED: N/A REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A-PASS B-FAIL

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						Bacc. 1/21/2002		
NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE				
		104FM35						
				operating pressure) the predicted hoop load is 25.3 lbs with a safety factor for hoop stress of 7.1. Testing has demonstrated that the tensile strength of the bladder seams meets or exceeds that of the bladder fabric.				
				B. Test - Acceptance: Components - see inspection	1.			
				Document 0111-710112:	acted at the boot level in a + 0.2 - 0.0 psig for a mini			
					was successfully tested (m operational life (Ref ILC D			
				The following usage, reflect restraint was documented do	cting requirements of signif aring certification:	icance to the boot		
				Requirement	S/AD Actual			
				Ankle Flexion/Extension Walking Steps Pressure Cycles Don/Doff Pressure Hours	11614 24000 4320 77760 300 600 98 400 458 916			
				The Enhanced Boot restraint was successfully subjected to a BTA ultimate pressure of 13.2 psig. (1.5 times max BTA operating pressure based on 8.8 psig) (Ref. ILC Doc. 0111-711330). C. Inspection - Components and material manufactured to ILC requirements at an approved supplie are documented from procurement through shipping by the supplier. ILC incoming receiving inspection verifies that the materials received are as identified in the procurement documents, that no damage has occurred during shipment and that supplier certifications have been received which provide traceability information.				
					spection of sewn seams durin ssure that this particular f			
				During PDA, the following inspection points are performed at the boot assembly level in accordance with ILC Document 0111-710112:				
				1. Visual inspection for :	fabric or material degradati	on. Seams are inspected		

1. Visual inspection for fabric or material degradation. Seams are inspected for broken or frayed stitches.

2. Visual inspection for structural damage following proof pressure test with

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TMGs removed.

D. Failure History - None.

E. Ground Turnaround - None, for every component within its limited life requirements.

Every four years or 229 hours of manned pressurized time the boot restraint and bladder assembly is separated from the LTA and subjected to a complete visual inspection (Interior and Exterior surfaces) for material damage and degradation. Following reassembly to the LTA, structural and leakage tests are performed.

F. Operational Use -Crew Response -Pre/post-EVA : No response, single failure not detectable. EVA : No response, single failure not detectable. Special Training - No training specifically covers this failure mode. Operational Considerations - Not applicable.

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-104 LOWER TORSO ASSEMBLY (LTA)

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

Prepared by: AS - Project Engineering

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NASA MOD

<u>5/23/02</u> 6/04/02 MASA-Grew,

6/3/02

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