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			0,00,2002	Date: 3/27/2002
NAME		FAILURE		
P/N QTY	CRIT	MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
		140FM06A		
POROUS PLATE SUBLIMATOR, ITEM 140 	2/1R	Internal leakage, coolant to feedwater circuit.	END ITEM: Water flow path from coolant loop (15 psi) to feedwater loop.	A. Design - The interface between the feedwater and coolant circuits consists of a .06 thic welded cover plate in the main sublimator. The supplemental sublimator interfacis a parent material separator.
OR SV805279-5		Structural failure, pin hole in parting sheet.	GFE INTERFACE: Increase in pressure in the feedwater circuit	B. Test - Component Acceptance Test - A leakage test is performed on the coolant loop per AT-E-140-2. With the coolan loop pressurized to 28.1 - 29.1 psig, and the feedwater loop open to ambient, leakage is observed for 60 minutes minimum and must not exceed 3 scc/hr.
			causing a possible	PDA Test - None.
			breakthrough. Breakthrough results in loss of EMU cooling/defog	Certification Test - Certified for a useful life of 25 years (ref. EMUM1-0243, EMUM1-1269).
			capability. MISSION:	This component (Item 140) is certified for the coolant loop proof pressure of 42.2 psid because the calculated safety factor for yield is 15.1 (for bulging o the coolant loop plates) at the 28.1 psid maximum operating pressure.
			Terminate EVA. CREW/VEHICLE: None for single failure. Possible loss of crewman with loss of	C. Inspection - Inspection of the EB weld joint includes x-ray, penetrant, and visual inspections per HS1442CLI. HS1442 CLI calls for 100% x-ray examination, 100% magnetic or penetrant inspection and 100% visual inspection of the weld joint. The first piece welded must be destructively evaluated for penetration and weld defects by a metalgraphically prepared cross section at no less than 100x magnification. During in-process manufacture, the weld joint is leak tested using nitrogen pressurized to 37.5-42 psig.
			SOP.	D. Failure History - None.
			TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: Minutes. Activate the SOP for defog by opening the	E. Ground Turnaround - Tested for non-EET processing per FEMU-R-001, Water Servicing, Leakage, and Gas Removal. FEMU-R-001 Para 8.2 EMU Preflight KSC Checkout for EET processing. F. Operational Use -
			purge valve. TIME AVAILABLE: Minutes.	Crew Response - EVA: When CWS data confirms increase in sublimator pressure trouble-shoot problem. If cooling insufficient or helmet fogging, terminate EVA. Open helmet purge vlv to anti-fog helmet if required. Training - Crewmen are trained for one man EVA scenario.
			TIME REQUIRED: Seconds. REDUNDANCY SCREENS:	Operational Considerations - Flight rules define go/no go criteria related to EMU thermal control. Flight rules define EMU go to remain on SCU (available for rescue if required). EVA checklist and FDF procedures verify hardware integrity and systems operational status prior to EVA. Real Time Data System allows ground monitoring of EMU systems.

A-PASS

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NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
		140FM06A			

B-PASS C-PASS

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-140 SUBLIMATOR

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

Prepared by: Munay 5 3/21/02. HS - Project Engineering	Approved by: RMB Ly 9/30/02
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M. Smylin HS - Reliability	182 g
HS - Réliability	NASA – EMY/SSM

- Engineering Manager

MASA - MOD 10-15/02

Re Mell 16/22/02 NASA Crew

NASA - Program Manager