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CIL

EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

| EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST | | 5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/31/2001 | | | Date: 3/27/2002 |
|-------------------------|------|---------------------------------|---|--|------------------------------|
| | | | | | |
| NAME D /N | | FAILURE | | | |
| P/N QTY | CRIT | MODE & CAUSES | FAILURE EFFECT | RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE | |
| ŽII | CKII | CAUSES | PAIDORE EFFECT | RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE | |
| | | 127FM01 | . – – – – – . | | |
| FILTER, COOLANT | 2/2 | Contamination | END ITEM: | A. Design - | |
| LOOP, ITEM 127 | | breakthrough. | Contaminants released to | (P/N SV778543): | agraga agraen normally is |
| SV778543-3 | _ | | downstream | 1) Filter is changed prior to every flight. Pressure small. (0.15 psid). There are screen supports built is | |
| (1) | | SV778543-3: | components. | 0.260 inch. | 3 1 |
| OD | | Defective | | 2) The strength of screen material is 20,000 psi yiel | ld and the material can |
| OR | _ | attachment of the filter | GFE INTERFACE: | handle a 34 psi delta P. 3) The screen material is a stainless steel screen, i | is a square weave0008 |
| SV805180-1 | | screen to the | Particles | diameter wire and a 635x635 wire mesh. | a square weave, |
| (1) | | housing. | migrate into | 4) The seals associated with sealing this item into i | its housing are viton |
| | | Cartridge seal bypass | <pre>pump. Possible pump binding,</pre> | material seals. | |
| | | leakage. | resulting in a | (P/N SV805180): | |
| | | Screen rupture. | loss of | 1) The radial flow filter design employes two cylinds | rical filter screens, each |
| | | SV805180-1: | coolant flow to the LCVG | supported by a coarse mesh screen. 2) The filters are supported by stainless steel scree | and 000 diameter wire and |
| | | Defective | and to the | 50 x 50 wire mesh. The strength of the support scree | |
| | | attachment of | sublimator. | yield and the material can handle a 400 psi delta P. | |
| | | the filter | | screens normally is small. (0.15 psid). | groon twilled groons weare |
| | | screens and support | MISSION: | 3) The filter screen material is a stainless steel so .0008 diameter wire and a 635 x 635 wire mesh. | reen, twilled square weave, |
| | | screens to the | Terminate EVA | 4) The bypass flow seal is a viton material. | |
| | | housing. | due to loss of | 5) The filter is changed every 328 hours. | |
| | | Cartridge seal bypass | LCVG cooling. | B. Test - | |
| | | leakage. | | (P/N SV778543 and P/N SV805180): | |
| | | Filter and | CREW/VEHICLE: | Component Acceptance Test - | |
| | | support screen rupture. | None. Crewman discomfort. | None. | |
| | | rupture. | (hot) | (P/N SV778543 and P/N SV805180): | |
| | | | | PDA Test - | |
| | | | TIME TO EFFECT | None. | |
| | | | /ACTIONS: | (P/N SV778543): | |
| | | | Minutes. | Certification Test - | |
| | | | штмп | Certified for a useful life of 15 years or 328 hours. | . (ref. EMUM-583, EMUM-680). |
| | | | TIME AVAILABLE: | C. Inspection - | |
| | | | Minutes. | (P/N SV778543): | |
| | | | THE DESILEDED. | Cause - Defective attachment of the filter screen to | |
| | | | TIME REQUIRED: Seconds. | A weld sample is processed with the production parts to verify a proper weld. | and is destructively tested |
| | | | beconab. | The production parts are 100% visually inspected for | proper placement of the |
| | | | REDUNDANCY | resistance welds and the band material. | |
| | | | SCREENS: A-N/A | A bubble point test is performed to check for any gap the screen. | s larger than the weave of |
| | | | B-N/A | one boreen. | |
| | | | C-N/A | (P/N SV805180): | _ |
| | | | | Cause - Defective attachment of the filter or support | _ |
| | | | | Two screen weld samples are destructively tested to ϵ schedule. In addition, one weld sample is processed | |
| | | | | production piece, and another at the completion of a | production lot. Both |
| | | | | samples are destructively tested to verify proper well | ld. The production parts |
| | | | | | |

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NAME FAILURE P/N MODE &

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CAUSES

are 100% visually inspected at a minimum of 25X magnification for proper palcement of the resistance welds at each level of assembly. A bubble point test is performed to check for any gaps larger than the weave of the screen.

(P/N SV778543 and P/N SV805180):

Cause - Cartridge seal bypass leakage.

The filter housing and valve housing sealing interfaces are 100% inspected to meet dimensional and surface finish requirements.

The O-seal is 100% inspected to meet dimensional and surface finish requirements.

Cause - Screen rupture.

A bubble point test is performed to check for any gaps larger than the weave of the screen.

D. Failure History -

P/N SV778543:

None.

P/N SV805180:

 $\rm H\textsc{-}EMU\end{-}127\end{-}D001\end{-}(6/10/92)$ - Three enhanced gas trap filters exhibited bubbles at bubble point pressures below the specification minimum of 8.9 inches of water. Testing at the vendor (Mectron) in Denatured Ethanol instead of ARP 901 specified Isopropyl Alcohol showed a false high bubble point pressure due to the high surface tension of the Ethanol. The vendor procedures have been corrected to use IPA as a test fluid and properly inspect all screens and welds for bubble point performance.

E. Ground Turnaround -

(P/N SV778543):

Filter is changed out during pre-flight processing for non-EET processing per FEMU-R-001. Also, tested per FEMU-R-001, Fan/Pump/Separator/Vent Flow Sensor Performance. None for EET processing.

(P/N SV805180):

The filter is changed out every 328 hours. Also, tested per FEMU-R-001, Fan/Pump/Separator/Vent Flow Sensor Performance.

F. Operational Use -

(P/N SV778543 and P/N SV805180):

Crew Response -

PreEVA: Trouble shoot problem If no success, consider third EMU if available, otherwise continue with EVA prep.

EVA: If cooling becomes a problem, diminish level of activity and try to stay away from direct sunlight. If cooling is still inadequate, terminate EVA. Training -

Standard training covers this failure mode.

Operational Considerations -

RTDS allows ground monitoring of EMU systems.

EVA check list procedures verify hardware integrity and systems operational status to EVA.

Flight rules define EMU as go to remain on SCU (available for rescue if required).

Flight rules define loss of EMU for loss of thermal control.

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-127 PUMP INLET FILTER

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

AS - Project Engineering

Approved by: Tong 1

ASA - Program Manager