CIL

EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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				Date: 3/27/2002
NAME		FAILURE		
P/N		MODE &		
QTY	CRIT	CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
		330FM04A		
COMMON MULTIPLE	2/2	External	END ITEM:	A. Design -
CONNECTOR, ITEM		leakage,	Water leakage	The DCM half has two cooling water connectors. When coupled, each DCM cooling
330		coupled, cooling water	to ambient.	water coupling has three potential external leakage paths. One path is blocked by a static face type O-seal. A second path is blocked by a sliding radial O-
SV778872-26		(there are two		seal and a static radial O-seal. The third path is blocked by two sliding
(1)		couplings one	GFE INTERFACE:	radial O-seals. The O-seal design configuration and rigidness of assembly
		inlet and one	Depletion of	provide squeeze under all loading conditions of the elastomeric seals. The
		outlet).	EMU water	sliding O-seals slide on Nituff coated surfaces, minimizing the potential for
			reservoir. The airlock fill	seal damage.
		Failure,	valve would be	
		coupling 0-	closed,	B. Test -
		seal bypass	preventing the	Component Acceptance:
		leakage.	leakage of vehicle water.	Air-Lock Inc. ATP 9619-08 requires that with the inlet and outlet cooling water parts pressurized with water at 22.5 + .5 psig external leakage shall not exceed
			venicle water.	.15 cc/hr.
			MISSION:	PDA:
			Terminate EVA.	None.
			Loss of use of one EMU.	Certification:
			one EMO.	Certified for a useful life of 15 years.
			CREW/VEHICLE:	
			None.	C. Inspection -
				The "O" seals and the metallic sealing components are 100% inspected by Air-
			TIME TO EFFECT	Lock, Inc. for dimensional and surface finish requirements.
			/ACTIONS:	
			Minutes.	D. Failure History -
			TIME	None.
			TIME AVAILABLE:	
			N/A	E. Ground Turnaround -
				Tested for non-EET processing per FEMU-R-001, Water Servicing, Leakage and Gas
			TIME REQUIRED:	Removal. FEMU-R-001 Para 8.2 EMU Preflight KSC Checkout for EET processing.
			N/A	F. Operational Use -
			REDUNDANCY	Crew Response -
			SCREENS:	Pre/PostEVA: Troubleshot problem, if no success terminate EVA operations.
			A-N/A	Special Training - Standard EMU training covers this failure mode.
			B-N/A	Operational Considerations - EVA checklist procedures verify hardware integrity
			C-N/A	and systems operational status prior to EVA. Flight rules define go/no go criteria related to EMU thermal control.
				offorth forward to him thermal control.

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-330 COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

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