CIL EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST			5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/2/1991		Page 1 Date: 3/27/2002
NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
		114FM04A			
SUIT PRESSURE TRANSDUCER ITEM 114 SV767788-1/-2	2/2	2/2       Loss of output,       END ITEM:       A. Design -         output,       False       -1 Conrac and -2 Gulton:         indicates zero       indication of pressure.       All electrical joints are coated with epoxy and insulated in provide wire strain relief and prevent an open circuit. Ele pressure.         are designed and soldered per NHB-5300.4(3A-1).		eadwires are used to ctrical solder joints	
		Failure in electrical leads or connector which causes an open circuit. Mechanical shock loading causes a loosening of the bearing adjustment and prevents the wiper from contacting the element.	GFE INTERFACE: False CWS warning and indication of low suit pressure emergency. The crewman is erroneously directed to close the purge valve. MISSION: Terminate EVA. Loss of CWS warning for low suit pressure.	<ul> <li>B. Test - Component Acceptance Test - The sensor is subjected to random vibration testing (6.1 gr are no workmanship or material problems that would cause an sensor is subjected to calibration testing at high and low degrees to 120 degrees F) to insure there are are no defect expansion/contraction would uncover. The sensor circuit con to insure there are no open circuits.</li> <li>PDA Test - The sensor is calibration checked as assembled on the shear output voltage is within spec limits per SEMU-60-010, Test</li> <li>Certification Test - Certified for a useful life of 20 years (Ref. EMUM1-0084).</li> <li>C. Inspection - The sensor is visually inspected prior to case assembly.</li> </ul>	ms) to insure there open circuit. The temperature (30 s that thermal tinuity is measured plate to insure the 27.
			CREW/VEHICLE: None. TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: Seconds. TIME AVAILABLE: N/A TIME REQUIRED: N/A REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A	<ul> <li>D. Failure History - RDR H-EMU-114-C003 (8-24-84) was issued for Item 114 due to voltage: After 40,000 pressure cycles 0 to full scale the of exhibited loss of output voltage at 65% of full scale output contamination of coil where wiper contacts it. The cycle li changed to 25,000 cycles to eliminate problem. This represe over the actual est. life cycles use of 2500 over 15 year.</li> <li>E. Ground Turnaround - Tested for non-EET processing per FEMU-R-001, Transducer an Calibration Check. FEMU-R-001 Para 8.2 EMU Preflight KSC Ch processing.</li> <li>F. Operational Use - Crew Response - PreEVA: If failure can be determined to be sensor, continue Perform manual leak checks. Training - Standard EMU trainin mode.</li> <li>Operational Considerations - For single failure, no constra</li> </ul>	loss of output ertification unit t due to fe requirement was nts a factor of 12 d DCM Gage eckout for EET with EVA prep. g covers this failure ints. EVA checklist

procedures verify hardware integrity and systems operational status prior to EVA. Real Time Data System allows ground monitoring of EMU systems.

## EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

**I-114 PRESSURE SUIT SENSOR** 

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

Prepared by: HS - Project Engineering Approved by: 2008

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