

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS (-5 MCIU INSTALLED)
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PAREL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

SHEET: 1

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: N/A
1401	5	28V POWER SUPPLY QTY-1 (ORBITER SYSTEM). PS 90128. WL 90128. ED 85511	MODE: LOSS OF 28V DC IN DIRECT MODE. CAUSE(S): (1) INPUT FILTER FAILURE (OPEN).	IF DIRECT DRIVE "POSITIVE" COMMANDED, JOINT DRIVES IN "NEGATIVE" DIRECTION. BRAKES "ON" FOR OTHER JOINTS. AUTO BRAKES WHEN COMMAND REMOVED. NO MOVEMENT FOR "NEGATIVE" COMMAND. LOSS OF EE MANUAL DRIVE MODE. EE AUTO DRIVE MODE IS STILL AVAILABLE. WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION. WRONG JOINT DIRECTION. CREW ACTION REQUIRED REUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- N/A		DESIGN FEATURES ----- THE 28VDC FILTER INCLUDES TWO FEED THROUGH FILTERS, QUALIFIED TO MIL-F-15733. ADDITIONAL CONTROL IS IMPOSED BY CAE PROCUREMENT SPEC, WHICH ENSURES COMPLIANCE WITH THE SCREENING REQUIREMENTS OF SPAR-RMS-PA.003. EEE PARTS HAVE BEEN SELECTED AND CONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. THIS DOCUMENT DEFINES THE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR MONITORING AND CONTROLLING EEE PARTS. THE REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE PARTS SELECTION TO AT LEAST "ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY" LEVELS, AND ADEQUATE DERATING OF PART STRESS LEVELS. PROCEDURES AND ACTIVITIES ARE SPECIFIED TO ENSURE AT LEAST EQUIVALENT QUALITY FOR NONSTANDARD AND IRREGULAR PARTS. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS HAS CONFIRMED NO PARTS WITH GENERICALLY HIGH FAILURE RATES. AEROSPACE DESIGN STANDARDS FOR DETAILING ELECTRONIC PARTS PACKAGING, MOUNTING AND STRUCTURAL/MECHANICAL/INTEGRITY OF ASSEMBLIES ARE APPLIED. SUCH DESIGN HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND FOUND SATISFACTORY THROUGH THE DESIGN AUDIT PROCESS, INCLUDING THE USE OF RELIABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY AND SAFETY CHECKLISTS. MATERIAL SELECTION AND USAGE CONFORMS TO SPAR-SG.368 WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO THE NASA MATERIALS USAGE REQUIREMENTS. WORST CASE ANALYSIS HAS BEEN CONDUCTED TO ENSURE THAT PERFORMANCE CAN BE MET UNDER WORST CASE TEMPERATURE AND AGING EFFECTS. EEE PARTS STRESS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND CONFIRMS THAT THE PARTS MEET THE DERATING REQUIREMENTS. PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD DESIGNS HAVE BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE ADEQUATE CIRCUIT PATH WIDTH AND SEPARATION AND TO CONFIRM APPROPRIATE DIMENSIONS OF CIRCUIT SOLDER PADS AND OF COMPONENT HOLE PROVISIONS. PARTS MOUNTING METHODS ARE CONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MSFC-STD-136 AND CAE PD93489. THESE DOCUMENTS REQUIRE APPROVED MOUNTING METHODS, STRESS RELIEF, AND COMPONENT SECURITY. WHERE APPLICABLE, DESIGN DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTATION GIVE CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF HANDLING PRECAUTIONS FOR ESD SENSITIVE PARTS. BOARD ASSEMBLY DRAWINGS INCLUDE THE REQUIREMENT FOR SOLDERING STANDARDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH NHB 5300.4(3A) AND JSC 08800A.

PREPARED BY:

MFWG

SUPERCEDING DATE: 29 SEP 87

APPROVED BY:

DATE: 24 JUL 91

CIL REV: 5

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS (-5 MC/U INSTALLED)
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

SHEET: 2

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: N/A
1401	5	28V POWER SUPPLY QTY-1 (ORBITER SYSTEM). PS 90120. WL 90120. ED 05511	<p>MODE: LOSS OF 28V DC IN DIRECT MODE.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) INPUT FILTER FAILURE (OPEN).</p>	<p>IF DIRECT DRIVE "POSITIVE" COMMANDED, JOINT DRIVES IN "NEGATIVE" DIRECTION. BRAKES "ON" FOR OTHER JOINTS. AUTO BRAKES WHEN COMMAND REMOVED. NO MOVEMENT FOR "NEGATIVE" COMMAND.</p> <p>LOSS OF EE MANUAL DRIVE MODE. EE AUTO DRIVE MODE IS STILL AVAILABLE.</p> <p>WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION. WRONG JOINT DIRECTION. CREW ACTION REQUIRED</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- N/A</p>	<p>ACCEPTANCE TESTS ----- THE HARDWARE ITEM IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING ACCEPTANCE ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING AS PART OF THE D&C PANEL.</p> <p>0 VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 1</p> <p>0 THERMAL: +100 DEGREES F TO +10 DEGREES F 2 CYCLES (9.5 HRS PER CYCLE)</p> <p>THE D&C PANEL ASSEMBLY IS FURTHER TESTED AS PART OF THE RMS SYSTEM (TP510 RMS STRONGBACK TEST AND TP552 FLAT FLOOR TEST) WHICH VERIFIES THE ABSENCE OF THE FAILURE MODE.</p> <p>QUALIFICATION TESTS ----- THE D&C PANEL HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATION TEST ENVIRONMENT:</p> <p>0 VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 1</p> <p>0 SHOCK: 20G/11MS - 3 AXES (6 DIRECTION)</p> <p>0 THERMAL: 130 DEGREES F TO -23 DEGREES F (12 HRS PER CYCLE) (6 CYCLES)</p> <p>0 HUMIDITY: 95% (120 DEGREES F TO 82 DEGREES F CYCLE IN 16 HRS) 10 CYCLES TOTAL</p> <p>0 EMC: MIL-STD-461 AS MODIFIED BY SL-E-0002 (TEST CE01, CE03, CS01(DC/AC), CS02, CS06, RE02 (B/N), RS02, RS03, RS04) RE02 (B/N) RS02, 03, 04)</p> <p>FLIGHT CHECKOUT ----- PDRS OPS CHECKLIST (ALL VEHICLES) JSC 16987</p>

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SHEET: 3

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT OR END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: N/A
1401	5	28V POWER SUPPLY QTY-1 (ORBITER SYSTEM). PS 9012B. WL 9012B. ED 85511	<p>MODE: LOSS OF 28V DC IN DIRECT MODE.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (?) INPUT FILTER FAILURE (OPEN).</p>	<p>IF DIRECT DRIVE "POSITIVE" COMMANDED, JOINT DRIVES IN "NEGATIVE" DIRECTION. BRAKES "ON" FOR OTHER JOINTS. AUTO BRAKES WHEN COMMAND REMOVED. NO MOVEMENT FOR "NEGATIVE" COMMAND.</p> <p>LOSS OF EE MANUAL DRIVE MODE. EE AUTO DRIVE MODE IS STILL AVAILABLE.</p> <p>WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION. WRONG JOINT DIRECTION. CREW ACTION REQUIRED</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p> <p>----- N/A</p>	<p>QA/INSPECTIONS -----</p> <p>EEE PARTS INSPECTION IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003. EACH EEE PART IS QUALIFIED AT THE PART LEVEL TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION. ALL EEE PARTS ARE 100% SCREENED AND BURNED IN, AS A MINIMUM AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003, BY THE SUPPLIER. ADDITIONALLY, EEE PARTS ARE 100% RE-SCREENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS, BY AN INDEPENDENT SPAR APPROVED TESTING FACILITY. DPA IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY PA.003 ON A RANDOMLY SELECTED 5% OF PARTS, MAXIMUM 5 PIECES, MINIMUM 3 PIECES FOR EACH LOT NUMBER/DATE CODE OF PARTS RECEIVED.</p> <p>WIRE IS PROCURED TO SPECIFICATION MIL-W-22759 OR MIL-W-81381 AND INSPECTED AND TESTED TO NASA JSCM8080 STANDARD NUMBER 95A.</p> <p>RECEIVING INSPECTION VERIFIES THAT ALL PARTS RECEIVED ARE AS IDENTIFIED IN THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS, THAT NO PHYSICAL DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED TO PARTS DURING SHIPMENT, THAT THE RECEIVING DOCUMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE TRACEABILITY INFORMATION AND SCREENING DATA CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ACCEPTABLE PARTS.</p> <p>PARTS ARE INSPECTED THROUGHOUT MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY AS APPROPRIATE TO THE MANUFACTURING STAGE COMPLETED. THESE INSPECTIONS INCLUDE,</p> <p>PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD INSPECTION FOR TRACK SEPARATION, DAMAGE AND ADEQUACY OF PLATED THROUGH HOLES,</p> <p>COMPONENT MOUNTING INSPECTION FOR CORRECT SOLDERING, WIRE LOOPING, STRAPPING, ETC. OPERATORS AND INSPECTORS ARE TRAINED AND CERTIFIED TO NASA WHB 5300.4(3A) STANDARD, AS MODIFIED BY JSC 0800A.</p> <p>CONFORMAL COATING INSPECTION FOR ADEQUATE PROCESSING IS PERFORMED USING ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT TECHNIQUES.</p> <p>POST P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CLEANLINESS AND WORKMANSHIP (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CHECK FOR CORRECT BOARD INSTALLATION, ALIGNMENT OF BOARDS, PROPER CONNECTOR CONTACT MATING, WIRE ROUTING, STRAPPING OF WIRES ETC.,</p> <p>PRE-TEST INSPECTION OF D&C PANEL ASSY INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILD CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>A TEST READINESS REVIEW (TRR) WHICH INCLUDES VERIFICATION OF TEST PERSONNEL TEST DOCUMENTS, TEST EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION/ VALIDATION STATUS AND HARDWARE CONFIGURATION IS CONVENED BY QUALITY ASSURANCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ENGINEERING, RELIABILITY, CONFIGURATION CONTROL, SUPPLIER AS APPLICABLE, AND THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE, PRIOR TO THE START OF ANY FORMAL TESTING (ACCEPTANCE OR QUALIFICATION).</p> <p>ACCEPTANCE TESTING (ATP) INCLUDES AMBIENT PERFORMANCE,</p>

PREPARED BY: HWG

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 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 51740E391

SHEET: 4

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: N/A
1401	5	28V POWER SUPPLY QTY-1 (ORBITER SYSTEM). PS 90128. WL 90128. ED 85511	MODE: LOSS OF 28V DC IN DIRECT MODE. CAUSE(S): (1) INPUT FILTER FAILURE (OPEN).	IF DIRECT DRIVE "POSITIVE" COMMANDED, JOINT DRIVES IN "NEGATIVE" DIRECTION. BRAKES "ON" FOR OTHER JOINTS. AUTO BRAKES WHEN COMMAND REMOVED. NO MOVEMENT FOR "NEGATIVE" COMMAND. LOSS OF EE MANUAL DRIVE MODE. EE AUTO DRIVE MODE IS STILL AVAILABLE. WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION. WRONG JOINT DIRECTION. CREW ACTION REQUIRED REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- N/A	1/1	THERMAL AND VIBRATION TESTING, (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT). INTEGRATION OF D&C PANEL, RHC, IHC AND MCIU, INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH STAGE OF INTEGRATION, WHICH INCLUDES GROUNDING CHECKS, INTER CONNECT CABLE VERIFICATION, CONNECTOR INSPECTION FOR BENT OR PUSHBACK CONTACTS ETC. SUB-SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TESTING (ATP). INCLUDES AN AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT). SRMS SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, THE INTEGRATION OF MECHANICAL ARM SUBASSEMBLIES AND THE FLIGHT CABIN EQUIPMENT TO FORM THE SRMS. INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH PHASE OF INTEGRATION WHICH INCLUDES GROUNDING CHECKS, THRU WIRING CHECKS, WIRING ROUTING, INTERFACE CONNECTORS FOR BENT OR PUSH BACK CONTACTS ETC. SRMS SYSTEMS TESTING - STRONGBACK AND FLAT FLOOR AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)

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SHEET: 5

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDMR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: N/A
1401	5	28V POWER SUPPLY QTY-1 (ORBITER SYSTEM). PS 90128. WL 90128. ED 85511	MODE: LOSS OF 28V DC IN DIRECT MODE. CAUSE(S): (1) INPUT FILTER FAILURE (OPEN).	IF DIRECT DRIVE "POSITIVE" COMMANDED, JOINT DRIVES IN "NEGATIVE" DIRECTION. BRAKES "ON" FOR OTHER JOINTS. AUTO BRAKES WHEN COMMAND REMOVED. NO MOVEMENT FOR "NEGATIVE" COMMAND. LOSS OF EE MANUAL DRIVE MODE. EE AUTO DRIVE MODE IS STILL AVAILABLE. WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION. WRONG JOINT DIRECTION. CREW ACTION REQUIRED REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- N/A	FAILURE HISTORY ----- 1/1	THERE HAVE BEEN NO FAILURES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FAILURE MODE ON THE SRMS PROGRAM.

PREPARED BY: MEWG

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CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS (-5 HCUV INSTALLED)
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

SHEET: 6

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HWWR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: N/A
1401	5	28V POWER SUPPLY QTY-1 (ORBITER SYSTEM). PS 90120. WL 90120. ED 85511	<p>MODE: LOSS OF 28V DC IN DIRECT MODE.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) INPUT FILTER FAILURE (OPEN).</p>	<p>IF DIRECT DRIVE "POSITIVE" COMMANDED, JOINT DRIVES IN "NEGATIVE" DIRECTION. BRAKES "ON" FOR OTHER JOINTS. AUTO BRAKES WHEN COMMAND REMOVED. NO MOVEMENT FOR "NEGATIVE" COMMAND.</p> <p>LOSS OF EE MANUAL DRIVE MODE. EE AUTO DRIVE MODE IS STILL AVAILABLE.</p> <p>WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION. WRONG JOINT DIRECTION. CREW ACTION REQUIRED</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- N/A</p>	<p>OPERATIONAL EFFECTS ----- DIRECT DRIVE CAN NOT BE USED TO COMPLETE THE MISSION. COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES OR BACKUP REMAIN. MISSION CAN BE COMPLETED IN OTHER AVAILABLE MODES.</p> <p>CREW ACTION ----- REMOVE COMMAND.</p> <p>CREW TRAINING ----- THE CREW SHOULD BE TRAINED TO ALWAYS OBSERVE WHETHER THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS. IF IT IS NOT THE COMMAND SHOULD BE REMOVED.</p> <p>MISSION CONSTRAINT ----- OPERATE AT LESS THAN VERNIER RATES WITHIN 10FT. OF STRUCTURE BY CYCLING SWITCH. OPERATOR MUST BE ABLE TO DETECT THAT THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS VIA WINDOW AND/OR CCTV VIEWS DURING ALL ARM OPERATIONS.</p> <p>OMRSD OFFLINE ----- WITH SAFING SWITCH IN 'AUTO' VERIFY VOLTAGE AT D&C PANEL OUTPUT.</p> <p>OMRSD ONLINE INSTALLATION ----- WITH SAFING SWITCH IN 'AUTO' VERIFY VOLTAGE AT LONGERON INTERFACE.</p> <p>OMRSD ONLINE TURNAROUND ----- WITH SAFING SWITCH IN 'AUTO' SELECT SINGLE AND DRIVE ANY JOINT. VERIFY TACHOMETER SIGNATURE.</p>	

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