CIL

EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

## 5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/24/1991

Page 1

\_ \_ \_ \_ \_ \_ \_

Date: 4/24/2002

\_\_\_\_\_

NAME		FATLURE		
P/N		MODE &		
QTY	CRIT	CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
		151 FM05		
	3/1070	Flootrical	END THEM.	A Decima -
HARNESS, ITEM 151	J/ INAD	open, fan	Loss of	SV789151-4
		winding power	continuity in	Open circuits in any of the circuits in the Item 151 harness are minimized by
SV789151-4		line.	one of two	the following:
(1)		Cable chafing	power lines.	with the metal backshells to minimize their movement and chance of shorting to
Or	-	against connector	1	the backshell.
SV824051-1			GFE INTERFACE.	b. The conductors are strain relieved at the connector/harness interface with a molded rubber backshell. This minimizes the effects of cable tension on the
(1)		shield.	Loss of one of	individual conductors.
		Improper	two redundant	c. Conductors are sheathed within a woven Nomex outer layer. This holds the
		connector	fan power lines Slight	cables together to share any loading.
		faulty	increase (0.05	properties which help prevent breakage.
		connection	ohms) in path	e. Each connector/adapter ring interface is locked in place to prevent rotation
		between the	resistance.	by a mechanical and adhesive lock. Crimping per SVSH4909 (based on MSFC-Spec-Q-
		the lead		in).
		wires,	MISSION:	SV824051-1
		conductor	None for	Open circuits in any of the circuits in the item 151 harness are minimized by the following:
		contact	failure.	Connectors of all metal construction with smooth internal edges (0.010" min.
		resistance.	Terminate EVA	corner radius) on backshell housings to prevent cable chafing are used.
			for loss of both power	Each connector/backshell interface is locked in place by a mechanical lock to
			lines.	of a connector backshell strain relief nut, collet, and pressure sensitive tape
				as required to secure the electrical cable.
			CREW/VEHICLE.	The #22 and #24 Teilon insulated wires and connector provide electrical conduction and insulation properties. Connector pips are operating at 56.7% of
			None for	derated temperature and the wire at 70.7% of derated current.
			single or	A woven Halar sheath is assembled over the cable wire bundles to provide load
			double failuro	sharing and protection from abrasion and impact. Wire crimping is performed per
			Possible loss	NH55500.4 (5h).
			of crewman	B. Test -
			with loss of	Component Acceptance Test -
			50P.	The harness is acceptance tested per the following tests of AT-EMU-151 to ensure
				there are no workmanship problems which would cause actual or potential open
			TIME TO EFFECT	circuits. Pull Test - This test subjects each connector/harness interface to a
			Seconds.	specific pull test (9 pounds) designed to exceed any stress encountered in actual use. The insulation resistance between each conductor and the ground
				circuit is measured during the test to ensure there is no shorting. The test is
			TIME	followed by a continuity check of each conductor path to ensure there are no
			AVAILABLE: Davs.	open circuits. Continuity Test - The resistance of each circuit is measured to ensure there are
			- ~1 ~ .	no open circuits or high resistance paths.
			TIME REQUIRED:	
			Days.	SV824U51-1 The 151 harness is subjected to acceptance testing per $\Delta T = F = 151 = 1$ prior to final
			REDUNDANCY	acceptance to ensure there are no workmanship problems that could cause an open
			SCREENS:	or short circuit. Each connector/harness interface is subjected to a 9 - 10
			A-FAIL	pound pull test. The insulation resistance between each conductor and ground

-	_		
_ C	т	т	
	-	_	

EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

## 5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/24/1991

Page 2

Date: 4/24/2002

\_ \_ \_ \_ \_ \_ \_

NAME		FAILURE		
P/N	ODIE	MODE &		
Q.T.X	CRIT	CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
		151FM05		
			B-FAIL C-PASS	circuit is measured during this test to ensure there are not intermittent shorts and to verify the integrity of the harness strain relief. A continuity test is performed to measure the resistance of each circuit to ensure there are not open circuits or high resistance paths. The insulation resistance and dielectric strength between each conductor and the shield ground is measured to ensure there are no shorts.
				PDA Test - An open circuit in the fan windings power lines would not be detected during PLSS PDA testing per SEMU-60-010 because of winding power line redundancy.
				Certification Test - SV789151-4 Certified for a useful life of 18 years (ref. EMUM1-0099).
				SV824051-1 Certified for a useful life of 15 years (ref. EMU1-13-046).
				<ul> <li>C. Inspection - SV789151-4</li> <li>During harness manfacturing, the following inspections are performed to ensure there are no open circuits.</li> <li>a. Visuals inspection of conductors prior to potting opertions to ensure there are no damaged conductors and that the conductors are routed property.</li> <li>b. Visual inspection of the harness prior to and after rubber boot molding process to ensure there are no damaged conductors which could causes an open circuit.</li> <li>c. In-process electrical checkout of the harness before and after potting and molding to ensure there are no open circuits.</li> <li>d. Visual inspection of the conductors prior to application of the outer sheath to ensure there are no damaged conductors that could cause an open circuit.</li> <li>e. Contact crimp samples are made prior to and after crimping to ensure the crimping tools are working properly. This ensures there will not be any high resistance problems at the contacts.</li> </ul>
				SV824051-1 To ensure that there are no workmanship problems which could cause an open or short circuit in the harness conductors, the following inspections are made: Contact crimp samples are made prior to start of crimping and at the conclusion of crimping and pull tested to ensure the crimp tooling is operating properly. Electrical bond test is performed to verify ground path through various points on the harness. In-process and final electrical checkout of the harness (conductor continuity, dielectric strength, and insulation resistance tests) are performed to ensure there are not open/short circuits. All crimp terminations are inspected for defects.
				D. Failure History - SV789151-4
				The following RDR's were issued for Item 151 due to open circuits. H-EMU-151-D001 - (7/08/83)
				Intermittent open due to a broken wire at the P12 connector during acceptance testing. This failure was caused by a workmanship problem. The corrective

CIL EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST			5/30/2002 SUP	5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/24/1991	
NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
		151FM05		action taken was to add a visual inspection prior to molding. H-EMU-151-D002 - (12/14/83) Intermittent open due to a broken wire at the P3 connector during accep testing due to a workmanship problem. The corrective action taken was t EC 42806-527 which fixes the angular location of the P3 adapter ring sl insure proper wire exit and EC 42806-527-2 which requires that a pull t performed to detect opens. SV824051-1 None. E. Ground Turnaround - None, this failure mode can not be detected during normal ground turnar testing because of the redundant design of the power line in the harnes	
				F. Operational Use - Crew Response - PreEVA/EVA: No response, single failure undetectable by cre Training - No training specifically covers this failure mod Operational Considerations - EVA Checklist and FDF procedures verify hardware integrity operatioanl status prior to EVA. Real Time Data system allo of EMU systems.	w or ground. e. and systems ws ground monitoring

\_ \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ \_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_ \_ \_ \_ \_

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-151 ELECTRICAL POWER HARNESS

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

Prepared by:

y: \_\_\_\_\_\_

<u>M. Snyli</u> HS - Reliability

4/24/02 HS - Engineering Manager

Approved by: <u>ATR</u> <u>ASA</u>-<u>SA</u>/SSM\*

ic

ASA MOL

NASA - Crew

Program Manager