

CIL  
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST  
FILE: CIL3/1

8/5/88 SUPERSEDES 4/4/88

NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
ELECTRICAL SIGMEL ITEM 852 54789152-2 181	2/2	ISE/NOG: ELECTRICAL SHORT IN WARNING TONE OR STATUS TONE LINES.  CAUSE: CABLE CHAFING AGAINST CONNECTOR SHELL OR SHIELD, IMPROPER CONNECTOR STRAIN RELIEF.	AND BEEN: SHORT FROM WARNING TONE OR STATUS TONE LINES TO GROUND.  CPE INTERFACE: TONES WILL BE CONFUSIONALLY ACTIVATED.  MISSION: TERMINATE EVA DUE TO CREW DISCOMFORT FROM CONTINUOUS TONES.  CREW/VEHICLE: NONE.	A. DESIGN - EACH CONNECTOR/CABLE INTERFACE IS STRAIN RELIEVED BY PUTTING THE CONDUCTORS IN PLACE. A RUBBER BACKSHELL IS TIGHTLY HOLED OVER THE CONNECTOR/CABLE INTERFACE. EACH CONNECTOR/ADAPTER RING INTERFACE IS LOCKED IN PLACE TO PREVENT SEPARATION BY MECHANICAL LOCK AND AN ADHESIVE LOCK. B24 AND, NYLON COATED WIRE PROVIDES THE REQUIRED INSULATION RESISTANCE. THE CONDUCTORS ARE BUNDLED WITHIN A NYLON COPPER STRANDED SHEATH OVER BRAIDED WITH A NYLON NYLON OUTER SHEATH. THESE COVER THE CABLES TO ACT TOGETHER AND SHARE ANY LOADING AND RESIST ANY DAMAGE FROM ABRASION AND IMPACT. WIRE CHAFING IS PER SWISSARD (BASED ON MSFC-SPEC-W-1A1).  B. TEST - COMPONENT ACCEPTANCE TEST - THE 182 HARNESS IS SUBJECTED TO ACCEPTANCE TESTING PER AT-888-152 PRIOR TO FINAL ACCEPTANCE TESTING. THIS TESTING INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING TESTS WHICH ENSURE THERE ARE NO WORKMANSHIP PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD CAUSE AN ELECTRICAL SHORT TO THE WARNING TONE OR STATUS TONE LINES TO GROUND. THE INSULATION RESISTANCE AND DIELECTRIC STRENGTH BETWEEN EACH CONDUCTOR AND THE SHIELD GROUND IS MEASURED TO ENSURE THERE ARE NO SHORTS. EACH CONNECTOR/CABLE INTERFACE IS PULSED TESTED (10 PULSES) TO DETECT ANY WORKMANSHIP PROBLEMS WHICH COULD CAUSE A SHORT CIRCUIT.  PDA TEST - THE WARNING TONE AND STATUS TONE LINES ARE FUNCTIONALLY CHECKED DURING PLS5 SQA PER SQA-88-000, TEST 4.0 TO INSURE THERE ARE NO SHORTS TO SHIELD GROUND WHICH AFFECT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PLS5.  CERTIFICATION TEST - THIS ITEM HAS COMPLETED THE STRUCTURAL VIBRATION AND SHOCK CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS DURING 18/88. ENGINEERING CHANGE 42004-527-2 (ADDED CONNECTOR PULL TEST) HAS BEEN INCORPORATED AND CERTIFIED SINCE THIS CONFIGURATION HAS CERTIFIED.

C3A  
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST  
FILE: C3A7/E

NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
ELECTRICAL SIGNALS ITEM 152 SV709152-2 (1)	2/2	B52FM04: ELECTRICAL SHORT IN WARNING TONE OR STATUS TONE LINES.		<p>C. INSPECTION - TO INSURE THERE ARE NO WORKMANSHIP PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD CAUSE A SHORT CIRCUIT IN THE HARNESS CONDUCTORS, THE FOLLOWING INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED: HARNESS CABLES AND CONDUCTORS ARE VISUALLY INSPECTED PRIOR TO ASSEMBLY TO INSURE THERE ARE NO DEFECTS WHICH COULD CAUSE A SHORT TO GROUND DUE TO DEFECTS IN THE CABLE INSULATION. CORRECTION WIRING IS INSPECTED BEFORE AND AFTER POTTING TO INSURE THERE IS NO CONDUCTION BRIDGE AND THAT THE CONDUCTORS ARE PROPERLY STRAIN RELIEVED AND PROPERLY DRESSED TO PREVENT CONDUCTOR SHORTING TO THE ADAPTER RING. INSULATION RESISTANCE AND DIELECTRIC STRENGTH ARE MEASURED BETWEEN EACH CONDUCTOR AND SHIELD GROUND TO INSURE THERE ARE NO SHORTS FROM TO AND AFTER POTTING OF THE CONDUCTORS. IN-PROCESS, ELECTRICAL CHECKOUT OF HARNESS BEFORE AND AFTER POTTING AND HOLDING TO INSURE THERE ARE NO SHORT CIRCUITS.</p> <p>D. FAILURE HISTORY - NONE FOR THIS FAILURE MODE. RELATED FAILURE: N-EMU-152-1001 (12/9/84) DURING PASS ACCEPTANCE TESTING, ALL SENSOR OUTPUTS READ FULL SCALE. A SHORT CIRCUIT IN THE HARNESS WAS FOUND BETWEEN VREF AND GROUND. THE SHORT WAS DUE TO IMPROPER ASSEMBLY AND DETECTED BY THE VENDOR. THE VENDOR'S ASSEMBLY AND TEST PROCEDURES WERE REVERSED. J-EMU-152-003 14-22-85: DURING A PRE-FLIGHT COMMUNICATIONS CHECK, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO TRANSMIT THROUGH THE RIGHT MICROPHONE ON THE CCA. THE FAILURE WAS CAUSED BY A SHORT CIRCUIT BETWEEN THE RIGHT MICROPHONE POWER LINE AND THE CABLE GROUNDING SHIELD. THE INSULATION ON THE POWER LINE WAS BEING DAMAGED PRIOR TO THE CABLE ASSEMBLY. EC 42009-527-2 WAS ISSUED TO CORRECT THE SV709152-2 HARNESS CONFIGURATION BY ADDING A CONNECTOR PULL TEST TO THE ACCEPTANCE TESTING REQUIREMENTS.</p> <p>E. GROUND TERMINATION - CABLES TERMINATED PER FEMU-0-001, TONES TEST.</p>
B145-2 ■				

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CIL  
 CRITICAL ITEMS LIST  
 FILE: CIL774

NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
ELECTRICAL SIGNALS ITEM 152 SY709852-2 (1)	L/E	152FN06; ELECTRICAL SHORT IN WARNING TONE OR STATUS TONE LINES.		<p>F. OPERATIONAL USE -          CREW RESPONSE - PREEVA: TROUBLE SHOOT PROBLEM. CONSIDER          THIRD EMU IF AVAILABLE. TERMINATE EVA PREP DUE TO CREW          DISCOMFORT CAUSED BY CONTINUOUS TONE AND LOSS OF EMU          ASSOCIATION CAPABILITY.          EVA: TERMINATE EVA. EMU IS GO FOR SCU IF NOISE LEVEL IS          BEARABLE.          TRAINING - STANDARD TRAINING COVERS THIS FAILURE MODE.          OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS - EVA CHECKLIST PROCEDURES          VERIFY HARDWARE INTEGRITY AND SYSTEMS OPERATIONAL STATUS          PRIOR TO EVA. FLIGHT RULES DEFINE GO/NO GO CRITERIA          RELATED TO EMU EMS. REAL TIME DATA SYSTEM ALLOWS GROUND          MONITORING OF EMU SYSTEMS.</p>

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