

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

ASSY NOMENCLATURE: PILOT CHUTE SUSPENSION LINES

SYSTEM: CREW ESCAPE SYSTEM

REVISION:

ASSY P/N: SK1102430087

SUBSYSTEM: PERSONAL PARACHUTE ASSY.

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FMEA		NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF DESIGNATION	QNTY	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
REF	REV					
3.2.2		SUSPENSION LINES, (4) SK1102430087	1/1	3.2.2 Mode: Suspension line entanglement Cause: a snag on crewmember or PPA during deployment	Nondeployment if lines do not un snag	<p>1. DESIGN FEATURES TO MINIMIZE FAILURE MODES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The vane design precludes entanglement of the suspension lines b. The suspension lines are an integral part of the pilot chute canopy c. The pilot chute is used extensively by the Navy to deploy main chute openings <p>2. TEST OR ANALYSIS TO DETECT FAILURE MODE</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Acceptance Test</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Certification tests will verify the PPA design b. <u>Certification Test</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Four dummy drops at 110 knots, 2 at 10,000 feet, 2 at 25,000 feet (2) Four live water drop jumps (3) One 300 knot wind blast test (4) Four dummy drops at 225 knots, 2 at 10,000 feet, 2 at 25,000 feet (5) Eight live jumps at 110 knots, 4 at 10,000 feet, 4 at 6,000 feet (6) Four live jumps at 170 knots, 15,000 feet. (7) Four live jumps at 185 knots, 20,000 feet (8) Four live jumps at 200 knots, 25,000 feet

PREPARED BY: R. E. ALLISON, M. HERR

SUPERSEDING DATE

ED BY: J. D. SCHLOSSER

DATE: 8/1/89

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

ASSY NOMENCLATURE: PILOT CHUTE SUSPENSION LINES

SYSTEM: CREW ESCAPE SYSTEM

REVISION:

ASSY P/N: SK11024300B7

SUBSYSTEM: PERSONAL PARACHUTE ASSY.

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FMEA		NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF DESIGNATION	CNTY	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT OR END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
REF	REV					
3.2.2		SUSPENSION LINES, (4) SK11024300B7	1/1	<p>3.2.2 Mode: Suspension line entanglement</p> <p>Cause: snag on crewmember or PPA during deployment</p>	<p>Nondeployment if lines do not un snag</p>	<p>c. <u>Turnaround Test</u> (In accordance with PLA 23028) The PPA will be unpacked, inspected, and repacked prior to each flight</p> <p>3. INSPECTION</p> <p>a. Check continuity of the suspension lines</p> <p>b. Check continuity of the pilot chute</p> <p>c. Check for equal tension on all suspension lines</p> <p>d. Verify the chute is under the riser.</p> <p>e. Verify proper stowage of the suspension lines.</p> <p>f. Verify the aiming cable is connected to the riser.</p> <p>g. One hundred percent visual inspection of PPA packing</p> <p><u>Turnaround Inspection</u> (In accordance with PLA 23028)</p> <p>a. The PPA will be unpacked, inspected, and repacked prior to each flight</p> <p>b. Check continuity of the suspension lines</p> <p>c. Check continuity of the pilot chute</p> <p>d. Check for equal tension on all suspension lines</p> <p>e. Verify the chute is under the riser</p>

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SUPERSEDING DATE: 10/24/88

APPROVED BY: J. D. SCHLOSSER

DATE: 8/7/89

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

ASSY NOMENCLATURE: PILOT CHUTE SUSPENSION LINES

SYSTEM: CREW ESCAPE SYSTEM

REVISION:

ASSY P/N: SR1102430007

SUBSYSTEM: PERSONAL PARACHUTE ASSY.

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FMEA		NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF DESIGNATION	CRITY	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT OR END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
REF	REV					
3.2.2		SUSPENSION LINES, (4) SR1102430007	1/1	3.2.2 Mode: Suspension line entanglement Cause: • snag on crewmember or PPA during deployment	Nondeployment if lines do not unsnag	<p>f. Verify proper stowage of the suspension lines.</p> <p>g. Verify the arming cable is connected to the riser.</p> <p>h. One hundred percent visual inspection of PPA packing.</p> <p>4. FAILURE HISTORY None. The pilot chute is in fleet use by the Navy</p> <p>5. OPERATIONAL USE</p> <p>a. Operational Effect of Failure - Possible loss of life</p> <p>b. Crew Action - None.</p> <p>c. Crew Training - Not applicable</p> <p>d. Mission Constraints - None. Mission would be terminated prior to use of this equipment</p> <p>e. In-Flight Checkout - None</p>

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SUPERSEDING DATE: 4/

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DATE: 8/21/89

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