

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: SET POWER AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 212071177

SHEET:

ITEM REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOUR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
3050	0	POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER QTY 6 SCHEMATIC 2563717	<p>MODE: LOWER THAN DEMANDED MOTOR VOLTAGE OUTPUT.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) FALSE OUTPUT FROM COMMUTATION LOGIC DETECTED. (2) EEE PARTS FAILURE.</p>	<p>THE JOINT MOTOR WILL HAVE REDUCED TORQUE OUTPUT. JOINT MAY STOP. ARM MAY TAKE AN UNEXPECTED TRAJECTORY.</p> <p>WORST CASE UNEXPECTED MOTION. ELECTRICALLY FROZEN JOINT. UNANNOUNCED. CREW ACTION REQUIRED.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING N/A</p>	1/1	<p>DESIGN FEATURES </p> <p>ALL RESISTORS AND CAPACITORS USED IN THE DESIGN ARE SELECTED FROM ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY (ER) TYPES. LIFE EXPECTANCY IS INCREASED BY ENSURING THAT ALL ALLOWABLE STRESS LEVELS ARE DERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. ALL CERAMIC AND ELECTROLYTIC CAPACITORS ARE ROUTINELY SUBJECTED TO RADIOGRAPHIC INSPECTION.</p> <p>THE DESIGN UTILIZES PROVEN CIRCUIT TECHNIQUES AND IS IMPLEMENTED USING CMOS LOGIC DEVICES.</p> <p>CMOS DEVICES OPERATE AT LOW POWER AND HENCE DO NOT EXPERIENCE SIGNIFICANT OPERATING STRESSES. THE TECHNOLOGY IS MATURE, AND DEVICE RELIABILITY HISTORY IS WELL DOCUMENTED. ALL STRESSES ARE ADDITIONALLY REDUCED BY DERATING THE APPROPRIATE PARAMETERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. SPECIAL HANDLING PRECAUTIONS ARE USED AT ALL STAGES OF MANUFACTURE TO PRECLUDE DAMAGE/STRESS DUE TO ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGE.</p>

RMS/ELEC - 723

PREPARED BY: HWG

SUPERSEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

APPROVED BY:

DATE:

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: SERVO POWER AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 5174071177

SHEET: 2

P/N & REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOUR / FUNC. I/I CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
3050	0	POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER QTY: 6 SCHEMATIC 2563717	MODE: LOWER THAN DEMANDED MOTOR VOLTAGE OUTPUT. CAUSE(S): (1) FALSE OUTPUT FROM COMMUTATION LOGIC DETECTOR. (2) EEE PARTS FAILURE.	THE JOINT MOTOR WILL HAVE REDUCED TORQUE OUTPUT. JOINT MAY STOP. ARM MAY TAKE AN UNEXPECTED TRAJECTORY. WORST CASE UNEXPECTED MOTION. ELECTRICALLY FROZEN JOINT. UNANNUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQUIRED. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING N/A		<p>ACCEPTANCE TESTS</p> <p>THE SPA IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING AS AN SRU.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 0 VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 4 0 THERMAL: PLUS 70 DEGREES C TO -25 DEGREES C DURATION - 1 1/2 CYCLES <p>THE SPA IS THEN TESTED AS PART OF THE JOINTS ACCEPTANCE TESTS (VIBRATION AND THERMAL VACUUM TEST).</p> <p>THE SPA'S/JOINTS UNDERGO RMS SYSTEM TESTS (1PS10 RMS STRONGBACK AND 1P552 FLAT FLOOR TESTS) WHICH VERIFIES THE ABSENCE OF THE FAILURE MODE.</p> <p>QUALIFICATION TESTS</p> <p>THE SPA IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING SRU QUALIFICATION TEST ENVIRONMENTS. THE SPA WAS ALSO TESTED AS PART OF THE JOINT QUALIFICATION TESTS.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 0 VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 4 0 SHOCK: 20G/11 MS/3 AXES (6 DIRECTIONS) 0 THERMAL VAC: +81 DEGREES C TO -36 DEGREES C (6 CYCLES) 1K10**6 TORR 0 HUMIDITY: TESTED WITH THE SHOULDER JOINT 0 EMC: MIL-STD-461 AS MODIFIED BY SL-E-0002 (TEST CE01, CE03, CS01, CS02, CS06, RE01, RE02 (N/B), RS01) <p>FLIGHT CHECKOUT</p> <p>PDRS OPS CHECKLIST (ALL VEHICLES) JSC 16987</p>

RMS/ELEC - 724

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: SLAVO AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 5120F1177

SHEET: 3

AREA REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOW / TIME, Y/I CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
3050	0	POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER QTY: 6 SCHEMATIC 2563717	<p>MODE: LOWER THAN DEMANDED MOTOR VOLTAGE OUTPUT.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) FALSE OUTPUT FROM COMMINATION LOGIC DETECTOR. (2) EEE PARTS FAILURE.</p>	<p>THE JOINT MOTOR WILL HAVE REDUCED TORQUE OUTPUT. JOINT MAY STOP. ARM MAY TAKE AN UNEXPECTED TRAJECTORY.</p> <p>WORST CASE</p> <p>UNEXPECTED MOTION. ELECTRICALLY FROZEN JOINT. UNANNUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQUIRED.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p> <p>N/A</p>	<p>1/1</p>	<p>QA/INSPECTIONS</p> <p>UNITS ARE MANUFACTURED UNDER DOCUMENTED QUALITY CONTROLS. THESE CONTROLS ARE EXERCISED THROUGHOUT DESIGN, PROCUREMENT, PLANNING, RECEIVING, PROCESSING, FABRICATION, ASSEMBLY, TESTING AND SHIPPING OF THE UNITS. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS ARE EMPLOYED AT VARIOUS STAGES OF FABRICATION ASSEMBLY AND TEST. GOVERNMENT SOURCE INSPECTION IS INVOKED AT VARIOUS CONTROL LEVELS.</p> <p>EEE PARTS INSPECTION IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003. EACH EEE PART IS QUALIFIED AT THE PART LEVEL TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION. ALL EEE PARTS ARE 100% SCREENED AND BURNED IN, AS A MINIMUM, AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003, BY THE SUPPLIER. ADDITIONALLY, EEE PARTS ARE 100% RE-SCREENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS, BY AN INDEPENDENT SPAR APPROVED TESTING FACILITY. DPA IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY PA.003 ON A RANDOMLY SELECTED 5% OF PARTS, MAXIMUM 5 PIECES, MINIMUM 3 PIECES FOR EACH LOT NUMBER/DATE CODE OF PARTS RECEIVED.</p> <p>WIRE IS PROCURED TO SPECIFICATION MIL-W-22759 OR MIL-W-81381 AND INSPECTED AND TESTED TO NASA JSC00080 STANDARD NUMBER 95A.</p> <p>RECEIVING INSPECTION VERIFIES THAT ALL PARTS RECEIVED ARE AS IDENTIFIED IN THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS, THAT NO PHYSICAL DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED TO PARTS DURING SHIPMENT, THAT THE RECEIVING DOCUMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE TRACEABILITY INFORMATION AND SCREENING DATA CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ACCEPTABLE PARTS.</p> <p>PARTS ARE INSPECTED THROUGHOUT MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY AS APPROPRIATE TO THE MANUFACTURING STAGE COMPLETED. THESE INSPECTIONS INCLUDE,</p> <p>PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD INSPECTION FOR TRACK SEPARATION, DAMAGE AND ADEQUACY OF PLATED THROUGH HOLES,</p> <p>COMPONENT MOUNTING INSPECTION FOR CORRECT SOLDERING, WIRE LOOPING, STRAPPING, ETC. OPERATORS AND INSPECTORS ARE TRAINED AND CERTIFIED TO NASA WHB 5300.4(3A) STANDARD, AS MODIFIED BY JSC 00800A.</p> <p>CONFORMAL COATING INSPECTION FOR ADEQUATE PROCESSING IS PERFORMED USING ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT TECHNIQUES.</p> <p>POST P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CLEANLINESS AND WORKMANSHIP (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CHECK FOR CORRECT BOARD INSTALLATION, ALIGNMENT OF BOARDS, PROPER CONNECTOR CONTACT MATING, WIRE ROUTING, STRAPPING OF WIRES ETC.,</p> <p>PRE-CLOSURE INSPECTION, WORKMANSHIP AND CLEANLINESS (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>PRE-ACCEPTANCE TEST INSPECTION, WHICH INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILT CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC., (MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p>

RMS/ELEC - 725

PREPARED BY: HFMG

SUPERSEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

APPROVED BY:

DATE:

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS

ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: SERVO POWER AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM

ASS'Y P/N: 51140F1177

SHEET: 4

THEA REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	MDR / YUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
3050	0	POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER QTY-6 SCHEMATIC 2563717	<p>MODE: LOWER THAN DEMANDED MOTOR VOLTAGE OUTPUT.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) FALSE OUTPUT FROM COMBINATION LOGIC DETECTOR. (2) EEE PARTS FAILURE.</p>	<p>THE JOINT MOTOR WILL HAVE REDUCED TORQUE OUTPUT. JOINT MAY STOP. ARM MAY TAKE AN UNEXPECTED TRAJECTORY.</p> <p>WORST CASE UNEXPECTED MOTION. ELECTRICALLY FROZEN JOINT. UNANNOUNCED. CREW ACTION REQUIRED.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING N/A</p>		<p>A TEST READINESS REVIEW (TRR) WHICH INCLUDES VERIFICATION OF TEST PERSONNEL TEST DOCUMENTS, TEST EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION/ VALIDATION STATUS AND HARDWARE CONFIGURATION IS CONVENED BY QUALITY ASSURANCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ENGINEERING, RELIABILITY, CONFIGURATION CONTROL, SUPPLIER AS APPLICABLE, AND THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE PRIOR TO THE START OF ANY FORMAL TESTING (ACCEPTANCE OR QUALIFICATION).</p> <p>ACCEPTANCE TESTING (ATP) INCLUDES AMBIENT PERFORMANCE, THERMAL AND VIBRATION TESTING. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p> <p>INTEGRATION OF UNIT TO JOINT SRU - INSPECTIONS INCLUDE GROUNDING CHECKS, CONNECTORS FOR BENT OR PUSHBACK CONTACTS, VISUAL, CLEANLINESS, INTERCONNECT WIRING AND POWER UP TEST TO THE APPROPRIATE JOINT INSPECTION TEST PROCEDURE (ITP) ETC.</p> <p>JOINT LEVEL PRE-ACCEPTANCE TEST INSPECTION, INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILT CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC.</p> <p>JOINT LEVEL ACCEPTANCE TESTING (ATP) INCLUDES AMBIENT, VIBRATION AND THERMAL-VAC TESTING. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p> <p>SRMS SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, THE INTEGRATION OF MECHANICAL ARM SUBASSEMBLIES AND THE FLIGHT CABIN EQUIPMENT TO FORM THE SRMS. INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH PHASE OF INTEGRATION WHICH INCLUDES GROUNDING CHECKS, THRU WIRING CHECKS, WIRING ROUTING, INTERFACE CONNECTORS FOR BENT OR PUSH BACK CONTACTS ETC.</p> <p>SRMS SYSTEMS TESTING - STRONGBACK AND FLAT FLOOR AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p>

RMS/ELEC - 726

PREPARED BY: HFWG

SUPERSEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

APPROVED BY:

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRHS
 ASSY NOMENCLATURE: SERVO MOTOR AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
 ASSY P/N: 51140F1177

SHEET: 5

ITEM REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RDR / FUNC. / CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
3050	0	POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER QTY: 6 SCHEMATIC 2563717	MODE: LOWER THAN DEMANDED MOTOR VOLTAGE OUTPUT. CAUSE(S): (1) FALSE OUTPUT FROM COMMUTATION LOGIC DETECTOR. (2) EEE PARTS FAILURE.	THE JOINT MOTOR WILL HAVE REDUCED TORQUE OUTPUT. JOINT MAY STOP. ARM MAY TAKE AN UNEXPECTED TRAJECTORY. WORST CASE UNEXPECTED MOTION. ELECTRICALLY FROZEN JOINT. UNANNUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQUIRED. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING N/A	1/1 FAILURE HISTORY THERE HAVE BEEN NO FAILURES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FAILURE MODE ON THE SRHS PROGRAM.	

RMS/ELEC - 727

PREPARED BY: MFMG

SUPERSEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

APPROVED BY:

DATE:

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SAMS
 ASSY NOMENCLATURE: SERVO POWER AMPLIFIER

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
 ASSY P/N: 5114071177

SHEET: 6

THCA REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOUR / FUNC. I/I CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
3050	0	POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER QTY-6 SCHEMATIC 2563717	<p>MODE: LOWER THAN DEMANDED MOTOR VOLTAGE OUTPUT.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) FALSE OUTPUT FROM COMMUTATION LOGIC DETECTOR. (2) EEE PARTS FAILURE.</p>	<p>THE JOINT MOTOR WILL HAVE REDUCED TORQUE OUTPUT. JOINT MAY STOP. ARM MAY TAKE AN UNEXPECTED TRAJECTORY.</p> <p>WORST CASE UNEXPECTED MOTION. ELECTRICALLY FROZEN JOINT. UNANNUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQUIRED.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING N/A</p>		<p>OPERATIONAL EFFECTS ARM DOES NOT RESPOND PROPERLY TO HAND CONTROLLER COMMANDS OR AUTO SEQUENCES. CREW INHERENTLY COMPENSATES FOR ANY UNDESIRED ARM TRAJECTORY IN MANUAL AUGMENTED MODES.</p> <p>CREW ACTION APPLY BRAKES. SELECT BACKUP.</p> <p>CREW TRAINING THE CREW WILL BE TRAINED TO OBSERVE WHETHER THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS. IF IT ISN'T, APPLY BRAKES.</p> <p>MISSION CONSTRAINT OPERATE UNDER VERMIER RATES WITHIN 10 FT OF STRUCTURE. THE OPERATOR MUST BE ABLE TO DETECT THAT THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS VIA WINDOW AND/OR CCTV VIEWS DURING ALL ARM OPERATIONS. AUTO TRAJECTORIES MUST BE DESIGNED TO COME NO CLOSER THAN 5 FT FROM STRUCTURE.</p> <p>SCREEN FAILURES N/A</p> <p>CMRSD OFFLINE IN COMPUTER CONTROLLED MODE VERIFY JOINT RATES FOR EACH JOINT</p> <p>CMRSD ONLINE INSTALLATION NONE</p> <p>CMRSD ONLINE TURNAROUND FOR EACH JOINT IN SINGLE MODE VERIFY TACHO SIGNATURE</p>

RMS/ELEC - 728