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CIL EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/24/1992

C-PASS

Date: 3/27/2002 FAILURE NAME P/N MODE & OTY CRIT CAUSES FAILURE EFFECT RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE 115FM15 2/1R END ITEM: SHEAR PLATE Bladder loop A. Design -ASSEMBLY, ITEM external Primary oxygen There are 8 external leak paths through radial seals and 3 through face seals. leakage to 115 (PIVOTED, leakage (113E The 0-ring seal design dimensions and the rigidness of the assembly provide to 120 ambient. squeeze under all load conditions. Oxygen temperature and pressure are not PLANAR) Transfer Tube, extreme, bladder loop pressure is 15 psid; vent loop pressure is 4.3 psid. SV778540-56 113E Test Port Cap and TPG GFE INTERFACE: B. Test -(1) housing) or Excessive Component Acceptance Test vent loop consumption of None. external the primary SV824133-8 leakage (113 oxygen supply. PDA Test -(1) PLSS SOP The SOP is The 02 feedwater circuit undergoes proof and leakage testing per SEMU-60-010. Initial proof pressure testing is at 30-32 psig for 5 minutes minimum. Any transfer automatically fitting and activated retest to proof pressure is to 19-21 psiq. lower relief during EVA if A leak test is run using 98% N2 and 2% He. With the circuit pressurized to tube). the suit 14.6 - 15.7 psig, a helium sniff test must show no evidence of leakage. pressure drops to 3.33 psid Seal failure. Certification Test minimum. Certified for a useful life of 20 years from the date of manufacture. Successful refurbishment will extend useful life to 30 years max. (ref EMUM1-0491, EMUM1-0027). MISSION: Terminate EVA. C. Inspection -Loss of use of 0-ring grooves are 100% inspected per drawing dimensions and surface finish. 0rings are inspected for surface characteristics per SVHS3432; 100% for Class I one EMU. and II 0-rings, and at least 1.5 AQL for Class III. CREW/VEHICLE: None for D. Failure History single None. failure. Possible loss of crewman with loss of SOP. E. Ground Turnaround -TIME TO EFFECT Tested for non-EET processing per FEMU-R-001, Final SEMU Gas Structural and Leakage. None for EET processing. /ACTIONS: Minutes. F. Operational Use -TIME Crew Response -Pre/PostEVA: Trouble-shoot problem. If no success, use third EMU if available. AVAILABLE: Otherwise terminate EVA. EMU is no go for EVA. Minutes. EVA: When CWS data confirms an accelerated drop in primary 02 tank pressure, TIME REOUIRED: terminate EVA. If SOP activation is also confirmed, abort EVA. Training -Immediate Standard training covers this failure mode. REDUNDANCY Operational Considerations -SCREENS: EVA checklist procedures verify hardware integrity and systems operational A-PASS status prior to EVA. Flight rules define go/no go criteria related to EMU pressure integrity. Real B-PASS

Time Data Systems allows ground monitoring of EMU systems.

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-115 SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

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