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EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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P/N QTY MODE 4 QTY MODE 4 CALURE S MODE 4 CALURE S MODE 4 CALURE S SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY, IFEM 115 (FIVOTED, FLANAR 2/2 ASSEMBLY, IFEM 115 (FIVOTED, FLANAR 2/2 ASSEMBLY, IFEM 115 (FIVOTED, FLANAR 2/2 Carriage will not translate 11 kage (1) A. Design - Carriage will position. SW224133-8 Cable or (1) Total or pass record carriage jam. Not translate position. A. Design - Total inde statiless steel ways with long wheelbase. The pushbutton statiles carriage image of A-206 and Lubricated when assembly consists of a stainless steel field carriage image of Nitronic 60 and slide electrofilmed stainless steel ways with long wheelbase. The pushbutton statiles stelling in a Teclin lined sheath. (1) SW224133-8 O. S psi. setLing. S. Test - Component Acceptance Test - Component Acc	NAME		FAILURE		
SHEAR FLATE 2/2 Fails in IV For IV Actuator cable Actuator cable ASSEMBLY, ITEM CHUPTED, Actuator cable Actuator cable The 02 actuator system incorporates features to maintain reliable and low SWTM5340-56 Cable or not translate actuator cable actuator cable actuator cable in motion capability of the moving parts. These features to maintain reliable and low SWTM5340-56 CABLE or not translate front to translate actuator cambed of Alton to the wheelbase. The pubbuton al SWT04313-6 Maintains SOP mechanism maintain SOP and suit SW24133-6 CABLE or and suit actuator connection; (1) Training are made of Alton to the wheelbase. The pubbuton al and suit (1) Cable or and suit actuator actuator call as setting. (1) Cable or connection; regulator off and suit (1) Cable or actuator connection; and suit (1) Cable or connection; and suit connection; (1) Cable or connection; beffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff	P/N	CRIT	MODE &	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
SHEAR FLATE 2/2 Fails in IV For the Statute of the			<u> </u>		
The airlock hatch door to crew compartmentspecification without a SOP attached. Crew training procedures were also a to prevent a recurrence of this condition.J-EMU-115-C002 (10-15-80) Difficulty in moving 02 actuator during a "Manne vacuum Certification Test". As a corrective action Engineering Change 4280 incorporated an actuator system having reduced operating forces, improved wenting the PLSS.The airlock hatch door to crew compartmentJ-EMU-115-C002 (10-15-80) Difficulty in moving 02 actuator during a "Manne Vacuum Certification Test". As a corrective action Engineering Change 4280 incorporated an actuator system having reduced operating forces, improved materials and lubricity, and improved glove hand feel.PLSS.EMU-115-C002 (4-27-79) Actuator binding due to interference with wires. As	SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY, ITEM 115 (PIVOTED, PLANAR) 		115FM02 Fails in IV position. Cable or linkage mechanism deformed or jams; severed cable or connection; high bearing drag; actuator	END ITEM: Actuator cable and/or carriage will not translate from IV position. Maintains SOP regulator off and suit regulator at 0.9 psi. setting. GFE INTERFACE: Unable to pressurize suit above 0.9 psig. Unable to doff the EMU without dumping PLSS pressure. PLSS is vented into airlock in order to doff EMU. MISSION: Loss of use of one EMU. CREW/VEHICLE: Airlock may not be compatible with pure oxygen atmosphere. The airlock hatch door to crew compartment should be opened before venting the PLSS.	<pre>A. Design - The 02 actuator system incorporates features to maintain reliable and low friction motion capability of the moving parts. These features include material selections, surface treatments and control of the wheelbase and loads of moving parts. The actuator cam has Nituff coated surfaces and has a long wheelbase with ball bearing supports, while the carriage is made of Nitronic 60 and slides on electrofilmed stainless steel ways with long wheelbase. The pushbutton slide bearings are made of A-266 and lubricated when assembled into the Nitronic 60 carriage. The flex cable assembly consists of a stainless steel flex cable sliding in a Teflon lined sheath.</pre> E. Test - Component Acceptance Test - None. DDA Test - Per SEMU-60-010 the forces required to disengage the actuator detents, and the forces required to push or pull the actuator through its complete travel are measured. The force required to push the actuator out of the "OFF", "ERESS", "EVA", OR "IV" detents must be 3.0 - 6.0 lbs. The force required to slide the actuator to any of the above four positions must be 15 lbs maximum. Proper cam mechanism actuation is verified through this test. Certification Test - Certification Test - Certification Test - Certification Test - Details are 100% inspected per drawing dimensions and surface finish characteristics. Details are manufactured from material with certified physical and chemical properties. All details, gases and test facilities are cleaned and inspected to HSJ150 EM50A to preclude contamination clogging. D. Failure History - J-FAMO-115-002 (1-1-83) 02 actuator binding due to actuation procedure utilized. As corrective action actuation forces are verified during PLSS PA testing and short EMU testing. This assures that mechanism behavior is normal and within specification without a SOP attached. Crew training procedures were also altered to prevent a recurrence of this condition. J-EMU-115-C002 (10-15-80) Difficulty in moving 02 actuator during a "Manned EMU Yacuum Certification Test". As

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NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
		115FM02		
			TIME AVAILABLE: N/A TIME REQUIRED: N/A REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A	<pre>coating from side of actuator guide plate. As a corrective action an Engineering Change was processed to eliminate the need for Nituff coating by changing the actuator carriage and guide plate material to Stainless Steel instead of aluminum. The carriage was also chrome plated. E. Ground Turnaround - Tested for non-EET processing per FEMU-R-001, V1103 Performance Data and Item 113 Regulator Check. FEMU-R-001 Para 8.2 EMU Preflight KSC Checkout for EET processing. F. Operational Use - Crew Response - Pre-EVA: Use third EMU if available. EMU is no go for EVA. Training - Standard training covers this failure mode. Operational Considerations - Flight rules define loss of EMU for loss of pressure regulation. EVA checklist procedures verify hardware integrity and systems operational status prior to EVA.</pre>

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-115 SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

Prepared by: Approved by: RAB L Approved by: RAB L RAB L

Ula Ploye HS - Engineering Manag tor RMa

M. Smych HS - Reliability

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