CIL EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/2/1991

EMO CRITICAL TIEMS LIST		5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/2/1991			Date: 3/27/2002
NAME P/N		FAILURE MODE &			
QTY	CRIT	CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
		138FM01A			
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER, FEEDWATER ITEM 138	2/2	2 Drifts high or full scale.  Stress relief of the bellows with time. Failure of the potentiometer linkage due to increased friction. Mechanical shock loading of the linkage which causes a misalignment of the resistive element relative to the wiper.	END ITEM: False, high, indication of airlock pressure.  GFE INTERFACE: The H20 GP and H20 WP values would read lower than the actual pressure. If H20 gas pressure is less than 13.5 psia, CWS will issue a H20 GP LOW warning message.	A. Design2 and -6 Conrac and -8 Gulton: The sensing element is made of an all welded solution hardening Inconel diaphragm to maximize strength and reduce any shift due to over stressing it. All linkage/resistive element attaching screws are potted in place to prevent shifting. The assembly is vacuum outgassed and temperatuare cycled until stable.  B. Test - Component Acceptance Test - The sensor is subjected to random vibration (6.1 grms) testing to insure there are no workmanship or material problems that would cause the voltage to shift	
SV767793-8 (1)				high. The sensor is subjected to calibration testing at hi (30 to 120 deg F) to insure there are no defects that ther contraction would uncover. The sensor is calibration check testing to insure sensor is stable.  PDA Test - The sensor is calibration checked at 0 psig as assembled the output voltage is within spec limits per SEMU-60-010,  Certification Test -	no defects that thermal expansion/ is calibration checked during acceptance psig as assembled on the PLSS to insure
			MISSION: Loss of use of one EMU. CREW/VEHICLE: None.	Certified for a useful life of 20 years (ref. EMUM1-0084).  C. Inspection - Conrac: a. The sensor is visually inspected prior to case there are no workmanship problems which could cause the outligh. b. The sensor is calibration checked at various step process to insure the sensor output is within specified li  Inspection (Continued) - Gulton: a. The sensor is visually case assembly to insure there are no workmanship problems	assembly to insure atput voltage to shift os in the assembly mits.
			/ACTIONS:	output voltage to shift high.  b. The sensor is calibration	checked in the

Seconds. TIME

AVAILABLE: N/A

TIME REQUIRED: N/A

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A

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output voltage to shift high. |b. The sensor is calibration checked in the assembly process to insure the sensor output is within specified limits. |c. The sensor is pressure cycled for at least 350 cycles during assembly to insure the sensor is stabilized. The sensor is temperature cycled between -65 deg F and +200 deg F to insure it is stable.

## D. Failure History -

The following RDR's were issued for Item 138 due to the output voltage drifting

EMU-138-C001 (8-28-79) Failed calibration check high but failure could not be

J-EMU-138-C001 (10-8-80) Pressure indicated a high PLSS level due to high liquid vapor. Class I EC 42803-267 was issued to increase the CWS from trip point level to 1.0 psi. This change was certified.

## E. Ground Turnaround -

Tested for non-EET processing per FEMU-R-001, Transducer and DCM Gage Calibration Check. FEMU-R-001 Para 8.2 EMU Preflight KSC Checkout for EET processing.

F. Operational Use -

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Date: 3/27/2002

NAME FAILURE

P/N MODE &
QTY CRIT CAUSES FAILURE EFFECT RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE

138FM01A

Crew Action -

PreEVA: No constraint, continue EVA prep. Use other EMU to monitor airlock

pressure.
PostEVA: N/A.

Training: Standard EMU training covers this mode.

Operational Considerations -

EVA checklist procedures verify hardware integrity and systems operational

status prior to EVA.

# EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

# SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

# I-138 FEEDWATER PRESSURE SENSOR

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

Prepared by: Approved by: Project Engineering

Approved by: