CIL

EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

#### 5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/24/1992

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Date: 3/27/2002

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NAME		FAILURE		
P/N	ODIE	MODE &		DARTONALE FOR ACCEDENNCE
QTY	CRIT	CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
		115FM03A	· – – – – – – – ·	
SHEAR PLATE	2/2	Fails in PRESS	END ITEM:	A. Design -
ASSEMBLY, ITEM		position.	Actuator cable	The 02 actuator system incorporates features to maintain reliable and low
115 (PIVOTED,		(PreEVA)	and/or	friction motion capability of the moving parts. These features include material
PLANAR)			carriage will	selections, surface treatments and control of the wheelbase and loads of moving
			not translate	parts. The actuator cam has Nituff coated surfaces and has a long wheelbase with
SV778540-56		Cable or	from "PRESS"	ball bearing supports, while the carriage is made of Nitronic 60 and slides on
(1)		linkage mechanism	position. Maintains SOP	electrofilmed stainless steel ways with long wheelbase. The pushbutton slide bearings are made of A-286 and lubricated when assembled
OR (ORU)		jams; severed	shut off.	into the Nitronic 60 carriage. The flex cable assembly consists of a stainless
		cable or	Shut OII.	steel flex cable sliding in a Teflon lined sheath.
SV824133-8		connection;		
(1)		high bearing drag, actuator	GFE INTERFACE: Unable to open	B. Test -
		carriage jams.	SOP shutoff	B. Test - Component Acceptance Test -
		calliage Jams.	valve. SOP	None.
			regulator is	
			kept OFF line.	PDA Test -
			Suit pressure	Per SEMU-60-010 the forces required to disengage the actuator detents, and the
			is regulated	forces required to push or pull the actuator through its complete travel are
			at 4.3 psi.	measured. The force required to push the actuator out of the "OFF", "PRESS",
				"EVA", or "IV", detents must be 3.0 - 6.0 lbs. The forces required to slide the
			MISSION:	actuator to any of the above four positions must be 15 lbs maximum. Proper cam
			Loss of use of one EMU.	mechanism actuation is verified through this test.
			Repress	Certification Test -
			airlock if	Certified for a useful life of 20 years from the date of manufacture.
			failure occurs	Successful refurbishment will extend useful life to 30 years max. (ref EMUM1-
			during airlock	0491, EMUM1-0027).
			depressure-	
			ization.	C. Inspection -
				Details are 100% inspected per drawing dimensions and surface finish
			CREW/VEHICLE:	characteristics. Details are manufactured from material with certified physical
			None.	and chemical properties. All details, gases and test facilities are cleaned and
				inspected to HS3150 EM50A to preclude contamination clogging.
			TIME TO EFFECT	
			/ACTIONS:	D. Failure History -
			Immediate.	B-EMU-115-A002 (3/08/90). Excessive force was required to operate the O2 Actuator from "PRESS" to "EVA" during an ETA chamber run. The condition could
			TIME	not be duplicated when the shear plate assembly was removed from the PLSS and
			AVAILABLE:	returned to Hamilton. Therefore, no corrective action was taken.
			N/A	
				E. Ground Turnaround -
			TIME REQUIRED:	Tested for non-EET processing per FEMU-R-001, V1103 Performance Data and Item
			N/A	113 Regulator Check. FEMU-R-001 Para 8.2 EMU Preflight KSC Checkout for EET
				processing.
			REDUNDANCY	
			SCREENS: A-N/A	F. Operational Use - Crew Response -
			A-N/A B-N/A	Crew Response - PreEVA: Repress airlock, use third EMU if available. EMU is no go for EVA.
			C-N/A	PostEVA: Repress allock, use child EMO II available. EMO IS NO GO IOI EVA. PostEVA: Perform quick doffing procedure if limited by cabin PP02. Have IV
			÷ 11/11	crewmember cover the neck ring vent hole while crewmember doffs the HUT. Then

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NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
		115FM03A		line when EMU is unbuttoned. Training - No training specifically covers this failure mode. Operational Considerations - Flight rules define loss of EMU for loss of SOP pressure EVA checklist procedures verify hardware integrity and sy status prior to EVA.	

# EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

### SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

### I-115 SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

## EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

Prepared by: Approved by: RAB L Approved by: RAB L RAB L

Ula Ploye HS - Engineering Manag tor RMa

M. Smych HS - Reliability

. u/mods

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