

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PART

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
ASS'Y P/N: 51140E39

SHEET: 1

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	/ FUNC. RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE 2/1R CRITICALITY SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
1220	1	VOLTAGE DETECTION CIRCUIT QTY-1 ED94385	<p>MODE: CONTINUOUS SAFING SIGNAL.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) INTERNAL PARTS FAILURE.</p> <p>(2) K6 CONTACT O/C.</p>	<p>OV TO SAFING LINE. ARM IN HARDWIRE SAFING. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE.</p> <p>WORST CASE</p> <p>LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p> <p>DIRECT AND BACKUP</p>	<p>DESIGN FEATURES</p> <p>-----</p> <p>THE VOLTAGE DETECTION CIRCUIT UTILIZES ONLY THREE "ACTIVE" EEE PARTS: TWO TRANSISTORS, TYPE 2N2222A, AND A RELAY. THE RELAY IS PROCURED TO MIL-R-39016 AND SCREENED TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF NASA ST-R-0001. THE RELAY IS MOUNTED ON A PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD WHICH HAS A FULL WIDTH MACHINED ALUMINIUM SUPPORT FRAME. THE FRAME ENGAGES IN MACHINED GUIDEWAYS IN THE ELECTRONICS PACKAGE. THIS CONFIGURATION ENSURES GOOD VIBRATION DAMPING AND HEAT TRANSFER.</p> <p>EEE PARTS HAVE BEEN SELECTED AND CONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. THIS DOCUMENT DEFINES THE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR MONITORING AND CONTROLLING EEE PARTS. THE REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE PARTS SELECTION TO AT LEAST "ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY" LEVELS, AND ADEQUATE DERATING OF PART STRESS LEVELS. PROCEDURES AND ACTIVITIES ARE SPECIFIED TO ENSURE AT LEAST EQUIVALENT QUALITY FOR NONSTANDARD AND IRREGULAR PARTS. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS HAS CONFIRMED NO PARTS WITH GENERICALLY HIGH FAILURE RATES. AEROSPACE DESIGN STANDARDS FOR DETAILING ELECTRONIC PARTS PACKAGING, MOUNTING AND STRUCTURAL/MECHANICAL/INTEGRITY OF ASSEMBLIES ARE APPLIED. SUCH DESIGN HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND FOUND SATISFACTORY THROUGH THE DESIGN AUDIT PROCESS, INCLUDING THE USE OF RELIABILITY MAINTAINABILITY AND SAFETY CHECKLISTS. MATERIAL SELECTION AND USAGE CONFORMS TO SPAR-SG.368 WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO THE NASA MATERIALS USAGE REQUIREMENTS. WORST CASE ANALYSIS HAS BEEN CONDUCTED TO ENSURE THAT PERFORMANCE CAN BE MET UNDER WORST CASE TEMPERATURE AND AGING EFFECTS. EEE PARTS STRESS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND CONFIRMS THAT THE PARTS MEET THE DERATING REQUIREMENTS.</p> <p>PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD DESIGNS HAVE BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE ADEQUATE CIRCUIT PATH WIDTH AND SEPARATION AND TO CONFIRM APPROPRIATE DIMENSIONS OF CIRCUIT SOLDER PADS AND OF COMPONENT HOLE PROVISIONS.</p> <p>PARTS MOUNTING METHODS ARE CONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MSFC-STD-136 AND CAE P093489. THESE DOCUMENTS REQUIRE APPROVED-MOUNTING METHODS, STRESS RELIEF, AND COMPONENT SECURITY.</p> <p>WHERE APPLICABLE, DESIGN DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTATION GIVE CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF HANDLING PRECAUTIONS FOR ESD SENSITIVE PARTS.</p> <p>BOARD ASSEMBLY DRAWINGS INCLUDE THE REQUIREMENT FOR SOLDERING STANDARDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH NHD 5300.4(3A) AND JSC 08800A.</p>

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

SHEET: 2

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
1220	1	VOLTAGE DETECTION CIRCUIT QTY-1 ED94385	MODE: CONTINUOUS SAFING SIGNAL. CAUSE(S): (1) INTERNAL PARTS FAILURE. (2) K6 CONTACT O/C.	OV TO SAFING LINE. ARM IN HARDWIRE SAFING. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE. WORST CASE ----- LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- DIRECT AND BACKUP		<p>ACCEPTANCE TESTS ----- THE HARDWARE ITEM IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING ACCEPTANCE ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING AS PART OF THE D&C PANEL.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> O VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 1 O THERMAL: +100 DEGREES F TO +10 DEGREES F 2 CYCLES (9.5 HRS PER CYCLE) <p>THE D&C PANEL ASSEMBLY IS FURTHER TESTED AS PART OF THE RMS SYSTEM (TP510 RMS STRONGBACK TEST AND TP552 FLAT FLOOR TEST) WHICH VERIFIES THE ABSENCE OF THE FAILURE MODE.</p> <p>QUALIFICATION TESTS ----- THE D&C PANEL HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATION TEST ENVIRONMENT:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> O VIBRATION: (LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 1 O SHOCK: 20G/11MS - 3 AXES (6 DIRECTION) O THERMAL: 130 DEGREES F TO -23 DEGREES F (12 HRS PER CYCLE) (6 CYCLES) O HUMIDITY: 95% (120 DEGREES F TO 82 DEGREES F CYCLE IN 16 HRS) 10 CYCLES TOTAL O ENC: MIL-STD-461 AS MODIFIED BY SL-E-0002 (TEST CE01, CE CE03, CS01(DC/AC), CS02, CS06, RE02 (B/N), RS02, RS03, RS04) RE02 (B/N) RS02, 03, 04) <p>FLIGHT CHECKOUT ----- PORS OPS CHECKLIST (ALL VEHICLES) JSC 16987</p>

PREPARED BY: MFHG

SUPERCEDING DATE: 06 OCT 87

APPROVED BY: _____

DATE: 24 JUL 91

CIL REV: 2

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

SHEET: 3

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
1220	1	VOLTAGE DETECTION CIRCUIT QTY-1 ED94385	<p>MODE: CONTINUOUS SAFING SIGNAL.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) INTERNAL PARTS FAILURE.</p> <p>(2) K6 CONTACT O/C.</p>	<p>OV TO SAFING LINE. ARM IN HARDWIRE SAFING. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE.</p> <p>WORST CASE</p> <p>LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p> <p>DIRECT AND BACKUP</p>	<p>QA/INSPECTIONS</p> <p>-----</p> <p>EEE PARTS INSPECTION IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003. EACH EEE PART IS QUALIFIED AT THE PART LEVEL TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION. ALL EEE PARTS ARE 100X SCREENED AND BURNED IN, AS A MINIMUM, AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003, BY THE SUPPLIER. ADDITIONALLY, EEE PARTS ARE 100X RE-SCREENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS, BY AN INDEPENDENT SPAR APPROVED TESTING FACILITY. DPA IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY PA.003 ON A RANDOMLY SELECTED 5% OF PARTS, MAXIMUM 5 PIECES, MINIMUM 3 PIECES FOR EACH LOT NUMBER/DATE CODE OF PARTS RECEIVED.</p> <p>WIRE IS PROCURED TO SPECIFICATION MIL-W-22759 OR MIL-W-81381 AND INSPECTED AND TESTED TO NASA JSCM8080 STANDARD NUMBER 95A.</p> <p>RECEIVING INSPECTION VERIFIES THAT ALL PARTS RECEIVED ARE AS IDENTIFIED IN THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS, THAT NO PHYSICAL DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED TO PARTS DURING SHIPMENT, THAT THE RECEIVING DOCUMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE TRACEABILITY INFORMATION AND SCREENING DATA CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ACCEPTABLE PARTS.</p> <p>PARTS ARE INSPECTED THROUGHOUT MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY AS APPROPRIATE TO THE MANUFACTURING STAGE COMPLETED. THESE INSPECTIONS INCLUDE,</p> <p>PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD INSPECTION FOR TRACK SEPARATION, DAMAGE AND ADEQUACY OF PLATED THROUGH HOLES,</p> <p>COMPONENT MOUNTING INSPECTION FOR CORRECT SOLDERING, WIRE LOOPING, STRAPPING, ETC. OPERATORS AND INSPECTORS ARE TRAINED AND CERTIFIED TO NASA NHB 5300.4(3A) STANDARD, AS MODIFIED BY JSC 08800A.</p> <p>CONFORMAL COATING INSPECTION FOR ADEQUATE PROCESSING IS PERFORMED USING ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT TECHNIQUES.</p> <p>POST P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CLEANLINESS AND WORKMANSHIP (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CHECK FOR CORRECT BOARD INSTALLATION, ALIGNMENT OF BOARDS, PROPER CONNECTOR CONTACT MATING, WIRE ROUTING, STRAPPING OF WIRES ETC.,</p> <p>PRE-TEST INSPECTION OF D&C PANEL ASSY INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILD CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>A TEST READINESS REVIEW (TRR) WHICH INCLUDES VERIFICATION OF TEST PERSONNEL, TEST DOCUMENTS, TEST EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION/ VALIDATION STATUS AND HARDWARE CONFIGURATION IS CONVENED BY QUALITY ASSURANCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ENGINEERING, RELIABILITY, CONFIGURATION CONTROL, SUPPLIER AS APPLICABLE, AND THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE, PRIOR TO THE START OF ANY FORMAL TESTING (ACCEPTANCE OR QUALIFICATION).</p> <p>ACCEPTANCE TESTING (ATP) INCLUDES AMBIENT PERFORMANCE,</p>

PREPARED BY: MFWG

SUPERCEDING DATE: 06 OCT 87

APPROVED BY: _____

DATE: 24 JUL 91

CIL REV: 2

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM

NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

SHEET: 4

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
1220	1	VOLTAGE DETECTION CIRCUIT QTY-1 ED94385	MODE: CONTINUOUS SAFING SIGNAL. CAUSE(S): (1) INTERNAL PARTS FAILURE. (2) K6 CONTACT O/C.	OV TO SAFING LINE. ARM IN HARDWARE SAFING. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE. WORST CASE ----- LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- DIRECT AND BACKUP		THERMAL AND VIBRATION TESTING, (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT). INTEGRATION OF D&C PANEL, RHC, ITC AND MCIV, INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH STAGE OF INTEGRATION, WHICH INCLUDES GROUNDING CHECKS, INTER CONNECT CABLE VERIFICATION, CONNECTOR INSPECTION FOR BENT OR PUSHBACK CONTACTS ETC. SUB-SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TESTING (ATP), INCLUDES AN AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT). SRMS SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, THE INTEGRATION OF MECHANICAL ARM SUBASSEMBLIES AND THE FLIGHT CABIN EQUIPMENT TO FORM THE SRMS. INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH PHASE OF INTEGRATION WHICH INCLUDES GROUNDING CHECKS, THRU WIRING CHECKS, WIRING ROUTING, INTERFACE CONNECTORS FOR BENT OR PUSH BACK CONTACTS ETC. SRMS SYSTEMS TESTING - STRONGBACK AND FLAT FLOOR AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)

PREPARED BY: MFVG

SUPERCEDING DATE: 06 OCT 87

APPROVED BY: _____

DATE: 24 JUL 91

CIL REV: 2

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SM-1
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 5114DE391

SHEET: 5

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HW / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
1220	1	VOLTAGE DETECTION CIRCUIT QTY-1 ED94385	MODE: CONTINUOUS SAFING SIGNAL. CAUSE(S): (1) INTERNAL PARTS FAILURE. (2) K6 CONTACT O/C.	OV TO SAFING LINE. ARM IN HARDWIRE SAFING. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE. WORST CASE ----- LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- DIRECT AND BACKUP		FAILURE HISTORY ----- NO EEE PARTS FAILURES HAVE OCCURRED SUBSEQUENT TO ASSEMBLY OF PARTS.

PREPARED BY: MFNG

SUPERCEDING DATE: 06 OCT 87

RMS/D&C - 245

DATE: 24 JUL 91

CIL REV: 2

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 5172DE391

SHEET: 6

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT OR END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. Z/IR CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
1220	1	VOLTAGE DETECTION CIRCUIT QTY-1 ED94385	<p>MODE: CONTINUOUS SAFING SIGNAL.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) INTERNAL PARTS FAILURE.</p> <p>(2) K6 CONTACT O/C.</p>	<p>OV TO SAFING LINE. ARM IN HARDWIRE SAFING. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE.</p> <p>WORST CASE ----- LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- DIRECT AND BACKUP</p>		<p>OPERATIONAL EFFECTS ----- COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES CANNOT BE USED TO COMPLETE THE MISSION. DIRECT DRIVE AND BACK-UP MODES REMAIN. IF PAYLOAD ATTACHED, THE ARM SHOULD BE MANEUVERED TO A SAFE POSITION FOR PAYLOAD RELEASE. LOSS OF NEXT REDUNDANT PATH RESULTS IN BEING ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM INABILITY TO CRADLE ARM. IF WITH SUBSEQUENT FAILURES ALL DRIVE MODES ARE LOST, THE ARM MAY BE JETTISONED.</p> <p>CREW ACTION ----- USE DIRECT DRIVE</p> <p>CREW TRAINING ----- NONE</p> <p>MISSION CONSTRAINT ----- NONE</p> <p>OMRSD OFFLINE ----- INITIATE AUTO SAFING. VERIFY HARDWIRE SAFING VOLTAGE AT D&C PANEL OUTPUT.</p> <p>OMRSD ONLINE INSTALLATION ----- INITIATE AUTO SAFING FROM MCIU. VERIFY HARDWIRE SAFING VOLTAGE AT LONGERON INTERFACE.</p> <p>OMRSD ONLINE TURNAROUND ----- INITIATE AUTO SAFING FROM MCIU. OPERATE ONE JOINT IN SINGLE. VERIFY NO JOINT MOTION.</p>

PREPARED BY: HTMG SUPERSEDING DATE: 06 OCT 87 APPROVED BY: _____ DATE: 24 JUL 91 CIL REV: 2