CIL

Page 1

EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/24/1992

Date: 3/27/2002 NAME FAILURE P/N MODE & OTY CRIT CAUSES FAILURE EFFECT RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE 115FM20 2/1R END ITEM: SHEAR PLATE Actuator cam A. Design -The actuator casing is bonded to the tube fitting which forms the shear plate ASSEMBLY, ITEM 115 fails out of Cable conduit EVA position. disconnected ground for the casing. Acceptance spec allowable actuator slide force is 15 lbs. maximum, while testing indicates actual slide forces approximately 10 lbs. These SV778540-56 from shear actuator slide forces are transmitted through the casing bond joint in shear. (1) plate Failure of structure Assuming 100% coverage, the bond joint is capable of transmitting up to a 528 lb bond between allowing the shear force. Thus there is a load safety factor of 35 compared to actuator slide OR (ORU) actuator cable actuator cam forces. External loads during assembly may import torsional or bending loads at SV824133-8 conduit and to move the bond joint. Capacity for a 100% bond joint loaded at the end of the conduit independently hard section is calculated to be 10 lbs., with no other casing support. (1) shear plate. of the actuator B. Test carriage. Cam Component Acceptance Test moves out of There is no direct stress test of the subject bond joint. However, proper 02 EVA position. actuator performance is verified during shear plate acceptance testing per AT-E-115 Para. 10.0 and 15.0. GFE INTERFACE: Secondary PDA Testing regulator Proper 02 actuator performance is verified during PLSS acceptance testing per shutoff. Loss SEMU-60-010 Para. 21.0 02 actuator cycling and control test which shows that actuation forces are acceptable. of emergency suit. pressurization Certification Testing -Certified for a useful life of 20 years from the date of manufacture. capability. Successful refurbishment will extend useful life to 30 years max. (ref EMUM1-MISSION: 0491, EMUM1-0027). Terminate EVA. C. Inspection -Proper bond filler at the bond joint is 100% inspected prior to assembling the actuator to the shear plate. CREW/VEHICLE: None. D. Failure History -TIME TO EFFECT None. However, 3 bond failures have occurred during shear plate assembly. /ACTIONS: Seconds. E. Ground Turnaround -Tested for non-EET processing per FEMU-R-001, 02 Actuator Position Switch Check. None for EET processing. AVATLABLE: Minutes. F. Operational Use -TIME REQUIRED: Crew Response -Pre/PostEVA: Trouble shoot problem use third EMU if available. If no success, Minutes. terminate EVA. EMU is no go for EVA. REDUNDANCY EVA: Terminate EVA, if cam fails in IV, OFF or PRESS position. SCREENS: Training - Standard Training covers this mode. A-PASS Operational Considerations - Flight rules define go/no go criteria related to B-PASS EMU pressure integrity and regulation. EVA checklist procedures verify hardware C-PASS integrity, and systems operational status prior to EVA. Real Time Data System

allows ground monitoring of EMU systems.

## EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

## SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-115 SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

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