

LOCAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS  
 ASS'Y IDENTIFICATION: SERVO POWER AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM  
 ASS'Y P/N: 5116071177

SHEET: 1

P/N REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING OR DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT OR END ITEM	RDMR / FUNC. I / I CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
3030	0	PULSE WIDTH MODULATOR QTY 6 SCHEMATIC 2558077	MODE: INCORRECT OUTPUT FROM PLM.  CAUSE(S): (1) LCC PARTS FAILURE.	THE OUTPUT TO THE MOTOR WILL NOT BE AS DEMANDED AND MAY RESULT IN RIMAWAY OR LESS THAN COMMANDED RATE. COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES AND DIRECT DRIVE AFFECTED. CONSISTENCY CHECK WILL INITIATE AUTO BRAKES IF ARM RUNS AWAY.  WORST CASE UNEXPECTED MOTION. SLUGGISH JOINT. UNANNOUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQUIRED.  REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- N/A		DESIGN FEATURES ----- ALL RESISTORS AND CAPACITORS USED IN THE DESIGN ARE SELECTED FROM ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY (ER) TYPES. LIFE EXPECTANCY IS INCREASED BY ENSURING THAT ALL ALLOWABLE STRESS LEVELS ARE DERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. ALL CERAMIC AND ELECTROLYTIC CAPACITORS ARE ROUTINELY SUBJECTED TO RADIOGRAPHIC INSPECTION.  COMPARATORS AND OPERATIONAL AMPLIFIERS ARE STANDARD LINEAR INTEGRATED CIRCUITS WITH MATURE MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY. APPLICATION CONSTRAINTS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003.  THE DESIGN UTILIZES PROVEN CIRCUIT TECHNIQUES AND IS IMPLEMENTED USING CMOS LOGIC DEVICES.  CMOS DEVICES OPERATE AT LOW POWER AND HENCE DO NOT EXPERIENCE SIGNIFICANT OPERATING STRESSES. THE TECHNOLOGY IS MATURE, AND DEVICE RELIABILITY HISTORY IS WELL DOCUMENTED. ALL STRESSES ARE ADDITIONALLY REDUCED BY DERATING THE APPROPRIATE PARAMETERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. SPECIAL HANDLING PRECAUTIONS ARE USED AT ALL STAGES OF MANUFACTURE TO PRECLUDE DAMAGE/STRESS DUE TO ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGE.

RMS/ELEC - 707

PREPARED BY: MEWG

SUPERSEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

APPROVED BY:

DATE:

**CRITICAL ITEMS LIST**

PROJECT: SRMS  
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: SERVO POWER AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM  
 ASS'Y P/N: 51120F1177

SHEET: 2

THEA REF.	REV.	WAVE QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOW / FUNC. I/I CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
3030	0	PULSE WIDTH MODULATOR QTY 6 SCHEMATIC 2558977	MODE: INCORRECT OUTPUT FROM PWM.  CAUSE(S): (1) EEE PARTS FAILURE.	THE OUTPUT TO THE MOTOR WILL NOT BE AS DEMANDED AND MAY RESULT IN RUNAWAY OR LESS THAN COMMANDED RATE. COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES AND DIRECT DRIVE AFFECTED. CONSISTENCY CHECK WILL INITIATE AUTO BRAKES IF ARM RUNS AWAY.  WORST CASE UNEXPECTED MOTION. SLUGGISH JOINT. UNANNOUNCATED. CREW ACTION REQUIRED.  REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ..... N/A		<p>ACCEPTANCE TESTS</p> <p>THE SPA IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING AS AN SRU.</p> <p>0 VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 4</p> <p>0 THERMAL: PLUS 70 DEGREES C TO -25 DEGREES C DURATION - 1 1/2 CYCLES</p> <p>THE SPA IS THEN TESTED AS PART OF THE JOINTS ACCEPTANCE TESTS (VIBRATION AND THERMAL VACUUM TEST).</p> <p>THE SPA'S/JOINTS UNDERGO RMS SYSTEM TESTS (7PS18 RMS STRONGBACK AND 1P552 FLAT FLOOR TESTS) WHICH VERIFIES THE ABSENCE OF THE FAILURE MODE.</p> <p>QUALIFICATION TESTS</p> <p>THE SPA IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING SRU QUALIFICATION TEST ENVIRONMENTS. THE SPA WAS ALSO TESTED AS PART OF THE JOINT QUALIFICATION TESTS.</p> <p>0 VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 4</p> <p>0 SHOCK: 20G/11 MS/3 AXES (6 DIRECTIONS)</p> <p>0 THERMAL VAC: +81 DEGREES C TO -36 DEGREES C (6 CYCLES) 1X10<sup>-6</sup> TORR</p> <p>0 HUMIDITY: TESTED WITH THE SHOULDER JOINT</p> <p>0 EMC: MIL-STD-461 AS MODIFIED BY SL-E-0002 (TEST CE01, CE03, CS01, CS02, CS06, RE01, RE02 (N/B), RS01)</p> <p>FLIGHT CHECKOUT</p> <p>PDRS OPS CHECKLIST (ALL VEHICLES) JSC 16987</p>

RMS/ELEC - 708

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SHMS  
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: SERVO PL. SPLITTER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM  
 ASS'Y P/N: 211C021177

SHEET: 3

MEA REF.	REV.	NAME QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY	NATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
3030	0	PULSE WIDTH MODULATOR QTY-6 SCHEMATIC 2558977	<p>MODE: INCORRECT OUTPUT FROM PLM.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) EEE PARTS FAILURE.</p>	<p>THE OUTPUT TO THE MOTOR WILL NOT BE AS DEMANDED AND MAY RESULT IN RUNAWAY OR LESS THAN COMMANDED RATE.</p> <p>COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES AND DIRECT DRIVE AFFECTED. CONSISTENCY CHECK WILL INITIATE AUTO BRAKES IF ARM RUNS AWAY.</p> <p>WORST CASE</p> <p>UNEXPECTED MOTION.</p> <p>SLUGGISH JOINT. UNANNUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQUIRED.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p> <p>N/A</p>	<p>QA/INSPECTIONS</p> <p>UNITS ARE MANUFACTURED UNDER DOCUMENTED QUALITY CONTROLS. THESE CONTROLS ARE EXERCISED THROUGHOUT DESIGN PROCUREMENT, PLANNING, RECEIVING, PROCESSING, FABRICATION, ASSEMBLY, TESTING AND SHIPPING OF THE UNITS. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS ARE EMPLOYED AT VARIOUS STAGES OF FABRICATION ASSEMBLY AND TEST. GOVERNMENT SOURCE INSPECTION IS INVOKED AT VARIOUS CONTROL LEVELS.</p> <p>EEE PARTS INSPECTION IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003. EACH EEE PART IS QUALIFIED AT THE PART LEVEL TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION. ALL EEE PARTS ARE 100X SCREENED AND BURNED IN, AS A MINIMUM, AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003, BY THE SUPPLIER. ADDITIONALLY, EEE PARTS ARE 100X RE-SCREENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS, BY AN INDEPENDENT SPAR APPROVED TESTING FACILITY. DPA IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY PA.003 ON A RANDOMLY SELECTED 5% OF PARTS, MAXIMUM 5 PIECES, MINIMUM 3 PIECES FOR EACH LOT NUMBER/DATE CODE OF PARTS RECEIVED.</p> <p>WIRE IS PROCURED TO SPECIFICATION MIL-V-22759 OR MIL-V-81301 AND INSPECTED AND TESTED TO NASA JSCM000 STANDARD NUMBER 95A.</p> <p>RECEIVING INSPECTION VERIFIES THAT ALL PARTS RECEIVED ARE AS IDENTIFIED IN THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS, THAT NO PHYSICAL DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED TO PARTS DURING SHIPMENT, THAT THE RECEIVING DOCUMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE TRACEABILITY INFORMATION AND SCREENING DATA CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ACCEPTABLE PARTS.</p> <p>PARTS ARE INSPECTED THROUGHOUT MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY AS APPROPRIATE TO THE MANUFACTURING STAGE COMPLETED. THESE INSPECTIONS INCLUDE,</p> <p>PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD INSPECTION FOR TRACK SEPARATION, DAMAGE AND ADEQUACY OF PLATED THROUGH HOLES,</p> <p>COMPONENT MOUNTING INSPECTION FOR CORRECT SOLDERING, WIRE LOOPING, STRAPPING, ETC. OPERATORS AND INSPECTORS ARE TRAINED AND CERTIFIED TO NASA NHB 5300.4(JA) STANDARD, AS MODIFIED BY JSC 08800A.</p> <p>CONFORMAL COATING INSPECTION FOR ADEQUATE PROCESSING IS PERFORMED USING ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT TECHNIQUES.</p> <p>POST P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CLEANLINESS AND WORKMANSHIP (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CHECK FOR CORRECT BOARD INSTALLATION, ALIGNMENT OF BOARDS, PROPER CONNECTOR CONTACT MATING, WIRE ROUTING, STRAPPING OF WIRES ETC.,</p> <p>PRE-CLOSURE INSPECTION, WORKMANSHIP AND CLEANLINESS (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>PRE-ACCEPTANCE TEST INSPECTION, WHICH INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILT CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC., (MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p>	

RMS/ELEC - 709

PREPARED BY: NIMG

SUPERSEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

APPROVED BY:

DATE:

**CRITICAL ITEMS LIST**

PROJECT: SRMS  
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: SERVO POWER AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM  
 ASS'Y P/N: ST140FT177

SHEET: 4

PMA REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDMR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
3030	0	PULSE WIDTH MODULATOR QTY: 6 SCHEMATIC 2558977	MODE: INCORRECT OUTPUT FROM PWM.  CAUSE(S): (1) EEE PARTS FAILURE.	THE OUTPUT TO THE MOTOR WILL NOT BE AS DEMANDED AND MAY RESULT IN RUNAWAY OR LESS THAN COMMANDED RATE. COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES AND DIRECT DRIVE AFFECTED. CONSISTENCY CHECK WILL INITIATE AUTO BRAKES IF ARM RUNS AWAY.  WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION. SLUGGISH JOINT. UNANNOUNCED. CREW ACTION REQUIRED.  REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- N/A		<p>A TEST READINESS REVIEW (TRR) WHICH INCLUDES VERIFICATION OF TEST PERSONNEL, TEST DOCUMENTS, TEST EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION/ VALIDATION STATUS AND HARDWARE CONFIGURATION IS CONVENED BY QUALITY ASSURANCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ENGINEERING RELIABILITY, CONFIGURATION CONTROL, SUPPLIER AS APPLICABLE, AND THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE, PRIOR TO THE START OF ANY FORMAL TESTING (ACCEPTANCE OR QUALIFICATION).</p> <p>ACCEPTANCE TESTING (ATP) INCLUDES AMBIENT PERFORMANCE, THERMAL AND VIBRATION TESTING, (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p> <p>INTEGRATION OF UNIT TO JOINT SRU - INSPECTIONS INCLUDE GROUNDING CHECKS, CONNECTORS FOR BENT OR PUSHBACK CONTACTS, VISUAL, CLEANLINESS, INTERCONNECT WIRING AND POWER UP TEST TO THE APPROPRIATE JOINT INSPECTION TEST PROCEDURE (ITP) ETC.</p> <p>JOINT LEVEL PRE-ACCEPTANCE TEST INSPECTION, INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILT CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC.</p> <p>JOINT LEVEL ACCEPTANCE TESTING (ATP) INCLUDES AMBIENT, VIBRATION AND THERMAL-VAC TESTING. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p> <p>SRMS SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, THE INTEGRATION OF MECHANICAL ARM SUBASSEMBLIES AND THE FLIGHT CABIN EQUIPMENT TO FORM THE SRMS. INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH PHASE OF INTEGRATION WHICH INCLUDES GROUNDING CHECKS, THRU WIRING CHECKS, WIRING ROUTING, INTERFACE CONNECTORS FOR BENT OR PUSH BACK CONTACTS ETC.</p> <p>SRMS SYSTEMS TESTING - STRONGBACK AND FLAT FLOOR AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p>

RMS/ELEC - 710

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS

ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: SERVO AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM

ASS'Y P/N: 51140FT177

SHEET: 5

P/N & REV.	REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOW / FUNC. I/I CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
3030	0	PULSE WIDTH MODULATOR QTY: 6 SCHEMATIC 2558077	MODE: INCORRECT OUTPUT FROM PWM.  CAUSE(S): (1) EEE PARTS FAILURE.	THE OUTPUT TO THE MOTOR WILL NOT BE AS DEMANDED AND MAY RESULT IN RUNAWAY OR LESS THAN COMMANDED RATE.  COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES AND DIRECT DRIVE AFFECTED. CONSISTENCY CHECK WILL INITIATE AUTO BRAKES IF ARM RUNS AWAY.  WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION. SLUGGISH JOINT. UNANNUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQUIRED.  REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- N/A		FAILURE HISTORY  THERE HAVE BEEN NO FAILURES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FAILURE MODE ON THE SRMS PROGRAM.

RMS/ELEC - 711

PREPARED BY: HFWG

SUPERSEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

APPROVED BY:

DATE:

**CRITICAL ITEMS LIST**

PROJECT: SRMS  
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: SERVO POWER AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM  
 ASS'Y P/N: 51720F1177

SHEET: 6

ITCA REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HROW / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
3030	0	PULSE WIDTH MODULATOR QTY: 6 SCHEMATIC 2558977	MODE: INCORRECT OUTPUT FROM PWM.  CAUSE(S): (1) EEE PARTS FAILURE.	THE OUTPUT TO THE MOTOR WILL NOT BE AS DEMANDED AND MAY RESULT IN RUNAWAY OR LESS THAN COMMANDED RATE. COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES AND DIRECT DRIVE AFFECTED. CONSISTENCY CHECK WILL INITIATE AUTO BRAKES IF ARM RUNS AWAY.  WORST CASE UNEXPECTED MOTION. SLAGGISH JOINT. UNANNUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQUIRED.  REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING N/A	OPERATIONAL EFFECTS ARM DOES NOT RESPOND PROPERLY TO HAND CONTROLLER COMMANDS OR AUTO SEQUENCES. CREW INHERENTLY COMPENSATES FOR ANY UNDESIRED ARM TRAJECTORY IN MANUAL AUGMENTED MODES.  CREW ACTION APPLY BRAKES. SELECT BACKUP.  CREW TRAINING THE CREW WILL BE TRAINED TO OBSERVE WHETHER THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS. IF IT ISN'T, APPLY BRAKES.  MISSION CONSTRAINT OPERATE UNDER VERNIER RATES WITHIN 10 FT OF STRUCTURE. THE OPERATOR MUST BE ABLE TO DETECT THAT THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS VIA WINDOW AND/OR CCTV VIEWS DURING ALL ARM OPERATIONS. AUTO TRAJECTORIES MUST BE DESIGNED TO COME NO CLOSER THAN 5 FT FROM STRUCTURE.  SCREEN FAILURES N/A OMRSD OFFLINE IN COMPUTER CONTROLLED MODE VERIFY JOINT RATES FOR EACH JOINT  OMRSD ONLINE INSTALLATION NONE  OMRSD ONLINE TURNAROUND FOR EACH JOINT IN SINGLE MODE VERIFY TACHO SIGNATURE	

RMS/ELEC - 712